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Abstract
This thesis asks two broad questions: ﬁrst, what are the neurobiological
and psychological consequences of poverty? Second, do these consequences,
in turn, inﬂuence economic behavior, and could these inﬂuences perpetuate
poverty? The ﬁndings presented here speak to a particular incarnation of
these two questions: ﬁrst, does poverty cause stress? Second, does stress
lead to short-sighted economic decisions, which then exacerbate poverty? I
address these questions in ﬁve studies.
First, in a laboratory experiment in Switzerland, I ﬁnd a strong correla-
tion between socio-economic status and baseline cortisol: a 1% increase in
income is associated with a 3% decrease in baseline cortisol levels, even after
controlling for a variety of other socioeconomic factors. However, a crucial
question is whether this relationship is causal.
In the second study, I address this question using two natural experiments
in Kenya: in a region populated by Maasai tribespeople, I study the eﬀect
of a drought on stress levels. I ﬁnd that the proportion of livestock lost
by each household is not predicted by any observable variables, making the
loss of livestock a random negative income shock. I ﬁnd that a year later,
baseline cortisol is signiﬁcantly higher in families who lost more livestock than
others. Second, in a farming district on the slopes of Mt. Kenya, I use rainfall
variation as an exogenous source of income variation to identify an eﬀect of
income shocks on stress levels. I ﬁnd that periods of no rain lead to signiﬁcant
increases in salivary cortisol, with a lag of 10 days. Thus, exogenous increases
in poverty lead to increases in salivary cortisol, establishing a causal link
between poverty and stress hormones.
Third, I study the causal eﬀect of poverty on other psychological vari-
ables. Using data from 60,000 households in 41 countries, I ﬁnd a strong
relationship between income and locus of control (LOC), i.e. the degree to
which respondents feel that they control their lives vs. that external events
determine their fate. This relationship holds both within and across coun-
tries, and is robust to controlling for a number of socioeconomic covariates.
More importantly, I establish a causal link from income to LOC using the
average distance of a country from icefree coasts as in instrument for GDP.
Thus, poverty not only aﬀects stress, but also locus of control  an important
variable both because of it aﬀects economic productivity, and because it is
closely related to mental health and depression.
Fourth, I conduct a laboratory experiment in which I ask if I ask whether
negative income shocks have consequences for economic choice. Subjects
perform an eﬀort task from which they can earn income. A random subset
of subjects then receives a negative income shock. I then ask whether this
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shock has consequences for economci behavior, and ﬁnd that subjects who
receive the negative income shock show increased levels of present bias. This
eﬀect is not observed in subjects who received a positive income shock, nor
for a control group which has the same level of wealth but did not suﬀer
an income shock. Thus, negative income shocks have a speciﬁc eﬀect on
economic behavior in that they increase present bias.
Finally, I ask whether stress causally aﬀects economic choice, in partic-
ular, time preference. Using the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) to induce
stress in the laboratory, I ﬁnd two dissociations in the eﬀect of stress on
time preference: ﬁrst, I experimentally and econometrically distinguish be-
tween two aspects of discounting: impatience, captured by an exponential
discount function, and present bias, captured by a quasi-hyperbolic discount
function. I ﬁnd that stress aﬀects present bias, but not impatience. Sec-
ond, immediately after stress, stressed subjects are more present-biased than
controls, while 20 minutes later (late group), they are less present-biased
than controls; this result is consistent with a rich literature documenting an
inverted-U relationship between stress and performance. The magnitude of
the behavioral change within the stress group is correlated with the magni-
tude of the stress-induced increase in cortisol, suggesting that the eﬀect may
be driven by corticosteroids.
My results suggest that poverty may cause increased levels of stress, in
particular the stress hormone cortisol; and that increases in stress, in turn,
can lead to short-sighted economic choice. Together, these ﬁndings suggest
that poverty could perpetuate itself through neurobiological and psycho-
logical vicious circles, in which poverty has particular psychological and
neurobiological consequences, which in turn lead to behaviors that reinforce
poverty. These factors could oﬀer new possibilities for poverty alleviation
in the future, and thus bring us a step closer towards solving this lingering
global problem.
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Part I
The Behavioral Economics and
Neurobiology of Poverty
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
The motivation for the research described in this thesis departs from the
simple question: What scientiﬁc problem should I be working on? I.e., which
is the most pressing question facing the world today?
In my view, there is an elephant in the room: one billion people worldwide
still live in abject poverty. Arguably, many other problems  e.g. disease and
violence  are at least partly consequences of this fact. In the research pre-
sented here, I integrate approaches from neurobiology, psychology, and eco-
nomics to understand and address this problem. Throughout, my methods
combine both lab and ﬁeld experiments, in both developed and developing
countries, and I focus on establishing causal links between my variables of
interest.
I ask two broad questions: ﬁrst, what are the neurobiological and psy-
chological consequences of poverty? Second, do these consequences, in turn,
inﬂuence economic behavior, and could these inﬂuences perpetuate poverty?
Together, these relationships could consitute a vicious cycle of poverty, in
which poverty has particular psychological and neurobiological consequences,
which in turn lead to behaviors that reinforce poverty.
The particular incarnation of this hypothesis that I address in this thesis
is as follows: ﬁrst, does poverty cause stress? Second, does stress lead to
short-sighted economic decisions, which then exacerbate poverty?
In the long run, I hope that these questions will expand and crystallize
into a broad area of research within cognitive science, Psychology and Neu-
robiology of Poverty. The promise of this ﬁeld would be to a) generate novel
insights into cognitive and aﬀective processes in an overlooked but important
domain, poverty; b) in doing so, elucidate the heterogeneity of cognition and
behavior across socioeconomic and cultural boundaries and beyond normal
subjects (MIT undergraduates?); and c) inform development policy and thus
alleviate poverty.
2
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1.1 From poverty to cognition: stress and locus
of control
The hypothesis that poverty leads to stress is motivated by a strong corre-
lation between socio-economic status and baseline cortisol: in Switzerland, I
ﬁnd that a 1% increase in income is associated with a 3% decrease in base-
line cortisol levels, even after controlling for a variety of other socioeconomic
factors (Chapter 3). However, a crucial question is whether this relation-
ship is causal. To address this question, I use two natural experiments in
Kenya: in Elangata Wuas, a region populated by Maasai tribespeople, a se-
vere drought in 2008/2009 led to the death of 46% of all livestock, which is
the main income source. The proportion of livestock lost by each household
is not predicted by any observable variables  in particular, rich households
could not protect themselves from the loss of livestock. This makes the loss
of livestock a random negative income shock to households, and thus it can
be used to identify a causal eﬀect of an increase in poverty on cortisol levels.
I ﬁnd that a year later, baseline cortisol is signiﬁcantly higher in families who
lost more livestock than others. In the second study, I use rainfall variation
as an exogenous source of income variation: in Kianyaga, Kenya, a farming
district populated by the Kikuyu, agriculture is the main source of income,
and periods of no rain pose signiﬁcant economic challenges for households.
To ask if the absence of rain raises levels of stress hormones, I combine high-
resolution infrared satellite imagery measuring rainfall with GPS location
data for each household, and salivary samples to assay cortisol. I ﬁnd that
periods of no rain lead to signiﬁcant increases in salivary cortisol, with a lag
of 10 days (Haushofer et al., 2011b; Chapter 4). Thus, exogenous increases
in poverty lead to increases in salivary cortisol, establishing a causal link
between poverty and stress hormones.
In a lab experiment, I ask whether poverty has psychological consequences
in a laboratory setting. I develop a laboratory paradigm for poverty (in
a reduced sense of the word), and test to what extent this experimental
manipulation aﬀects psychological outcome variables, neurobiological mark-
ers of stress, and economic choice (Chapter 6). Subjects perform an eﬀort
task, from which they can earn income. To mimic two important aspects
of poverty, diﬀerent groups of subjects start the experiment with diﬀerent
initial endowments; in addition, after a certain number of periods, subsets of
participants receive exogenous positive or negative income shocks. I then ask
whether these manipulations  i.e., having less money than others, and/or
having less money than previously  leads to increased levels of cortisol and
self-reported stress. I ﬁnd that negative income shocks lead to an increase
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in present bias: subjects are more likely to prefer immediate outcomes and
make time-incosistent intertemporal decisions after having suﬀered a large
exogenous decrease of their wealth. This eﬀect does not occur after positive
income shocks. Crucially, current income is rigorously controlled, as the neg-
ative income shock group is brought to the same level of absolute wealth as
the control group through the income shock; thus, income eﬀect can be con-
clusively ruled out in generating the behavioral eﬀect  it must result from
endogenous preference formation.
Finally, I also study the causal eﬀect of poverty on other psychological
variables. Using a unique dataset of 60,000 households from 41 countries
provided by the World Values Survey, I analyze the relationship between
income and locus of control (LOC), i.e. the degree to which respondents
feel that they control their lives vs. that external events determine their
fate (Chapter 5). I ﬁnd a strong correlation between income and LOC both
within countries and across countries; this relationship is robust to controlling
for a number of socioeconomic covariates. More importantly, I establish a
causal link from income to LOC using instrumental variables: using the
average distance of a country from icefree coasts as a natural experiment
that inﬂuences countries' income, I show that income causally aﬀects LOC
when it is instrumented using distance from the coast. This result shows
that poverty not only aﬀects, but also causes diﬀerences in locus of control 
an important variable both because of it aﬀects economic productivity, and
because it is closely related to mental health and depression.
In ongoing work, I ask if poverty decreases have the converse eﬀect, i.e.
led to a decrease in cortisol levels. I employ the methodology of randomzed
controlled trials, pioneered in developing countries by the Jameel Poverty
Actin Lab at MIT. In one experiment in Nairobi, a randomly selected sample
of 300 informal metal workers receives free health insurnance for one year; a
control group of 300 receives the monetary equivalent of the insurance as a
cash gift, and a further control group of 300 recieves no intervention. Again I
measure cortisol as an outcome variable; in this setting, however, I also obtain
blood samples, which allows measuring cytokines such as the stress-related
interleukin-6 in blood serum. In the second experiment, in Rarieda, Kenya, a
rural district with high levels of poverty, I employ an even more direct poverty
decrease: here 500 randomly chosen participants receive an unconditional
cash transfer of $300 (250 to women, 250 to men), while a control group of
500 receives no transfer. Again I measure cortisol levels to assess the eﬀect
of this intervention on stress hormones. Together, these studies will show
whether a causal link exists from poverty decreases to stress hormones. In
a third ongoing RCT, I study the eﬀect of community monitoring on the
performance of clinics and the stress levels of health workers in Sierra Leone.
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Results from these projects are expected in 2013.
1.2 From cognition to economic choice: stress
and temporal discounting
The causal relationship between poverty and stress that I have begun to
identify is important in its own right, as stress is a signiﬁcant factor in the
etiology of depression (Holsboer, 2000), and, through its impact on the im-
mune system, a contributor to disease progression, in particular atheroscle-
rosis (Glaser & Kiecolt-Glaser, 2005). However, it is diﬃcult to resist asking
the natural next question: does stress also aﬀect decision-making, in ways
that may exacerbate poverty?
The economic behavior I am particularly interested in is temporal dis-
counting. Deﬁned as the subjective devaluation of outcomes through delay,
it is a pervasive feature of human behavior, and helping people overcome
their bias towards the present has been shown to produce large welfare gains
in developing countries (e.g. Ashraf et al., 2006). Indeed, the original obser-
vation that led me to pursue the relationship between stress and discounting
was that, in both Switzerland and Kenya, poorer people not only had higher
levels of cortisol, but also showed much steeper discounting than others.
Could stress causally aﬀect temporal discounting?
I address this question in a lab experiment in which we manipulate stress
levels using the well-known Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Chapter 7). In
this task, a video-recorded mock job interview and mental arithmetic in front
of a panel of judges reliably induces stress (i.e., raises cortisol and noad-
renaline levels), compared to a control condition without video recording
and judges. After inducing stress, we elicit discount rates using standard
methods from behavioral economics. In doing so, we experimentally and
econometrically distinguish between two aspects of discounting: pure time
preference or impatience, captured by an exponential discount function; and
present bias, captured by a quasi-hyperbolic discount function. Present bias
is the more interesting of the two parameters, since it is normatively irra-
tional: it implies time inconsistency, i.e. present-biased subjects will not
follow through on (savings) plans they make today.
We ﬁnd that stress strongly aﬀects discounting, with two interesting
twists: ﬁrst, stress aﬀects present bias, but not impatience; second, immedi-
ately after stress (early group), stressed subjects are more present-biased
than controls, while 20 minutes later (late group), they are less present-
biased than controls. Both of these eﬀects are independently signiﬁcant. In
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addition, we ﬁnd evidence suggesting that cortisol may drive these results:
within the stress group, the magnitude of the stress-induced cortisol increase
correlates across subjects with the size of the stress eﬀect on present bias.
Crucially, this correlation goes in opposite directions for the early and late
groups, and is independently signiﬁcant in each group.
This result is consistent with a rich literature documenting an inverted-U
relationship between stress and performance, the well-known Yerkes-Dodson
law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908): in line with this hypothesis, we found that
moderately increased levels of cortisol, captured in the late group, lead to a
decrease in irrational present-biased responding, while very high levels, cap-
tured in the early group, have the opposite eﬀect. However, an alternative
account is that time, not levels, is the relevant factor: cortisol has both im-
mediate and delayed eﬀects on the brain, and it could be that the immediate
eﬀects lead to more present bias, while the delayed eﬀects, which come to
the fore when testing 20 minutes after stress, lead to less present bias. To
distinguish the time and levels accounts, it is necessary to manipulate cortisol
levels directly. This approach also deals with a further caveat concerning the
study, namely that the correlation between present bias and cortisol we ob-
served in our study is not conclusive proof that cortisol is causally responsible
for the behavioral eﬀects; only administration can achieve this.
I am therefore currently preparing a follow-on study in which I will admin-
ister hydrocortisone to healthy male participants, and then tests its eﬀects on
discounting behavior. Hydrocortisone is the biologically identical synthetic
version of cortisol and is prescribed against rheumatoid and inﬂammatory
diseases, allergies, and skin conditions. Crucially, to distinguish between the
two hypotheses described above, hydrocortisone will be administered in two
diﬀerent doses: subjects will either receive 20 mg or 40 mg doses. In addition,
testing will take place at two diﬀerent times after hydrocortisone administra-
tion: 30 minutes, or 1 hour. Together, the combination of these conditions
tests both the levels hypothesis and the time hypothesis: if cortisol levels are
the crucial factor in aﬀecting discounting, the two diﬀerent doses of cortisol
should aﬀect discounting diﬀerentially, without an eﬀect of time; conversely,
if time is the crucial factor, the diﬀerent test times after hydrocortisone ad-
ministration should aﬀect discounting diﬀerentially, while the diﬀerent doses
should have no eﬀect.
As described above, the laboratory paradigm for poverty oﬀers a further
opportunity to study the relationship between poverty, stress, and discount-
ing. In this experiment, a group of subjects receives a negative income shock,
which reduces their income to the level of the always poor group; at this
point, I elicit their discount function. These two groups have the same level
of income at this stage, but they diﬀer in whether or not they received a
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negative income shock just before. I ﬁnd that those subjects who received
the negative income shock have signiﬁcantly higher present bias than the
always poor group, suggesting that an increase in poverty even in this
restricted sense leads to an increase in present bias. Thus, this ﬁnding shows
a direct link from poverty to temporal discounting.
In a wider context, I have also been interested in another salient feature
of poverty that is closely linked to stress: violence. In a recent paper I stud-
ied the temporal dynamics of retaliation in the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict
(Chapter 9). We found that, contrary to previous claims, retaliation in the
conﬂict occurs in both directions, i.e. Palestinians retaliate against previous
Israeli aggression, and Israelis retaliate against prior Palestinian aggression.
This paper triggered a collaboration with Israeli scientists, with whom I am
currently preparing an experiment in Israel which aims to test whether be-
havior towards the ingroup vs. the outgroup among Israelis and Palestinians
could be driven by conﬂict-induced stress. Israeli and Palestinian subjects
will be primed with emotionally engaging information about the conﬂict,
or with neutral primes; following these primes, we will assess a) whether
they increase perceived stress and cortisol levels, and b) whether they aﬀect
behavior towards the ingroup vs. the outgroup. Speciﬁcally, using a sophis-
ticated version of the Prisoner's Dilemma from game theory, we will be able
to distinguish the eﬀect of the prime on four motives of behavior, namely
in-group trust, in-group love, out-group hate, and out-group aggression (cf.
de Dreu et al., 2010, for details).
1.3 Future goals
The studies described above are the beginning of what I hope will be an
in-depth research program on the psychology and neurobiology of poverty.
Since this area of research is so young, there is no shortage of important
follow-on questions and projects; a selection follows below:
1. My research to date has focused on stress and locus of control as psy-
chological variables that are aﬀected by poverty and that may in turn inﬂu-
ence economic behavior. However, other important variables remain largely
untested, e.g. optimism, self-esteem, and altruism/pro-social preferences.
My future work will address whether these variables are causally aﬀected by
poverty, and whether they, in turn, have implications for economic behavior.
2. Similarly, in the neurobiological domain I have so far focused on corti-
sol, cytokines, and alpha-amylase (a marker of noradrenergic activity). How-
ever, other hormones and neurotransmitters have shown intriguing associa-
tions with poverty, e.g. serotonin and tesotserone (see Haushofer, 2011c, and
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Eisenegger, Haushofer, Fehr, 2011, for a review). In the case of serotonin, the
association seems to be additionally modulated by genetic polymorphisms.
My future work will therefore study the causal relationship between poverty
and serotonin and tesosterone, and their eﬀects on economic behavior.
3. My current laboratory studies have all been run in developed coun-
tries (Switzerland, USA). With my current R01 grant, I plan to establish a
behavioral testing lab in Nairobi, Kenya, that will allow to repeat the same
experiments in a developing country, with subjects who have actually expe-
rienced poverty. In addition, the plan is that this lab will be accessible to
cognitive scientists and behavioral economists who want to expand the pop-
ulations they study to include subjects who have experienced severe poverty.
4. My research shifts into focus what looks like a serious mental health
problem in developing countries: I ﬁnd very high cortisol levels and stag-
gering rates of depressive symptoms in my study populations. However,
interventions to address this problem are few and far between; while sim-
ple psychotherapy interventions for developing contexts exist and show some
initial promise, this research is in its infancy, and no study has rigorously
tested the eﬀects of such interventions on overall welfare and neuroendocrine
markers of stress. I am currently working with Prof. David Ndetei MD, head
of the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Nairobi and Director
of the Africa Mental Health Foundation, to set up a randomized controlled
trial that evaluates a psychotherapeutic intervention among populations in
Kenya and Sierra Leone that show high rates of depressive symptoms.
1.4 Signiﬁcance
The goal of my research agenda is to test whether poverty could perpetuate
itself through neurobiological and psychological vicious circles, in which
poverty has particular psychological and neurobiological consequences, which
in turn lead to behaviors that reinforce poverty. If that is the case, these
factors could oﬀer new possibilities for poverty alleviation in the future, and
thus bring us a step closer towards solving this lingering global problem.
Apart from this humanitarian purpose, I foresee scientiﬁc insights of relevance
to several disciplines:
First, within cognitive and neuroscience, I hope that my research pro-
gram will both provide novel insights into cognitive and aﬀective processes
in poverty, and in addition place a renewed focus on the study of cognitive
and aﬀective heterogeneity across cultures and socioeconomic strata. In de-
velopment economics, my ﬁndings suggest a novel source of poverty traps,
namely psychological and neurobiological channels, which can inform theo-
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ries of ineﬃciencies and market failures in developing countries. In public
policy, my ﬁndings suggest novel targets for poverty alleviation programs,
namely the cognitive processes that are aﬀected by poverty and which in
turn aﬀect decision-making. In addition, my research is relevant to public
health researchers since it shifts into focus what looks like a serious mental
health problem in developing countries, and suggests ways of addressing it.
Thus, my broader goal is to get psychologists and neuroscientists more
interested in using their tools to address the problem of global poverty, and
to get development economists and policymakers more interested in a deep
understanding of behavioral and neurobiological features of poverty. My
initial ﬁndings suggest that this approach holds promise, and with some
luck, it may make a small contribution towards shrinking the elephant in the
room.
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Chapter 2
Neurobiological Poverty Traps
2.1 Summary
Poverty remains one of the most pressing problems facing the world. The
advent of large-scale randomzied ﬁeld experiments in development economics
has opened the ﬂoor for rigorous scientiﬁc testing of poverty alleviation pro-
grams; however, the channels through which poverty perpetuates itself re-
main incompletely understood. In this paper, I review evidence suggesting
that poverty has particular neurobiological consequences, and that these con-
sequences in turn lead to suboptimal economic behaviors which exacerbate
and perpetuate poverty. Speciﬁcally, I argue that poverty raises levels of the
stress hormone cortisol, causes dysregulation and altered gene-environment
interactions in serotonergic neurotransmission, and leads to increased levels
of testosterone. These neurobiological eﬀects impair executive function and
exacerbate behavioral biases in economic choice, and thus contribute to the
perpetuation of poverty.
2.2 Introduction
About half of the world's population live on less than 2$ a day (UN, 2007;
World Bank, 2001). This lack of ﬁnancial means has far-reaching conse-
quences: 30,000 children die every day from poverty-related causes (UNICEF,
2000); in Sub-Saharan Africa, 30% of children are malnourished, and every
second child never goes to school (UN, 2007); 37% of the population are
illiterate, and the average African dies 28 years earlier than the average Eu-
ropean (UNDP, 2009). Economic poverty means lack of sanitation, shelter,
food, education, and healthcare; it means living in squalor, dying early, and
leaving children who face similar prospects.
12
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It's not that nobody cares. Since the 1950s, developed countries have
given 2.3 trillion dollars in aid to developing countries (Easterly, 2006). How-
ever, despite this massive ﬂow of funds, the problem persists, and some even
argue that aid has contributed nothing at all to its resolution (Easterly, 2006;
Moyo, 2009). Where does this leave us? Recent years have witnessed a po-
larization of the debate: on one side, aid enthusiasts such as Jeﬀrey Sachs
propose addressing all problems  nutrition, education, health, etc.  in a
single, concerted eﬀort (Sachs, 2005); on the other, skeptics such as William
Easterly and Dambisa Moyo argue for leaving the problem to free markets
(Easterly, 2006; Moyo, 2009).
2.2.1 An experimental approach to development eco-
nomics
However, over the last decade a third position has emerged: the modest,
data-driven approach of randomized controlled trials (RCTs). The basic
claim of this approach is that the best way to spend aid is to ﬁrst ﬁnd out
in a rigorous, scientiﬁc manner which development interventions actually
produce positive results. In practice, this takes the form of large-scale ﬁeld
experiments that resemble clinical trials: a randomly chosen treatment group
receives an intervention such as free schoolbooks or de-worming pills, and
a control group, also randomly chosen, receives no intervention (Duﬂo &
Kremer, 2003). Due to the random selection of the treatment and control
groups, any diﬀerence in outcomes between these groups can then be directly
attributed to the intervention (Imbens, 2009).
For this reason RCTs have gained respect as a powerful approach to obtain
true casual evidence on development interventions. Their rise to prominence
was cemented by a series of signiﬁcant initial successes: for instance, an early
study (Miguel & Kremer, 2004) showed that the most cost-eﬃcient way of
ensuring school attendance among children in rural Kenya  orders of mag-
nitude cheaper than more obvious candidates such as free school uniforms or
meals  is treatment with de-worming pills (see also Banerjee, 2007). An-
other recent study found that dramatic decreases in teenage pregnancies (and
by proxy, infection with sexually transmitted diseases) can be achieved by
simply telling girls about the risks associated with unprotected sex (Dupas,
2005).
Despite these successes, the approach has its limitations: ﬁrst, certain
interventions, such as changes in macroeconomic policy or large-scale in-
frastructural projects, are diﬃcult to randomize: e.g., one cannot randomly
assign certain interest rates to the central banks of several countries. Sec-
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ond, the results of ﬁeld experiments might be context-speciﬁc: de-worming
children might increase school attendance in Kenya, but not necessarily in
other places. Finally, the most prominent criticism of RCTs is that the
channels or mechanisms through which the interventions work may not be
clear (Deaton, 2009): to name a stylized example, if de-worming increases
school attendance, is this the case because the children are healthier and
therefore able to attend; or because the parents don't have to spend money
on de-worming pills themselves any longer and are therefore better able to
pay the school fees? Note that the policy implications of the two alternative
explanations are quite diﬀerent: the ﬁrst would argue for an expansion of
the de-worming program, while the second would alternatively justify simple
subsidies for school fees. It so happens that this particular example has been
resolved in favor of the ﬁrst explanation (Miguel & Kremer, 2004), but the
point remains that the existing literature has paid somewhat more attention
to project impacts themselves than to the nature of the changes that underlie
them.
The ﬁrst of these criticisms  not everything can be randomized  is best
answered by humble acknowledgment of this limitation on the one hand, but
on the other hand also by reference to the considerable successes of RCTs in
areas where they are feasible (Imbens, 2009). The second point  unknown
generalizability of the results of RCTs  are relatively straightforward to ad-
dress in the same fashion done by older experimental sciences like biology and
psychology, namely through replication in diﬀerent settings. Note, however,
that even replication will always leave residual doubts  how many replica-
tions in how many countries are suﬃcient before we recommend world-wide
de-worming of children? In contrast, these lingering doubts could be much
reduced by answering the third criticism stated above, namely insuﬃcient
understanding of the mechanisms driving the eﬀects of RCTs: if we were
able to identify fundamental properties of economic systems that catalyze
the eﬀects of RCTs, this would not only be an important insight in its own
right, but would also turn the question about the generalizability of RCTs
into one about the universality of these fundamental properties, which might
be much more readily answered.
2.2.2 The question, and a caveat
The main purpose of this paper, therefore, is to work towards identifying
mechanisms through which poverty might perpetuate itself, and through
which poverty alleviation programs might take their eﬀects. In particular, for
reasons explained in detail below, I focus on neurobiological and behavioral
channels: these have not only proven to be extremely powerful drivers of the
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eﬀects of RCTs; they are also, so far, at an extremely early stage of research,
both in terms of their relation to poverty and in terms of the sophistication
of the variables that have been tested, and thus hold signiﬁcant promise for
future research.
By necessity, some of the neuroscientiﬁc evidence I will draw on was ob-
tained in experimental animals, such as rats and monkeys. Relating these
results to the behavior of poor people is an open invitation to misunder-
standing. I should therefore stress at the outset that when I draw parallels
between humans and animals, they apply universally and are not limited to
poor people. None of the arguments in this paper should be misconstrued as
assertions that poor people are in some fashion more like other animals than
richer people. Relatedly, this paper takes no stance on the nature-nurture
debate of individual diﬀerences in characteristics and skills. In particular,
none of the arguments that follow rely on a hereditary view of psychologi-
cal and neurobiological individual characteristics; the point of this paper is
not to argue that poor people are born with certain deﬁcits that amplify
poverty. Rather, it is to show how universal neurobiological and psychologi-
cal processes can be triggered or ampliﬁed by an environment of poverty into
which one happens to have been born. While this does not rule out hereditary
mechanisms, it limits their scope. Thus, if the reader takes anything away,
it should be that we might all be poor if it weren't for certain environmental
and neurobiological coincidences.
2.2.3 Economic consequences of behavioral changes
A unifying feature of many of the most successful randomized trials in de-
velopment economics is that they work to a large extent through behavioral
channels. For instance, in an experiment in South Africa, Bertrand et al.
(2005) tested the impact of a variety of psychological factors on the likeli-
hood of bank customers to take-up a loan oﬀer. They found that even subtle
psychological manipulations had large eﬀects on take-up; for instance, if the
letter oﬀering the loan contained a picture of an attractive young woman,
male bank clients were willing to pay up to 4% more interest on the loan.
(Obviously making people buy loans isn't necessarily a desirable develop-
ment outcome, but it illustrates the power of such interventions.) A study
in Kenya showed that households were 50 percentage points more likely to
chlorinate water if the chlorination device was placed in plain sight at the
source rather than kept at home (Kremer et al., 2009). As mentioned above,
Dupas et al. (2005) found that teenage pregnancies among women in West-
ern Kenya can be decreased drastically by a simple behavioral intervention:
realizing that many women already become infected as school girls through
2.2. INTRODUCTION 16
intercourse with so-called Sugar Daddies, who in return provide ﬁnancial
assistance, this study simply presented schoolgirls with a short video and
lesson about the risk of unprotected sex with partners of diﬀerent ages, and
found that this intervention resulted in a reduction in teenage pregnancies
by 65% (Dupas, 2005).
Apart from these common-sense behavioral interventions, a small group
of RCTs has begun to use theory and evidence from behavioral economics
and psychology to develop and improve development interventions. In par-
ticular, one prominent group of RCTs takes advantage of a particularly well-
understood feature of human decision-making to improve economic outcomes:
it is a well-established fact in behavioral economics and psychology that peo-
ple are hyperbolic temporal discounters. This term refers to the ﬁnding that,
as outcomes are delayed into the future, their subjective value decreases hy-
perbolically (i.e. proportional to delay). This function implies that decision-
makers are time inconsistent: they will procrastinate and neglect to execute
the savings plans they make today; they overspend and undersave relative
to their own long-run preferences, give in to temptation at the expense of
achieving their long-term goals (Laibson, 1997; Mazur, 1987; Mischel et al.,
1989).
This universal feature of human decision-making suggests ways in which
desirable economic outcomes can be achieved. For instance, Thaler & Be-
nartzi (2007) took advantage of the hyperbolic shape of the discount function
to increase retirement savings: they oﬀered participants to commit future
salary increases to their savings plan. In doing so, they subjected the sub-
jective cost of not immediately consuming the salary increase to temporal
discounting, thus making it less dramatically felt by respondents. As a re-
sult, retirement savings increased substantially (Thaler & Benartzi, 2007).
In the development economics literature, a small number of RCTs have
utilized this feature of human decision-making as a vehicle to improve welfare.
Duﬂo et al. (2009) took advantage to hyperbolic discounting to address the
problem of insuﬃcient fertilizer use in developing countries: many farmers
want to use fertilizer, but they postpone buying it until the beginning of
the season, when ﬁnancial liquidity is low. Duﬂo et al. counteracted this
tendency to procrastinate by oﬀering a small discount on fertilizer purchases
to farmers at the time of harvest, i.e. coinciding with greatest ﬁnancial
liquidity. This small intervention signiﬁcantly increased fertilizer use and
thus raised income and welfare.
Similarly, Ashraf et al. (2006) used the evidence on hyperbolic dis-
counting to develop a way to help consumers in developing countries to
increase their savings rates. Economic theory predicts that sophisticated
time-inconsistent individuals should value commitment devices, i.e. mecha-
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nisms that bind them to a particular savings plan once they have made it
(Laibson, 1997). Ashraf et al. (2006) oﬀered bank customers the Philippines
a simple commitment savings device  essentially, simply a voluntary lock on
the account, similar to a piggy bank, with no other beneﬁts. The authors
found not only that the commitment device was very popular among bank
clients, but it also led to 84% increases in household savings rates. This
result suggests, ﬁrst, that many individuals save less than they themselves
would like, and that therefore there is scope for behavioral "nudges" which
bring behavior closer to the level desired by the individual "long-run self";
and second, that these nudges can be very eﬀective.
Together, these examples illustrate three points. First, development inter-
ventions at the level of individual persons or households can have signiﬁcant
positive economic consequences. Second, interventions that operate through
behavioral changes are among the most cost-eﬀective and successful of these
interventions. It is important to stress here that none of these interventions
trick or mislead participants in any way; they simply take advantage of psy-
chological regularities that we all share, and oﬀer people an opportunity to
bring their own behavior closer to what they themselves desire. Third, note
that many of the behavioral interventions mentioned above  even though
they are shining examples of the power of behavioral changes in alleviating
poverty  are based on everyday, folk psychology: it doesn't take a cognitive
scientist to come up with the hypothesis that pictures of pretty women might
inspire customers to purchase a product. On the other hand, the few RCTs
that did take advantage of the rich body of knowledge in behavioral eco-
nomics and psychology, such as those employing the evidence on hyperbolic
discounting mentioned above, opened up powerful and previously unexplored
mechanisms for improving welfare in developing countries.
2.2.4 Behavioral characteristics of poverty
Thus, small behavioral changes can have substantial economic consequences
at the household level, leading to better use of limited resources, increased
savings, and improved health. Two further questions arise from these in-
sights. First, what could be achieved through interventions that take even
fuller advantage of the rich toolkit and existing knowledge of neurobiology,
experimental psychology, and behavioral economics? Second, what could the
starting point for developing such interventions be? In my view, the most
obvious candidates for behaviors and psychological variables which might
aﬀect poverty are those which themselves are speciﬁc to, and potentially re-
sults of, poor contexts. Thus, the most convincing answer to this question
is a further question: What are the behavioral characteristics of poverty?
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In the following, I brieﬂy summarize the behavioral consequences of poverty
in two domains: psychological outcomes and economic choice; in addition, I
brieﬂy consider the eﬀect of these domains on one another.
2.2.4.1 Psychological characteristics of poverty
Several lines of research suggest that speciﬁc behaviors and psychological
states may be particularly pronounced in settings of poverty (Bertrand et
al., 2005).
First, a well-known literature has investigated the relationship between
self-reported happiness and income both within and across countries. Ini-
tially it was found that happiness correlated with income within countries,
but not across countries (Easterlin, 1974); thus, surprisingly, the poorest per-
son in a developed country such as the United States was on average just
as satisﬁed with her life as the poorest person in a developing country like
Kenya, even though the diﬀerences in absolute income between the two were
enormous. However, this ﬁnding was recently overturned: using newer and
better data, Hagerty & Veenhoven (2003) and Stevenson & Wolfers (2008)
showed that there was a strong correlation between self-reported happiness
and income not only within countries, but also across countries: people in
richer countries were, on average, happier than those in poor countries.
On the other end of the happiness spectrum, a related literature has in-
vestigated the prevalence of clinical depression in developed countries. The
most striking ﬁnding of these studies is that the prevalence of depression
in developing countries is much higher than in developed countries: while
the point prevalence ﬁgures are around 5-10% in Europe and North Amer-
ica, developing countries report numbers such as 19% (Lebanon, Mexico),
20% (Thailand), 24% (Uganda), 39% (Dominican Republic) and 40% (Cuba;
Bolton et al., 2004; Garcia-Alvarez, 1986; Thavichachart et al., 2001; Sobocki
et al., 2006; Patel et al., 2003). Within countries, low-income population
groups show prevalence rates that are 1.5 to 2 times higher than those of
high-income groups (WHO, 2001). Depression is projected to be the leading
cause of disease burden worldwide by 2030 (WHO, 2001), and is already the
leading cause of loss of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) in Sub-Saharan
Africa, ahead of malnutrition and cancer (World Bank, 1993).
A central element in the etiology of clinical depression is stress, and the
associated stress hormone cortisol: 80% of all patients with depression have
histories of chronic stress or stressful life events (Hammen, 2005), and de-
pression is marked by dysregulation of the stress hormone cortisol (Holsboer,
2000). Another major biological player in depression is serotonin; depressed
patients show serotonergic dysregulation, and selective serotonin reuptake
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inhibitors (SSRIs) are among the most eﬀective drugs for the treatment of
depression (Schildkraut, 1965; Fournier et al., 2010). Putting these facts
together with the evidence on high prevalence of depression in developing
countries suggests that poor people might exhibit higher levels of cortisol
and dysregulated serotonergic functioning; this relationship is a main focus
of the remainder of this paper.
Evidence on the relationship between other psychological variables and
poverty is scarce. The most robust association with poverty, apart from
stress and depression, is that of self-esteem: individuals with high SES con-
sistently show higher self-esteem that those with lower SES (for a review, see
Twenge & Campbell, 2002). In cognitive neuroscience, Martha Farah and
her colleagues have provided evidence showing a correlation between poverty
and components of cognitive functioning; they ﬁnd that children from mid-
dle socioeconomic status (SES) families substantially outperform those from
poorer families on tests of working memory, language ability, and executive
function (Noble et al., 2005, 2007). Evans & Schamberg (2009) conﬁrmed
that childhood poverty was associated with impaired working memory per-
formance in young adults, and additionally indicated that this relationship
might be mediated by chronic stress. A smaller number of papers suggests
a correlation between poverty and external locus of control, i.e. the percep-
tion that one's life outcomes are determined mostly by external events rather
than one's own behavior (Maqsud & Rouhani, 1991; Sherman & Hofmann,
1978). Finally, a correlation between poverty and optimism has been sug-
gested: poor people tend to view their future more negatively than richer
individuals (Scheier & Carver, 1985; Robb et al., 2009; Lynch et al., 1997;
Taylor & Seeman, 1999).
However, conclusive evidence on the nature of the relationship between
poverty and these variables is lacking: almost all studies were conducted in
developed countries, and most damagingly, demonstrations of causality are
missing. However, in an ingenious ﬁeld experiment, Spears (2010) has begun
to address these problems and attempted to establish a causal relationship
between poverty and psychological outcomes in a developing country. He
randomly assigned poor participants in India to one of four conditions: they
could either be rich or poor, in the sense that they received either two (rich)
or one (poor) good from a choice set of three options. In addition, each par-
ticipant could either be in a "choice" or a "no choice" condition, where the
former meant that participants could choose which item(s) from the choice
set they wanted to receive, whereas in the latter case the items were ran-
domly assigned. Spears then asked participants to perform two tasks that
are frequently used to measure cognitive control: squeezing two handlebars
for as long as possible, and performing a Stroop-like task. In this task, partic-
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ipants have to name the number of items in a display, which, confusingly, are
numbers themselves; thus, a display might be "3 3", in which case the cor-
rect answer would be "two" since there are two items in the display. Spears
found that participants performed worse on the two cognitive-control tasks
if they had been randomly assigned to both the poor and the choice condi-
tions. Thus, requiring people to make a choice appeared to deplete cognitive
control, but this was only true for poor participants.
2.2.4.2 Economic-choice characteristics of poverty
In addition, an emerging economics literature suggests that poverty may
be associated with particular patterns of economic choice, in particular with
regard to time preference and risk aversion: poor individuals tend to be more
impatient and more risk-averse than richer individuals.
In an early paper, Lawrence (1991) estimated Euler equations from US
panel data and found a negative correlation between time preferences and
income. She concluded that savings behavior may be aﬀected by diﬀerences
in discounting and hence may contribute to the observed heterogeneity across
socioeconomic groups.
In a more recent paper, Tanaka et al. (2010) report a ﬁeld experiment
in Vietnam which studies the relation between time preferences, risk pref-
erences, and wealth. Subjects were presented a number of payment options
and were asked to choose between a smaller amount they could receive the
same day, or a larger amount to be paid in the near future; alternatively, they
chose between a small, low-risk amount vs. a larger, riskier amount. The
authors found that poorer people discount future payoﬀs at a higher rate
and are hence less patient; in addition, they are more risk-averse than richer
individuals. This pattern should also aﬀect savings behavior and wealth ac-
cumulation over time, suggesting that initial poverty could be obstructive
to further economic development. Note that it remains somewhat unclear
in these studies whether present-biased time preferences and risk aversion
might be explained by liquidity constraints. More importantly, the impor-
tant question whether the relationship between poverty and economic choice
is causal remains unanswered by these studies.
2.2.4.3 Economic-choice consequences of psychological variables
Finally, a small literature suggests that changes in psychological variables
may have economic consequences. On a general level, the macroeconomic
eﬀects of depressive disorders are well-known; they include unemployment,
absences, and at-work performance deﬁcits (for reviews, see Lerner & Henke,
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2008; Crisp, 2007). In fact, impairment in occupational functioning is among
the diagnosis criteria for depressive episodes (American Psychiatric Associ-
ation, 1994), and it is estimated that the economic cost of depression in
Europe amounts to around 1% of Europe's GDP (Sobocki, 2006). In ad-
dition, a small number of studies in experimental economics suggests that
experimentally induced happiness and related emotions lead to improved eco-
nomic performance, such as higher eﬀort (Oswald et al., 2009), productivity
(Argyle, 1989, 2001), and creativity (Amabile et al., 2005).
Thus, poverty appears to be associated with particular psychological and
behavioral outcomes. In the following, I outline three neurobiological mech-
anisms which might underlie these eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, in Sections 2, 4, and
6, I show that poverty raises levels of the stress hormone cortisol, causes dys-
regulation and altered gene-environment interactions in serotonergic neuro-
transmission, and raises levels of the sex hormone testosterone. These neuro-
biological eﬀects in turn have behavioral consequences; speciﬁcally, they im-
pair executive function and exacerbate behavioral biases in economic choice.
These consequences are discussed in Sections 3, 5, and 7. Section 8 addresses
some emerging questions, and Section 9 concludes the paper.
2.3 Cortisol and Poverty
2.3.1 Cortisol Basics
Cortisol is the body's major stress hormone. It is synthesized by the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis: in response to external stressors, the hypotha-
lamus in the midbrain secretes corticotrophin-releasing hormone (CRH), which
in turn controls the release of adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH) from the
pituitary gland; ACTH then causes the release of cortisol from the adrenal
gland. Two factors give cortisol its prominent role in stress: ﬁrst, it is released
in response to both psychological and physiological strain on the organism. In
the physical domain, it increases following bodily injuries, physical exertion,
illness, and extreme temperatures. In the psychological domain, cortisol in-
creases in response to social stressors such as having to give a speech in front
of a panel of judges, performing mental arithmetic, or enduring physically
unpleasant situations like immersion of one's hand in cold water (Kirschbaum
et al., 1993; Ferracuti et al., 1994).
Second, cortisol in turn has exactly those eﬀects on the body that one
would expect from a stress hormone; in particular, it increases blood sugar
to levels that prepare the organism to deal with stress. Moreoever, corti-
sol exerts a direct and broadly suppressive eﬀect on the immune system;
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in particular, it suppresses pro-inﬂammatory cytokines such as interleukin
6 and interleukin 1 (Straub, 2004; Wilckens, 1995). However, chronic ele-
vations of cortisol appear to have the opposite eﬀect, leading to permanent
mild elevations of cytokine levels (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2003). These cy-
tokine elevations then contribute directly to disease onset and progression,
e.g. in atherosclerosis and cancer (Steptoe et al., 2001, 2002; Aggarwal et al.,
2006; Coussens et al., 2002; Ross, 1999). Thus, while transient cortisol eleva-
tions are adaptive and protective, permanently high cortisol is physiologically
damaging, quite apart from the psychological eﬀects.
2.3.2 Cortisol and Poverty
Does cortisol relate to socio-economic status or poverty? An increasing num-
ber of studies suggest that this is indeed the case.
2.3.2.1 Studies in children
A sizeable literature investigates the eﬀect of family socioeconomic back-
ground on the cortisol levels and cognitive outcomes of children. In these
studies, socioeconomic status is usally deﬁned as a compound measure of
parental education and income.
Evans & English (2002) collected overnight urine samples from a sample
of 287 rural white children who were either from low-income or middle-income
families. The urine samples were assayed for cortisol, epinephrine, and nore-
pinephrine, all markers of stress. Evans & English found that children
from poor families had signiﬁcantly higher levels of overnight cortisol and
epinephrine than those from richer families, while levels of norepinephrine
were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across these groups.
In a later study also by Gary Evans, 207 children from the same sam-
ple, now aged 13, were again tested for overnight cortisol, and this measure
was related to the duration during which each participant had experienced
poverty during childhood (Evans & Kim, 2009). There was a robust positive
association between the two, with children having spent more time in poverty
exhibiting higher cortisol levels than others. In contrast, cortisol levels did
not correlate with concurrent poverty levels.
Using a longitudinal approach, Chen and colleagues (2010) studied 50
children from families of varying socioeconomic background. Notably, they
collected saliva samples over a period of 2 years, with 4 daily samples, re-
peated on two consecutive days on each occasion. Measurements were taken
in 6-month intervals. The authors used area under the curve (AUC) of the
diurnal proﬁle as the cortisol measure of interest, and focused on family sav-
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ings as an indicator of socioeconomic status. They found that while there
was no initial relationship between savings and cortisol, the change in cortisol
AUC over the course of two years was predicted by SES, with children from
low-SES families showing a steeper increase in cortisol AUC than children
from families with higher SES.
Lupien et al. (2000) measured cortisol level in a sample of 217 children
aged 6-10, and related them to the socioeconomic status of the children's fam-
ilies. High-SES children had signiﬁcantly lower cortisol levels than medium-
and low-SES children across all age groups. The diﬀerence between medium-
SES and low-SES children was signiﬁcant only for the 10-year old group. The
authors suggest that maternal depression may be a mediator of this ﬁnding,
as the mothers' score on the depressive subscale of the Derogatis stress proﬁle
was correlated with the child's cortisol level.
How long does the inﬂuence of parental SES on children's stress levels
last? In a follow-up study to the one discussed above, Lupien et al. (2001)
again measured cortisol levels in 302 school-age children, this time in the age
range from 6-16. They replicated their previous ﬁnding of higher cortisol
levels in low-SES children in the age range from 6-10, but found that no
such relationship obtained for older children, i.e. after the transition to
high-school the relationship between SES and cortisol disappeared. One
possible explanation of this ﬁnding is that the inﬂuence of parents and their
socioeconomic background on children's stress levels attenuates as children
get older and high school peers assume a more central role.
An important source of concern regarding SES-cortisol correlations is the
direction of causality: while it is plausible that low SES causes stress and
raises cortisol levels, it may also be the case that high cortisol levels lead to
bad health, which in turn brings down income, leading to a pathway from
cortisol to SES rather than vice-versa. One advantage of studies in children
is that reverse causality is a more diﬃcult proposition, i.e. it is harder to
argue that children have low SES because of their cortisol levels. One study
capitalized on this argument by studying extremely young children: Saridjan
et al. (2009) measured salivary cortisol throughout the day in 366 infants
aged between 12-20 months. They found that both the AUC and the Cortisol
Awakening Response (CAR) were larger in infants whose families had low
incomes compared to infants from high-income families. For children at this
extremely young age, it is unlikely that family SES is low because of the
children's cortisol levels; rather, the causality is more likely to run in the
other direction. Nevertheless, genetic and very early developmental factors
cannot be ruled out; indeed, estimates for the heritability of cortisol levels
are around 60% (Bartels et al., 2003). Studies establishing causality are
therefore sorely needed.
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In addition to these correlational studies, one study has provided evi-
dence for a cortisol-related gene-environment interaction. Ouellet-Morin et
al. (2009) measured the genetic contribution to morning cortisol levels, ei-
ther right at awakening or some time later in the laboratory, in 6-month
old twins. The authors found a signiﬁcant gene-environment interaction, in
that monozygotic twins showed a markedly higher correlation in their cortisol
levels compared to dizygotic twins in the laboratory sample, but only when
family adversity was high (i.e. SES was low). This ﬁnding is in line with
the so-called diathesis-stress hypothesis, which states that an individual's
genetically determined vulnerability to stress comes to bear only in resource-
poor settings. Similar gene-environment interactions have been observed for
a polymorphism of the serotonin transporter gene; these will be discussed
below.
These ﬁndings strongly suggest an association between parental SES and
children's cortisol levels. Nevertheless, a small number of other studies are
more equivocal or even point in the other direction: Cutuli and colleagues
measured salivary cortisol in 66 homeless children aged between 4 and 7,
both before and during a set of cognitive tasks, such as a reasoning task, a
Stroop task, and a vocabulary test. They used a measure of socioeconomic
risk, which was a variable composed of indicators for neighborhood quality,
parental education, parental unemployment, lack of family income, and abil-
ity of parents to pay rent, and compared this measure to children's cortisol
levels throughout the task. No association between either morning cortisol
or task-related cortisol increase and socioeconomic risk was found. However,
a graded measure of income was absent from the socioeconomic risk measure,
and its six elements were simply present-absent dichotomies; this simpliﬁca-
tion is likely to have led to some loss of information. In addition, it may be
the case that socioeconomic status is not reﬂected in the cortisol increase in
response to cognitive tasks.
Kraft & Luecken (2009) measured cortisol levels in 94 young adults both
before and after they performed a speech task. Throughout the task, and
prior to it, children from families where the parents had divorced showed
lower levels of cortisol and children from intact families. A similar pattern
was observed for family income, i.e. children from richer families had higher
cortisol levels than children from poorer families. It is unclear what gives
rise to this ﬁnding.
Finally, Dulin-Keita et al. related the cortisol levels of 148 children with
an average age of roughly 8 years to the quality of the neighborhoods in
which the children grew up. Neighborhood quality was measured through
disorder indices. The authors found that in African-American children,
lower neighborhood quality was associated with signiﬁcantly lower serum
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cortisol levels, while this relationship was reversed, although not signiﬁcant,
in Caucasian children. The authors suggest that getting used to and learning
to cope with an environment of disadvantage may lower cortisol levels in the
long run.
Despite these contradictory ﬁndings, the majority of studies do ﬁnd a neg-
ative association between parental SES and children's cortisol levels. From
this result, naturally the question arises to what extent the adverse develop-
mental outcomes that are characteristic of an environment of poverty might
be due to the stress channel. In one of the ﬁrst studies to relate socioeco-
nomic status, levels of stress hormones, and cognitive outcomes, Evans &
Schamberg (2009) found that working memory performance in young adults
was lower for individuals coming from poor families; moreover, the coeﬃcient
on poverty became non-signiﬁcant when the authors controlled for allostatic
load during childhood. Allostatic load was a composite measure which in-
cluded overnight urine levels of cortisol, epinephrine, and norepinephrine,
body mass index, and resting blood pressure. This ﬁnding suggests that a
signiﬁcant proportion of the relationship between poverty and adverse cog-
nitive outcomes can be explained by chronic stress during childhood.
2.3.2.2 Studies in adults
Does the association between SES and cortisol levels that is obversed in
children also hold in adults?
In an early study, Arnetz et al. (1991) measured cortisol levels in a
sample of 354 Swedish blue-collar workers before and after a subset of these
workers lost their jobs. The authors measured serum cortisol levels along
with a number of other health indicators, and found that cortisol levels were
signiﬁcantly higher in those workers who lost their jobs.
Cohen et al. (2006a), in one of the largest studies up to that point,
obtained daily cortisol proﬁles from 781 middle-aged adults who were par-
ticipants in the CARDIA study. The authors found that lower income and
education were associated with higher evening cortisol levels. This ﬁnding
translated into a larger AUC for poor than for richer participants, and a
ﬂatter decreasing slope in the cortisol proﬁle throughout the day. This study
is noteworthy for its size and the relatively involved cortisol sampling tech-
nique, with 6 daily samples per respondents. The fact that the results clearly
support a relationship between cortisol and SES suggests that studies which
did not ﬁnd this relationship may not have large enough sample sizes or a
suﬃcient number of measurement timepoints.
In another study by Sheldon Cohen, he and coauthors tested 193 adults
of various ages for cortsiol and catecholamines (Cohen et al., 2006b). Specif-
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ically, their subjects provided seven daily salivary cortisol samples over three
days, and 24-hour urine samples for catecholamines over 2 days. Cohen et
al. found that persons with low SES, as measured by income and education,
had higher overall levels of cortisol. Similarly, they had higher epinephrine
levels, while a marginal eﬀect was found for higher levels of norepinephrine.
In yet a larger study, Li et al. (2006) obtained two daily cortisol measures
 one in the morning, one in the evening  from a sample of 6335 45-year-olds
who were members of the 1958 British Birth Cohort Study. In addition, the
authors measured lifetime socioeconomic position by categorizing the occupa-
tions of the respondents themselves and their fathers into high- and low-class
jobs. There was a robust relationship between socioeconomic position (SEP)
thus deﬁned and extreme values on the morning cortisol sample, as well
as between SEP and cortisol AUC, and between SEP and an abnormal
diurnal cortisol decline (where abnormal was deﬁned as having a morning
cortisol value≤ 7.5 nmol/L, or an evening cortisol value that is more than
80% of the morning value). Poor individuals showed higher overall levels,
higher AUC, and more abnormal diurnal patterns.
This evidence suggests that high levels of stress and its physiological
markers cortisol may be consequences of poverty. Note, however, these stud-
ies were conducted in developed countries; it remains unclear whether a sim-
ilar relationship exists in developing countries. More importantly, these ﬁnd-
ings are merely correlational and therefore do not justify conclusions about
whether poverty causes stress or vice-versa.
Two very recent studies have attempted to resolve this correlation-causation
dilemma, and measured the impacts of development programs on stress lev-
els: Fernald & Gunnar (2009) measured cortisol levels in children who had
been exposed to the Mexican PROGRESA program  a comprehensive con-
ditional cash transfer program with a focus on health and education. The
authors found that children who had been exposed to the program exhibited
lower baseline cortisol levels than those children who had not been in the
program. In another study, Fernald et al. (2008) investigated responses to
stress and depression questionnaires in a sample of South-African respon-
dents after they were randomly assigned to receive a loan. Those who had
received loans showed lower levels of depressive symptoms than the control
group; interestingly, however, questionnaire-assessed stress levels were higher
after receiving a loan than in the control group, possibly due to the stress
induced by having to pay back the loan at a high interest rate (200% p.a.).
Even though the former study was in children rather than adults, and the
latter cannot unambigulously be called a reduction in poverty since people
had to pay large interest on their loans, these ﬁndings lend weight to the
hypothesis that poverty (reductions) may have psychological consequences.
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2.4 Cortisol and Economic Choice
The previous section summarized ﬁndings suggesting that poverty causes
increased levles of cortisol. This section reviews evidence that this increase
in cortisol levels, in turn, has cognitive and behavioral consequences.
There is a vast literature on the cognitive eﬀects of cortisol (for reviews,
see McEwen & Seeman, 1999; McEwen, 2004; McEwen & Sapolsky, 1995; de
Kloet et al., 1999; Lupien et al., 2007, 2009; Kim & Haller, 2007). Much
of this research has revolved around memory. This is due to the fact that
corticosteroid receptors are most prominently expressed in the hippocam-
pus, which is a crucial structure for spatial and declarative memory, and
in the prefrontal cortex, which serves important working memory functions
(de Kloet et al., 1999). Generally, moderate levels of stress and cortisol are
thought to be performance-improving; however, severe and prolonged expo-
sures lead to performance decrements (McEwen & Seeman, 1999; McEwen,
2004).
Since the eﬀects of cortisol on memory have been discussed extensively
elsewhere (McEwen & Seeman, 1999), I focus here on its eﬀects on decision-
making and economic choice. Klein (1996) reviews the evidence of the ef-
fects of actue stress from the military and human factors literature human
decision-making. He argues that the main cognitive consequences of stress
for cognition are narrowed attention and focus on salient cues, as well as
reduced working-memory capacity. The consequences of these eﬀects are
decision-making strategies that are simpler than usual, a decreased reliance
on analytical in favor of recognitional or salience-based strategies, and less
complete mental simulations.
An early study on the eﬀects of stress on decision-making by Keinan
(1987) oﬀers support for this argument. Keinan put participants in a situa-
tion where they expected either controllable or uncontrollable electric shocks
while performing a decision-making task. In the task, subjects had to choose
the correct verbal analogy from a set of six options. In the uncontrollable
threat condition, they were told in addition that every now and then through-
out the experiment, they would receive mild electric shocks to their non-
dominant hand. The controllable condition was identical, with the exception
that subjects were informed that the shocks were contingent on their per-
formance on the task. In the control condition, subjects were not told that
they would be shocked during the experiment. In reality, no shocks were
administered in any of the conditions; any eﬀects on performance were thus
due to expectation rather than experience. The author found that subjects
performed signiﬁcantly worse on the task when they expected to be shocked:
speciﬁcally, they got fewer answers correct, scanned the alternatives in non-
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systematic ways, and stopped scanning alternatives earlier when they ex-
pected a shock than when they did not. No diﬀerences were found between
the controllable and uncontrollable conditions.
In one of the ﬁrst experiments testing the eﬀect of stress on economic
choice, Gray (1999) used the temporally extended choice task by Herrnstein
et al. (1986) to study the eﬀect of stressful emotional context on decision-
making in this task. Subjects are asked to advance slides on a projector,
using one of two buttons. They earn money for displaying the maximum
number of pictures in a given time, i.e. advancing the projector as quickly as
possible. The speed at which the projector can be advanced is determined
by a central ﬁxation spot, which on every trial takes a set number of seconds
to disappear; subjects can only advance the projector once the ﬁxation point
has disappeared. Crucially, subjects can inﬂuence the ﬁxation duration on
each trial by choosing the button which they press to advance the projector:
one button, the bad button, speeds up the immediately consecutive trial,
but slows down the four that follow, resulting in an overall temporal cost.
In contrast, the good button delays the immediately following trial, but
speeds up the four that follow, resulting in an overall temporal gain. Thus,
this task can be compared to an Iowa Gambling Task over time, with subjects
having to keep track of the temporal (rather than probabilistic) consequences
of each button press; a preference for the bad key can be interpreted as
short-sighted intertemporal choice.
Gray established a stressful vs. non-stressful context for this task by
presenting the ﬁxation spot on a background of either neutral or negative
emotional pictures from a standard picture database. He found that sub-
jects who were exposed to stressful, negative pictures performed worse on
the task, i.e. exhibited a larger preference for the bad key, and as a result
earned less money than the control group. Thus, it appears that inducing a
stressful emotional context leads to a performance decrement on a concur-
rently performed decision-making task.
Preston and colleagues (2007) tested subjects on the well-known Iowa
Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994, 1999). In this task, subjects are pre-
sented with four decks of cards, A, B, C, and D. Subjects draw cards from
decks of their choice and gain or lose the number of points shown on each
card they draw. Decks A and C are disadvantageous in that they lead to
long-run losses, even though the initial cards have high gains. In contrast,
decks B and D are advantageous in that they lead to long-run gains, de-
spite high initial losses. Over time, normal subjects learn to choose from
the advantageous decks; inability to learn this behavior can be interpreted
as suboptimal economic decision-making. Preston and colleagues found that
subjects who were anticipating to give a public speech while they performed
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the Iowa Gambling Task were signiﬁcantly slower at learning the optimal
response pattern, resulting in lower overall gains. In addition, the eﬀect was
diﬀerentiated across men and women, with a performance decrement under
stress for men, and a performance improvement for women. The authors
argue that given the somewhat better average performance usually observed
for men on this task, this ﬁnding is consistent with an inverse U-shaped re-
lationship between stress and task performance. An alternative possibility,
and a very common problem in this literature, is the hormonal ﬂuctuations
make it more diﬃcult to obtain clean data from female subjects.
An obvious explanation for this ﬁnding not related to stress, which the
authors acknowledge, is that the impending speech occupied working memory
resources; this is a somewhat distinct explanation from a simple eﬀect on
stress, which should also operate without working memory impediment.
This criticism applies to a lesser extent, however, to another study which
assessed behavior on the Iowa Gambling Task under conditions of stress; van
den Bos et al. (2009) tested subjects on the IGT, but after they had been
exposed to a social stressor. This task, the well-known Trier Social Stress
Test, requires subjects to give a speech in front of an interview panel, and
perform a challenging arithmetic task. It has been shown that it reliably
increases stress and cortisol levels (Kirschbaum et al., 1993; Kirschbaum,
1999). Van den Bos and colleagues found, again, that male subjects per-
formed signiﬁcantly worse at the IGT after they had been exposed to stress,
and as a consequence earned less money in the experiment. Again ﬁndings
were inconclusive for women, presumably due to the issues mentioned above.
Other tasks control for this confound. Porcelli & Delgado (2009) used
the well-known cold-pressor task to study the eﬀects of stress on ﬁnancial
decision-making. In this task, subjects are simply asked to hold their hand
in ice-cold water for 2 minutes. The control group hold their hand into room-
temperature water. Note that this task does not suﬀer from the working
memory confounds described above for subjects facing the prospect of giving
a speech.
The authors then presented subjects with a ﬁnancial risk-taking task, in
which they could choose between two lotteries; for instance, they might be
asked whether they would rather win $0.25 with 80% certainty, or win $3 with
20% probability. Risk-taking was deﬁned as choosing the low-probability,
high-return option. Similar trials were presented in the loss domain; here,
participants might be asked, for instance, whether they would prefer losing
$0.25 with 80% probability, or losing $3 with 20% probability.
The standard ﬁnding in risk preference tasks like this one is what has
been termed the reﬂection eﬀect: subjects are risk-averse in the gain do-
main, i.e. when the expected values of the gambles are equal, they prefer
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the gamble with the higher probability; in contrast, they are risk-seeking in
the loss domain, i.e. prefer smaller probabilities of larger losses to greater
probabilities of small losses. This behavior is often seen as an anomaly in
economics, since paying a risk premium is not consistent with behavior that
maximizes expected value.
Porcelli & Delgado found that the cold pressor task reliably induced stress
in that it raised subjects' skin conductance response, and subjects' recogni-
tion memory for a list of previously studied words was impaired, as is ex-
pected for memory performance after stress. Most importantly, however,
the authors also observed an eﬀect on ﬁnancial risk-taking: subjects in the
stress group showed an enhanced reﬂection eﬀect compared to those in the
control group, i.e. they were more risk-averse in the gain domain, and more
risk-seeking in the loss domain. Thus, they exhibited an increase in non-
normative, non-proﬁt maximizing economic behavior under stress.
In addition to these eﬀects on ﬁnancial decision-making, stress induced by
the Trier Social Stress Test has also been suggested to aﬀect social cognition:
Takahashi et al. (2005) exposed subjects to the TSST and then tested them
on a questionnaire called the General Trust Scale, which measures interper-
sonal trust. Subjecst who had higher cortisol responses to the TSST showed
lower trust scores on this questionnaire, suggesting that stress may make
them less trusting in economic games. However, Takahashi did not test their
behavior in actual economic exchanges, leaving this question unanswered and
fodder for future research.
Most of the studies cited above took place in the laboratory. To overcome
the concerns about external validity associated with this setting, Coates &
Herbert (2008) studied traders on in a real-life setting on a London trading
ﬂoor. The authors observed 17 traders for 8 consecutive business days, taking
two saliva samples a day, at 11am and 4pm. They found that traders had
higher cortisol levels, and higher variance in these levels, if their trading
volatility was high, i.e. when their proﬁts and losses (P&L) had high variance.
In addition, the authors used option prices as a measure of anticipated market
volatility; this approach is useful because options indicate to what extent
traders value the ability to buy an asset at a ﬁxed price in the future, thereby
hedging against uncertainty. Indeed, the authors found a strong correlation
between average cortisol levels and implied volatility as measured by option
prices. It remains unclear in which direction causality runs; however, the
ﬁnding further associates cortisol with particular behaviors, and lends further
weight to the hypothesis that altered cortisol levels may have has economic
consequences.
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2.5 Serotonin and Poverty
In this section, I review evidence showing that poor people exhibit diﬀer-
ential serotonergic function compared to richer people. In particular, socio-
economic status, as measured by income and education, has been shown to be
reliably associated with both serotonergic responsivity, and with a particular
polymorphism of the serotonin transporter gene.
2.5.1 Serotonin Basics
Serontonin is one of the major neurotransmitters in the central nervous sys-
tem of humans and other animals. It is synthesized from tryptophan, which
is ingested with the diet, and released in the CNS by serotonergic neurons
located in the raphe nuclei of the brainstem. These neurons project widely
to both the neocortex and subcortical structures, including areas that are
important for emotion regulation and reward processing, such as amygdala
and basal ganglia (Berger et al., 2009). Serotonin is thought to be a major
player in the etiology of depression; patients suﬀering from depression exhibit
lower levels of serotonin (Schildkraut, 1965), and prolonging the presence of
serotonin in the synaptic cleft with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRIs) is a well-known and eﬀective treatment for depression (Fournier et
al., 2010).
There is notorious and profound disagreement in the literature about the
precise function of serotonin. What is clear is that serotonin has far-reaching
eﬀects on mental health, and a plethora of accounts accord it an impor-
tant function in anxiety (Lesch et al., 1996; Wise et al., 1972), depression
(Deakin & Graeﬀ, 1991), stress reactivity (Greenberg, 2000), as well as im-
pulsivity, behavioral inhibition, and aggression (Manuck et al., 1998; Gray,
1982; Soubrié, 1986). While all of these disorders and behavioral patterns are
associated with dysregulation of serotonergic neurotransmission, a unifying
account remains elusive (Robbins & Crockett, 2010; Dayan & Huys, 2009).
Regardless, it will emerge in the following discussion that serotonin has been
credibly linked to poverty.
2.5.2 Serotonin and Poverty
In the ﬁrst study in this vein, Matthews and colleagues (2000) studied the
relationship between socio-economic status (measured by income and educa-
tion) of 139 adult men and women to their serotonergic responsivity in the
fenﬂuramine challenge. In this protocol, fenﬂuramine is administered and
induces serotonin release and reuptake inhibition. This increase in serotonin
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availability causes the release of the hormone prolactin by the pituitary gland
into the blood stream; thus, the degree of serotonergic responsivity can be
measured by prolactin in blood serum (Quattrone et al., 1983; Yatham &
Steiner, 1993). The authors found that low-SES individuals exhibited lower
PRL increases in the fenﬂuramine challenge than high-SES individuals. In
other words, low SES was associated with blunted serotonergic responsivity.
This eﬀect was mainly due to income, as it reached signiﬁcance considering
only income or income and education together, but not education by itself.
Diﬀerences in impulsivity in low-SES individuals appear not to account for
the relationship. The authors speculate that low serotonergic responsivity
in low-SES individuals could be explained by higher exposure to stressful
environments in this population. This hypothesis is consistent with stud-
ies showing that monkeys who are deprived of their mothers early in life
show lower levels of the serotonin metabolite 5-HIAA in their cerebrospinal
ﬂuid than those who are not deprived (Higley et al., 1992), suggesting lower
serotonergic responsivity in these animals.
Interestingly, in monkeys this relationship between maternal deprivation
is mediated by a length variation in the 5-HTTLPR gene: in monkeys who
experienced maternal deprivation, those animals who were homozygous for
the long allele of this gene had with higher 5-HIAA concentrations than het-
erozygous animals, while this diﬀerence by genotype was not seen in monkeys
who had not experienced maternal deprivation (Bennett et al., 2002).
This ﬁnding was conﬁrmed by a similar study in humans, in which Manuck
and colleagues (2004) related the socio-economic status (measured by income
and education) of 139 adult men and women to their serotonergic responsiv-
ity in the fenﬂuramine challenge. The authors found that carriers of at least
one 5-HTTLPR short allele (SS, L/S) showed a relationship between SES
and PRL increases during the fenﬂuramine challenge, with lower-SES indi-
viduals exhibiting lower serotonergic responsivity. In contrast, individuals
who were homozygous for the L allele showed no such relationship.
This ﬁnding was somewhat qualiﬁed by another study by Manuck and
colleagues (2005), conducted at the community level: these authors obtained
a measure for the socioeconomic status not of individuals, but of entire com-
munities in the United States, which consisted of median income, percentage
of households below the poverty line, unemployment, home ownership, ratio
of rental price to income, and education. The authors found that individuals
who lived in low-SES communities had a decreased PRL response to the fen-
ﬂuramine challenge than persons in high-income neighborhoods. In contrast
to their previous study showing that genetic variation in the 5-HTTLPR gene
modulated the relationship between SES and response to the fenﬂuramine
challenge, this modulation was not observed at the community level.
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Williams et al. (2008) studied the eﬀect of 5-HTTLPR genotype on
stress reactivity in a social stress task similar to the Trier Social Stress Test
(Kirschbaum et al., 1993). Participants had to recall an event that angered
or saddened them, in front of a panel of listeners; the control task consisted of
reading a neutral text. Settings of this type have been shown to reliably in-
duce stress in participants. The authors found that low-SES individuals had
higher responses to the social stressor. In addition, the 5-HTTLPR genotype
aﬀected stress reactivity in this task: participants with two L alleles showed
higher responses in terms of diastolic and systolic blood pressure than L/S
and S/S individuals. However, SES and genotype did not interact; the eﬀect
of SES on stress reactivity was of similar magnitude for both S/S and L/L
individuals. It is surprising that the L genotype was associated with higher
stress reactivity, since the S allele is normally considered to be the vulnerable
one.
While the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism and serotonergic responsivity in
the fenﬂuramine challenge have been most robustly associated with poverty,
other features of serotonergic neurotransmission appear to also be altered
by poverty. For instance, Brummett et al. (2010) showed that the inter-
action between low socio-economic status and disease may be mediated by
the serotonin metabolite 5-HIAA: these authors found that low-SES subjects
have higher levels of the beta2-integrin CD11b , which is involved in the de-
velopment of atherosclerosis; however, this was only true in subjects with
low circulating levels of 5-HIAA. Thus lack of serotonin may facilitate the
association between low SES and stress-related disease.
Jokela et al. (2007) examined the relationship between parental socio-
economic status, adult harm avoidance, and a particular polymorphism of
the serotonin receptor 2A gene. Harm avoidance is one of four fundamental
temperament traits in Cloninger's (1987) biosocial model of personality, and
refers to behavioral inhibition, fearfulness, and cautiousness (Cloninger et
al., 1987), and emotional and physiological stress reactivity (Puttonen et al.,
2005). A number of studies have shown that harm avoidance is related to
individual serotonin levels (Peirson et al. 1999, Hansenne and Ansseu 1999,
Munafo et al. 2005), and in particular the binding potential of 5-HT2A
receptors (van Heeringen et al. 2003). The binding potential of these recep-
tors is in turn associated with the T102C polymorphism of the HTR2A gene
(Turecki et al. 1999; see also Polesskaya and Sokolov 2002). Jokela found
that indeed this polymorphism is related to harm avoidance , with the C/C
genotype showing higher harm avoidance than the other genotypes. Inter-
estingly, this relationship was mediated by parental SES: individuals with
higher parental SES had lower adulthood harm avoidance, but this was only
true for individuals carrying the T/T or T/C genotype and not those carry-
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ing the C/C genotype. The authors speculate that the C/C genotype might
make the 5-HT2A receptors less sensitive to environmental inﬂuences. This
ﬁnding is in line with another study by the same authors, which showed that
carriers of the C/C genotype showed no association between maternal nur-
turance in childhood and depressive symptoms in adulthood, while carriers
of the other genotypes did show this association.
2.6 Serotonin and Economic Choice
In the previous section, I reviewed evidence showing that poverty is charac-
terized by altered serotonergic neurotransmission. This section summarizes a
growing body of literature suggesting that serotonin also plays a critical role
in decision-making. In reviewing this literature, I focus on those studies that
implicate serotonin in economic choice in particular; speciﬁcally, serotonin
has been linked to impulsitivty and time- and risk preferences. Together
with the link between serotonin and poverty, this body of evidence suggests
that poverty may perpetuate itself by altering serotonergic neurotransmission
and thereby inhibiting prudent economic choice.
I described above that poverty may reduce serotonergic responsivity as
assessed by the fenﬂuramine challenge, and that this eﬀect may be mediated
by the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism: poor individuals show reduced prolactin
levels in the fenﬂuramine challenge, and this eﬀect is particularly strong in
individuals carrying the S-allele of the transporter polymorphism. Do lower
serotonin levels, in interaction with the S allele of the serotonin transporter
polymorphism, also lead to changes in economic behavior? A growing number
of studies indicate that this is indeed the case.
2.6.1 Evidence from Typtophan Depletion
The standard method to experimentally produce conditions of reduced sero-
tonergic neurotransmission is dietary tryptophan depletion. Tryptophan is
the precursor amino acid from which serotonin is synthesized; it is ingested
with the diet, and therefore dietary interventions can be used to alter levels
of tryptophan and thereby serotonin. Speciﬁcally, in tryptophan depletion,
subjects are given an amino acid cocktail that either contains tryptophan
or does not. In the latter case, plasma and brain levels of tryptophan, and
thereby serotonergic function, are signiﬁcantly reduced (Reilly, 1997). Thus,
tryptophan depletion is a powerful experimental tool to induce reduced sero-
tonergic function.
In an early study of the eﬀect of tryptophan depletion on economic choice,
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Rogers et al. (1999) tested subjects on the so-called Decision-Gamble task.
In this task, subjects are presented with 10 red and blue boxes, and are
asked behind a box of which color they think a yellow token is hidden. They
are rewarded for predicting the location of the token correctly. This task
has a normatively optimal choice of color, namely the color of the majority
of the 10 boxes. The authors assessed the eﬀect of acute TRP depletion
on performance of this task. They found that tryptophan-depleted subjects
showed worse performance, i.e. they chose the more likely outcome (the
correct choice) on a smaller number of trials compared to controls.
In contrast, Talbot et al. (2006) found that TRP depletion actually im-
proved decisions, i.e. TRP-depleted subjects chose the optimal action more
frequently. It remains unclear what accounts for this diﬀerence. Talbot et al.
(2006) also assessed risk-taking, which was quantiﬁed as the proportion of
points bet in the gambling task, and impulsivity, quantiﬁed as the diﬀerence
in the decisions in the ascending vs. descending sequences of displays of pos-
sible bets (this can be understood as an aversion to waiting for the desired bet
to be presented). They found no eﬀect on these tasks. Note, however, that
these tasks are not what economists usually understand as risk-taking tasks;
the proportion of points bet is only a measure of risk-taking if one takes into
account the probabilities involved, and the diﬀerence between choices on the
ascending and descending bet presentations might also be noise, failure to
maximize reward, or disinterest in the task.
A partial resolution to this contradiction was obtained by Rogers and
colleagues (2003). These authors presented subjects with a gambling task in
which they chose between a control gamble, with a 50-50 chance of winning
10 vs. losing 10 points, and an experimental gamble which varied in terms
of probabilities and stakes, with high or low probabilities (25% vs 75%) and
high or low stakes (80 vs. 20 points). In addition, a standard risk-aversion
trial type presented subjects with a choice between a certain 40 point gain
vs. a 50-50 chance of winning 80 points or 0 points, and a loss-aversion trial
type presented subjects with a choice between a certain 40 point loss vs. a
50-50 chance of losing 80 points or 0 points. Rogers and colleagues found
that participants chose the experimental gamble more frequently when its
expected gains were large compared to when they were small; however, this
eﬀect was less pronounced under TRP depletion. Given that both the control
and the experimental gambles involved an element of risk, it is diﬃcult to
interpret this pattern as a change in risk aversion; in addition, the standard
risk-aversion trials described above showed no eﬀect of TRP depletion: sub-
jects chose the safe gambles more often than the risky gambles, and this eﬀect
did not diﬀer across TRP+ and TRP- groups. The authors conclude that
TRP depletion attenuates subjects' ability to discriminate between gains of
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diﬀerent expected magnitudes. An alternative explanation is that Rogers
and colleagues found no eﬀects of TRP depletion on risk preferences because
the task was not incentivized.
Murphy et al. (2003) used the same task as Rogers et al. (2003), com-
bined with dietary tryptophan supplements (rather than depletion, as in the
previous study). The authors found that tryptophan supplements exacer-
bated the reﬂection eﬀect in risky choice. This eﬀect consists in risk aversion
in the gain domain, and risk-seeking in the loss domain. After receiving tryp-
tophan supplements, this eﬀect was attenuated: TRP-treated subjects chose
the risky option more often in the gain domain, and less often in the loss
domain, compared to controls, indicating that increases in serotonin avail-
ability led to less risk aversion in the gain domain and less risk seeking in
the loss domain. By implication, the absence of serotonin would predict in-
creases in the reﬂection eﬀect, i.e. more risk-aversion in the gain domain and
more risk-seeking in the loss domain. However, tryptophan depletion in the
previous study by the same authors did not produce these results.
Finally, converging evidence on the role of serotonin in risky choice comes
from primates: Long et al., (2009) presented macaque monkeys with a risk
preference task, where they could choose between a safe and a risky option.
When the two options had expected values, any signiﬁcant preference for
the safe option can be interpreted as risk aversion. The authors found that
tryptophan depletion decreased monkeys' preference for the safe option, i.e.
made the monkeys more risk-seeking. When the expected values diﬀered,
the relative preference for the safe vs. risky option can be interpreted as
the risk premium, i.e. the amount of extra juice required by the monkeys to
choose the risky over the safe option. In line with the results obtained for
equal expected values, under tryptophan depletion monkeys had lower risk
premia than otherwise, suggesting again that lower serotonin decreased risk
aversion. This is in contrast to the human studies discussed above, in which
decreased risk aversion (at least in the gain domain) was seen for increased
levels of tryptophan (Murphy et al., 2003) were generally associated with
more risk-averse choice.
2.6.2 Evidence from Genetics
As discussed in the previous section, poverty may interact with the serotonin
transporter gene 5-HTT to aﬀect serotonergic responsivity; carriers of the
short allele of the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism have a blunted response in the
fenﬂuramine challenge, but this eﬀect is stronger in poor compared to rich
people. In other words, poverty exacerbates the eﬀect of this polymorphism
on serotonergic neurotransmission. This raises the question whether the short
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allele of this polymorphism may have behavioral consequences which might
in turn contribute to exacerbating poverty. Indeed, it will emerge in the
following discussion that the short allele has indeed been shown to aﬀect
economic choice, in potentially adverse ways.
On a general level, the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism appears to be asso-
ciated with impulsivity; for instance, Sadeh and colleagues (2010) observed
a main eﬀect of 5-HTTLPR genotype on the impulsivity dimension of psy-
chopathology, with SS individuals exhibiting greater impulsivity than LL
carriers. In addition, however, this eﬀect appears to be exacerbated by low
SES: In a sample of Italian adolescents, Nobile et al. (2007) showed that
low SES interacted with DRD4 long and 5-HTTLPR long alleles to produce
higher aggressive behavior scores on the Child Behavior Checklist/6-18. In
other words, low-SES individuals who carried both long DRD4 and long 5-
HTTLPR alleles scored higher on this measure of aggression.
In the Iowa Gambling Task described above, Must et al. (2007) found
that subjects chose the disadvantageous decks more frequently if they were
SS compared to LL carriers. The subjects in this study all suﬀered from
major depressive disorder (MDD), thus it is not clear to what extent their
ﬁnding generalizes to normal volunteers. However, a number of studies have
since reﬁned and extended this ﬁnding: in particular, evidence is emerging
that subjects carrying the SS allele may be slower at learning to choose from
the optimal decks in the IGT than LL carriers. For instance, Jollant and
colleagues found that subjects carrying two long or one long and one short
allele of the 5-HTTLPR gene improved their performance over time while
performing the IGT, whereas subjects with two short alleles showed no such
improvement. Unfortunately the authors do not report whether the interac-
tion eﬀect of time x genotype on performance is signiﬁcant; in addition, their
subjects all had a history of suicide attempts and are therefore not entirely
representative. However, in a similar study in obsessive-compulsive patients,
da Rocha et al. (2008) found that LL-carriers showed better learning as the
IGT progressed compared to SS and SL carriers. Moreover, Homberg and
colleagues (2008) obtained similar results in normal subjects, showing that
women who carried two S alleles were worse at learning to respond optimally
in the IGT that those who carried at least one L allele. The authors inter-
preted this ﬁnding as an indication that lack of serotonin causes subjects to
maintain the established choice option; however, the possibility that they had
a general learning impairment remains open. Regardless, the S allele appears
to impair optimal actions in a simple economic maximization task. A study
by Ha et al. (2009) qualiﬁes this conclusion somewhat, as these authors failed
to ﬁnd a main eﬀect of 5-HTTLPR genotype on performance; instead, they
found that the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism interacted with a dopaminergic
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polymorphism, namely widely studied dopamine receptor D4 polymorphism
(DRD4): among subjects who carried the short allele of 5-HTTLPR, those
who also carried the 2R- allele of the DRD4 polymorphism performed worse
at the IGT than those who carried the 2R+ allele; in contrast, among those
who carried the long 5-HTTLPR allele, 2R- carriers performed better than
2R+ carriers. These ﬁndings conﬁrm the involvement of the 5-HTTLPR
polymorphism in economic choice, whnlie in addition suggesting that the
details of how this inﬂuence interacts with other neurotransmitter systems
remain to be clariﬁed.
While the Iowa Gambling Task measures to what extent subjects are
capable to optimizing their behaviour to maximize reward, it does not reveal
the eﬀect of genetic variation on economic preferences (arguably the IGT
contains an element of time preference; however, since the timing of payment
and consumption do not diﬀer for the early vs. late trials in an experiment,
this claim is diﬃcult to support.) Could genetically modulated serotonergic
neurotransmission also aﬀect economic preferences? To answer this question,
Kuhnen & Chiao (2009) presented subjects with a ﬁnancial risk-taking task,
in which they could allocate investments between a riskless and a risky asset.
The subjects could allocate $23 or $28 between these two assets. The riskless
asset paid a known rate of return with certainty, while the riskless asset paid
either of two rates of return with equal probability. One trial was chosen
randomly for payment. Risky investment was measured by the diﬀerence
between the amount each individual participant invested in the risky asset,
and the amount invested in the risky asset by the average participant.
The authors found that individuals carrying two S alleles of the 5-HT
transporter gene were signiﬁcantly more risk-averse than those with S/L or
L/L genotypes, in that they invested 28% less in the risky asset than the
other participants. The authors speculate that the long allele may confer
novelty-seeking behavior that is evolutionarily adaptive.
In a study notable for its completeness and interesting results, Crisan
et al. (2009) extended the role of 5-HTTLPR genotype to a number of
other economically relevant behaviors. First, the authors found that S-allele
carriers showed increased fear conditioning compared to LL individuals: after
watching a movie in which another person was conditioned to associate the
presentation of squares of a certain color with electric shocks, subjects showed
an increased skin conductance response to those colors that had been paired
with shock in the observed participant. (Note that participants never actually
experienced shocks themselves, making it slightly ambiguous through what
channels this learning eﬀect operated.) Notably, this increase in SCR to the
CS+ compared to CS- was larger in subjects carrying at least one S-allele.
Second, the authors conﬁrmed the involvement of the 5-HTTLPR poly-
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morphism in risk preferences by tested risk taking in the Balloon Analogue
Risk Task (BART). In this task, subjects are asked to pump up a balloon on a
computer screen to accumulate rewards. However, if the balloon is pumped
up too much, it pops, and the accumulated points are lost. The authors
found that S allele carriers were signiﬁcantly more risk-averse, i.e. stopped
pumping at smaller balloon sizes, than LL individuals.
Similarly, S-allele carriers showed a larger reﬂection eﬀect in risk-taking.
Using the framing task proposed by De Martino et al. (2006), the authors
found that the diﬀerence between risk-aversion in a gain frame and risk-
seeking in a loss frame was greater in these subjects than in LL carriers.
(The authors do not report the interaction term, but the results appear
solid.) Interestingly, this eﬀect was entirely driven by increased risk-seeking
in the loss frame in S-allele carriers, while risk aversion in the gain frame
showed no eﬀect of genotype. This contrasts with the BART ﬁndings above,
potentially because the BART task is more experiential than the somewhat
abstract ﬁnancial risk task.
The ﬁndings of Crisan et al. (2009) were conﬁrmed by a similarly elegant
study by Roiser et al. (2009), which combined genetic information with fMRI
data. Presenting subjects with the same framing task as described above,
these authors conﬁrmed the larger behavioral framing eﬀect in SS compared
to LL subjects. In addition, they found that amygdala activation during
task performance diﬀered between SS and LL individuals: in particular, the
authors observed a genotype x frame x decision interaction on amygdala
activation: in SS participants, amygdala activation was higher when subjects
chose according to frame than when they chose counter to frame, i.e. when
they chose the gamble option in the loss frame or the safe option in the gain
frame. This interaction was not seen in LL subjects.
The authors then performed a psychophysiological interaction analysis
(PPI, Friston et al., 1997). This analysis allows to assess coupling between a
brain region of interest and other regions depending on experimental context.
In this case, the authors were interested in the coupling between the amygdala
and other brain regions when subjects chose according to frame vs. counter
to frame, and in whether this coupling varied as a function of genotype.
Indeed, they observed that the coupling between anterior cingulated cortex
(ACC) and amygdala was modulated by subjects' decisions: connectivity
was high when decisions were counter to frame, but low when decisions were
in line with frame. However, crucially this eﬀect was only observed in LL
individuals; SS individuals showed low connectivity between these regions
regardless of whether their decisions were made in accordance with or counter
to frame. The authors speculate that the ACC may have a role in overriding
emotional responses represented in the amygdala, and that this inhibition
2.7. TESTOSTERONE AND POVERTY 40
might be attenuated in SS individuals. These ﬁndings are in line with the
involvement of amydala and ACC in serotonin-modulated behaviors outlined
above.
In sum, it appears that the short allele of the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism
indeed aﬀects economic choice: it impairs optimal decision-making in the
Iowa Gambling Task, and leads to risk aversion and increased reﬂection ef-
fects in ﬁnancial decision-making. The fact that the eﬀects of this allele on
serotonergic neurotransmission are exacerbated in poor individuals suggests
that poverty may perpetuate itself by aﬀecting serotonergic neurotransmis-
sion through the 5-HTTLRP polymorphism, which in turn aﬀects economic
choice behaviour and thereby potentially reinforces poverty.
2.7 Testosterone and Poverty
2.7.1 Testosterone Basics
Testosterone is one of the body's major sex hormones. A steroid hormone
like cortisol, it occurs in both men and women; in men, it is mainly produced
by the Leydig cells of the testes, while in women it is produced by the ovaries
and placenta. In both sexes, it is also produced by the adrenal cortex. Secre-
tion is regulated by the hypothalamic-pituitary-testicular (HPT) axis: the
hypothalamus releases gonadotrophin-releasing hormone (GnRH), which in
turn causes the release of lutenizing hormone (LH) and follicle-stimulating
hormone (FSH) by the pituitary gland, which then leads to testosterone pro-
duction in the testes (men), and estrogen production in the ovaries (women).
In the brain, it acts on structures that are crucial for emotion regulation,
memory, and decision-making, such as amygdala, hippocampus, and pre-
frontal cortex (McEwen & Milner, 2007; de Kloet et al., 1998).
2.7.2 Testosterone and Poverty
The evidence on the linke between poverty and testosterone levels is weaker
than in the case of cortisol and serotonin. Nevertheless, a number of papers
have reported associations between baseline testosterone levels and SES.
In the largest and most persuasive study to date, Dabbs & Morris (1990)
studied a sample of 4,462 male U.S. military veterans. They classiﬁed those
whose testosterone levels were in the highest 10% of the distribution as being
high in testosterone. In self-report measures, these individuals reported more
excessive and antisocial behaviors: the were more likely to be delinquent,
to abuse drugs and alcohol, to have many sex partners, and to have gone
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AWOL (absent without leave) in the military. Dabbs & Morris then divided
the sample into high- and low-SES groups (deﬁned as being above vs. below
the US median in both income and education). Two ﬁndings emerged. First,
the low-SES group had higher levels of testosterone: 14% of the low-SES
group were in the top 10% in terms of testosterone levels, while only 6% of
the high-SES group were in this group. In addition, the relationship between
testosterone and antisocial behaviors was mediated by SES: the low-SES
group showed signiﬁcant relationships between testosterone levels and the
antisocial behaviors mentioned above, while no such relationship was evident
in the high-SES group. A potential confound is sample size, in that the
high-SES group had fewer individuals in the upper 10% of the testosterone
distribution than the low-SES group, namely only 73. However, this ﬁnding
nevertheless suggests a link between low SES and high testosterone levels.
In a later paper, Dabbs (1992) related the serum testosterone levels of the
same group to their occupational status, and found that blue-collar workers
and the unemployed had higher testosterone levels than white-collar workers.
Controlling for age and race did not alter these results. In addition, among
employed participants, testosterone levels correlated negatively with Sevens
& Cho's (1985) occupational status score. (Intriguingly, farmers had some
of the lowest testosterone levels, even though their occupational standing
and income was likely more comparable to that of blue-collar than white-
collar workers.) Dabbs shows that the correlation between testosterone and
occupational status may be mediated by intelligence, antisocial behavior, or
education. More generally, the direction of causality remains unclear; Dabbs
argues that testosterone may be high in childhood due to its high heritability
(Meikle et al., 1987, 1988) and subsequently aﬀect intelligence, education,
and antisocial behavior. However, environmental conditions associated with
low SES may have direct eﬀects on testosterone levels as well, as outlined
below.
Gray et al. (2006) compare baseline testosterone levels among ﬁve diﬀer-
ent population strata studied in the THUSA (Transition and Health During
Urbanization of South Africans) study (Vorster et al., 2000). In this study,
a sample of 1854 respondents from the North West Province of South Africa
was classiﬁed according to urbanization: rural groups were those living in
tribal areas and people living on commercial farms, while urban groups were
those living in informal settlements (``squatter camps''), those living in es-
tablished townships with access to water and electricity, and ﬁnally those
living in western-style houses in upper-class suburbs. Gray et al. found that
the last of these groups, i.e. fully Westernized participants from auent
suburbs, had signiﬁcantly higher testosterone levels than the other groups.
However, this diﬀerence was no longer signiﬁcant after potential confounds
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were controlled for, namely physical activity levels, depression, aﬀect, and
hostility.
Two further studies from the same author provide related anecdotal evi-
dence. First, Dabbs et al. (1990) studied testosterone levels in seven occu-
pational groups; these authors found that ministers had lower testosterone
levels than actors or football players, but it remains unclear to what extent
this diﬀerence is related to occupational status, income, or other variables,
and moreover whether it is a result or a consequence of any of these variables.
Second, Dabbs et al (1998) suggest that trial lawyers are the blue-collar
workers of the legal profession, in that they engage directly with defendants
and compete forcefully with one another. They ﬁnd that, indeed, trial lawyers
have higher levels of testosterone than other types of lawyers such as patent
lawyers.
Together, these results suggest that poverty and low socioeconomic status
may be associated with higher levels of testosterone. As in the previous
sections, concerns remain about the direction of causality of this relationship.
Nevertheless, at least the correlation appears to exist. Equipped with this
ﬁnding, we can now ask to what extent these raised testosterone levels in
poverty have behavioral consequences.
2.8 Testosterone and Behavior
Testosterone has a prominent role in controlling behavior. It is involved in
regulating sex drive, muscle development, and the behavioral ﬁght-or-ﬂight
response; in addition, it has been closely linked to dominance- and status-
related behaviors (Mazur & Booth, 1998) and aggression (Book et al. 2001).
In particular, it appears to increase competition (Silverin, 1980; Hegner &
Wingﬁeld, 1987), lead to confrontational responding in status and domi-
nance challenges (Muller & Wrangham, 2004; Dabbs, 1997), and contribute
to establishing and maintaining social hierarchies (Dugatkin & Druen, 2004).
Thus, testosterone's role in behavior appears to be one of signaling and reg-
ulating social status and the response to status challenges (Mazur & Booth,
1998). In the following, I disucss three mechanisms by which testosterone
interacts with environmental factors to produce such behaviors in btoh adap-
tive and maladaptive fashions.
2.8.1 The Winner Eﬀect
One of the most established ﬁndings regarding the behavioral eﬀects of testos-
terone is the so-called winner eﬀect. The winner eﬀect refers to two fre-
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quently replicated ﬁndings. First, testosterone levels rise in anticipation of an
antagonistic or dominance encounter or a status challenge; second, after the
challenge, levels rise further in winners, but decline in losers. These diﬀer-
ences in post-encounter testosterone levels then contribute to further success
in winners, and further losses in losers. Thus, the winner eﬀect describes a
self-reinforcing cycle in which positive testosterone feedback leads winners to
keep winning and losers to keep losing.
For instance, Bernstein et al. (1974) introduced 5 male macaques to a
group of 34 other macaques. The newcomers were quickly attacked and de-
feated by the resident group, and this event was accompanied by an 80% drop
in their circulating testosterone levels. A diﬀerent setting that allowed the
intruder to achieve victory over the resident group led to strongly increased
testosterone levels in this animal.
A similar eﬀect was shown in humans by Booth et al. (1989), who found
that tennis players who won a match had rising testosterone levels throughout
the match, while those who lost showed declining levels. Similarly, Mazur &
Lamb (1980) found that winning players had higher levels after the match
than losers.
A potential concerns with these ﬁndings is endogeneity, i.e. players might
have won because of their high testosterone levels, rather having had high
testosterone as a consequence of their wins. To alleviate this concern, Gladue
et al. (1989) experimentally manipulated winning vs. losing by randomly
assigning participants to one or the other outcome in a laboratory game.
As in Booth's study, winners had higher testosterone (but not cortisol) levels
compared to losers. In line with these results, recently released hostages from
Iraq showed strongly elevated levels of testosterone, possibly as a result of
elation over their release (Rahe et al., 1990). In contrast, Mazur & Lamb
(1980) did not observe such a diﬀerence when winning vs. losing was deter-
mined by a lottery draw; thus, testosterone surges after winning experiences
appear to be restricted to situations where winners attribute the win to their
own actions.
In a similar experiment with non-endogenous winning vs. losing out-
comes, McCaul et al. (1992) placed subjects in a situation in which they
could win or lose $5, the outcome being governed entirely by luck. Intrigu-
ingly, the authors again found that testosterone levels were higher in winners
than in losers, suggesting that testosterone may respond to status-altering
outcomes. McCaul and colleagues also measured cortisol, but found no eﬀect
of winning vs. losing on this measure.
Finally, Bernhardt et al. (1998) used a natural setting which arguably
controlled for the endogeneity of winning vs. losing outcomes to a similar
extent. These authors studied the testosterone levels of football fans before
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a World Cup match between Brazil and Italy. These fans did not expect
to actively participate in the contest themselves, and thus changes in their
testosterone levels must reﬂect the anticipation of a status encounter and
the experiences of winning and losing. Indeed, Bernhardt et al. found that
testosterone levels were elevated in anticipation of the match in both groups
of fans. In addition, fans of the winning team, Brazil, showed increased
testosterone levels after the match, while Italy fans showed decreased levels.
A potential concern with all of these ﬁndings is that even in those studies
in which winning vs. losing was manipulated by the experimenters (or, in the
acse of the World Cup study, by the relative performance of two teams which
were closely matched in terms of ability), participants might have come to the
experiment with home-grown beliefs about their own likelihood of winning;
in this way, changed testosterone levels after wins vs. losses might relfect
the degree to which subjects' expectations regarding their own performance
were fulﬁlled, as opposed to winning vs. losing experiences per se.
Importantly, the changes in testosterone levels as a result of winning
vs. losing also have further behavioral consquences, namely in that winning
individuals with higher testosterone levels are more likely to win subsequent
status challenges than losers with lower levels. For instance, Oyegbile &
Marler (2005) staged ﬁghts between male mice; in an initial phase, winners
were created among the test animals by pairing them with weaker and mildly
sedated opponents. The animals won most of these ﬁghts; based on the
above ﬁndings, one would therefore expect a testosterone surge after such
wins. Indeed, after two wins, the winners showed increased testosterone
levels compared to control, and after three wins, they were more likely to
win subsequent ﬁghting encounters than under control conditions. Similar
ﬁndings have been produced in a number of other species: insects (Otronen,
1990; Whitehouse, 1997), ﬁsh (Hsu & Wolf, 1999), and reptiles (Schuett,
1997). While no demonstration of the eﬀect appears to exist in humans,
the animal literature strongly suggests that prior wins indeed contribute to
subsequent wins, and that this eﬀect is mediated by the testosterone surge
that follows winning experiences.
Together, these studies suggest an important potential channel through
which the eﬀects of testosterone on behavior may amplify themselves: indi-
viduals with high testosterone are likely to win dominance encounters; this
further raises testosterone levels, and these raised levels in turn contribute to
subsequent wins. Conversely, losers will show a loser eﬀect, in which losing a
dominance challenge leads to decreased testosterone levels and subsequently
a higher probability of losing dominance encounters.
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2.8.2 The Mismatch Eﬀect
A second strand of literature modulates these winner eﬀect ﬁndings in an
intriguing way. The winner eﬀect refers to rises in testosterone levels in
anticipation of status or dominance challenges, and further rises after a win,
thus leading to a cycle in which one win leads to subsequent ones, and one loss
leads to further losses. However, a second group of studies describes a parallel
ﬁnding known as the Mismatch Eﬀect. The basic claim of this literature is
that the same testosterone level may operate in diﬀerent ways in diﬀerent
situational contexts. Speciﬁcally, high-testosterone individuals may improve
in performance when they ﬁnd themselves in dominant positions; in contrast,
when they ﬁnd themselves in submissive positions, their performance may
deteriorate.
Josephs et al. (2006) placed male participants with either high or low
baseline testosterone levels in a rigged competition, in which they completed
cognitive tasks such as spatial processing. By randomly letting one partici-
pant win, Josephs et al. manipulated relative status. They then assessed cog-
nitive functioning with questions from the analytic section of the Graduate
Record Examination (GRE). It turned out that participants with high base-
line testosterone performed best when they were in the dominant position
after the rigged competition, while low-testosterone individuals performed
best when they were in the submissive position. The authors suggest that
when there is a mismatch between one's desired status, as proxied by baseline
testosterone levels, and actual status, as assigned in the rigged competition,
participants are distracted by this mismatch and therefore perform worse
on the cognitive task. This ﬁnding would imply that low-status individuals
with high testosterone will perform poorly. If, in addition, low status has
environmental consequences which increase testosterone, this could lead to a
vicious circle by which an environment of poverty leads to high testosterone,
and in combination with awareness of one's low status, this leads to impaired
performance and antisocial behavior.
These ﬁndings suggest an additional channel to the winner eﬀect by which
poverty may aﬀect testosterone levels and behavior: in the winner eﬀect
model, a fall into poverty would decrease testosterone levels, lead to sub-
sequent losses, thereby further decreasing testosterone, and so on. In the
mismatch eﬀect model, a fall into poverty would interact with previous testos-
terone levels to produce adaptive behavior in individuals with previously low
testosterone, and maladaptive behavior in individuals with previously high
testosterone. Thus, if poor people have initially high testosterone, an increase
in poverty would lead to a mismatch between with their low social status
and their high testosterone levels, and thus lead to bad performance, which
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would further exacerbate poverty. Thus, the mismatch eﬀect can produce a
self-perpetuating cycle in which poverty reinforces itself.
Note, however, that the winner and mismatch eﬀects operate in opposite
directions: according to the mismatch eﬀect, individuals with high testos-
terone who ﬁnd themselves in a low-status position should perform badly,
and therefore descend in the hierarchy. This is consistent with the correla-
tional ﬁndings mentioned above. However, the winner eﬀect would suggset
that over time poor individuals should lose more dominance challenges than
richer people and therefore show lower testosterone levels, while rich peo-
ple would be more likely to win status challenges and therefore should show
higher levels.
How can these contradictory ﬁndings be reconciled? First, note that
the winner and mismatch eﬀects are not mutually exclusive: on the one
hand, high-testosterone individuals may perform poorly when placed in sit-
uations in which they are the underdog (mismatch eﬀect); on the other
hand, according to the loser eﬀect, such poor performances would lead to
lower testosterone levels, which in these situational contexts would produce
adaptive behavior, etc. Thus, what is necessary to create a vicious cycle in
which high testosterone in poor people leads to maladaptive behavior and
thus further poverty, is that the mismatch eﬀect is stronger than the winner
eﬀect. I am unaware whether this proposition has been tested; it is interest-
ing material for future studies.
A further problem is that according to the above argument, rich people
with low testosterone levels would ﬁnd themselves in a mismatch between
their high social status and their low testosterone levels, which, according
to Josephs' ﬁndings, should also lead to maladaptive behavior, and thus a
descent in the hierarchy. However, an additional line of evidence argues
against this relationship.
A modiﬁed version of the mismatch argument is that the behavioral eﬀects
of testosterone may only come to bear in situational contexts in which one's
status is threatened. According to this line of reasoning, rich people may
ﬁnd themselves in environments where they do not encounter frequent status
threats, and for this reason the mismatch between their low testosterone
levels and high status does not lead to maladaptive behavior.
In support of this argument, such a context-related eﬀect of testosterone
on performance was found by Josephs et al. (2003). These authors primed
gender stereotypes for performance on math questions, by presenting partici-
pants with a questionnaire asking questions such as I think that some people
feel I have less math ability because of my gender. The participants then
responded to items from the quantitative section of the GRE (GRE-Q) for
20 minutes. The authors found that men with high testosterone, for whom
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the math test oﬀered the possibility to conﬁrm a positive stereotype, per-
formed well on the GRE-Q, while women with high testosterone, for whom
the math test would be more likely to be seen as a status threat due to
negative stereotypes about the mathematical ability of women, performed
poorly. Thus, high testosterone appears to impair performance in contexts
where one is faced with status threats.
Further evidence for this view comes from a study by Millet & Dewitte
(2007). These authors found that the eﬀect of testosterone on aggression is
mediated by situational context. Rather than measuring testosterone levels
directly, these authors used a simple indicator of prenatal testosterone ex-
posure: the 2D:4D ratio, i.e. the ratio of the length of the index compared
to the ring ﬁnger. A low 2D:4D ratio has been shown to be associated with
high prenatal levels of testosterone, while a high ratio is thought to reﬂect low
levels (Csatho et al., 2003; Manning, 2002; Manning et al., 1998; Williams
et al., 2003).
Millet & Dewitte found that subjects with high testosterone levels (lower
2D:4D ratio) scored higher on questionnaire measures of aggression (Buss
& Perry, 1992; O'Connor et al., 2001). However, this relationship obtained
only after participants had viewed a violent video, not after viewing neutral
videos. Thus, situational context appears to uncover the eﬀect of testosterone
on aggressive behavior.
Together, these ﬁndings suggest that the mismatch eﬀect may not nec-
essarily make rich people poor over time due to the contrast between their
high social status and low testosterone levels: it may be that the relation-
ship between testosterone and behavior only becomes apparent when status
is threatened, and rich people may only rarely ﬁnd themselves in such situ-
ations.
2.8.3 Testosterone and Economic Choice
I have argued above that poverty may lead to increased testosterone levels,
which in turn may interact with social status to produce suboptimal be-
havior. However, the behaviors in question were cognitive performance; I
have ignored evidence on the eﬀect of testosterone on economic choice so far.
In fact, the evidence is mounting that testosterone has far-reaching conse-
quences for economic behavior.
2.8.4 Testosterone and Time Preference
A small group of studies suggests that high testosterone may be associated
with present-biased economic decisions. Wilson & Daly (2004) provide early
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anecdotal evidence for this view: these authors presented men with pictures
of attractive women; it was thought that viewing of attractive female pictures
would increasetestosterone levels, and so this paradigm arguably oﬀers a
non-invasive testosterone manipulation. Wilson & Daly observed that this
manipulation increased temporal discounting, i.e., made men more impatient,
than viewing control pictures.
In a purely correlational study, Takahashi et al. (2006) measured the asso-
ciation between baseline testosterone and the discount parameter k (Kirby et
al., 1999). No linear relationship was found, but a regression that included
a quadratic regressor for log(k) resulted in signiﬁcance for all coeﬃcients.
Speciﬁcally, testosterone increased as discounting increased for subjects with
low k values (i.e. patient subjects), while testosterone decreased as discount-
ing increased for subjects with high k values. It is somewhat unclear as to
how this ﬁnding is to be interpreted, mostly because it is more intuitive to
think of discounting as a consequence of testosterone levels, but if one views
it as such no clear relationship is apparent. In a partial answer to this puz-
zle, other studies have found that the relationship between testosterone and
discounting may be mediated by social status.
Speciﬁcally, Kobe & Millet (2004) capitalized on this fact to study the
relationship between baseline testosterone and economic choice under diﬀer-
ence social status conditions. They manipulated social status in the lab by
asking participants to work on a Sudoku puzzle, and then providing bogus
feedback on their performance. In the high-status condition, participants
were told that they had performed the task better than 90.7% of the par-
ticipants in a previous study, while in the low-status condition, they were
informed that their performance only put them at the 11.4 percentile. Par-
ticipants then completed a time discounting task, in which they indicated
which amount of money they would require after a certain delay to make
them indiﬀerent between that amount and 15 Euros on the day of the exper-
iment. Kobe & Millet found that testosterone was related to discounting, but
this relationship was mediated by status assignment: participants in the low-
status condition showed a relationship between 2D:4D ratio and discounting,
in that a smaller 2D:4D ratio (and thus, higher testosterone) was associated
with higher discounting; in contrast, in the high-status condition, no such
relationship existed. Thus, higher testosterone levels may lead to impatience
in low-status, but not in high-status conditions; put diﬀerently, a low-status
environment may allow the eﬀects of testosterone on impatience to come
to the fore, while these eﬀects are suppressed in a high-status environment.
A potential problem with the 2D:4D metric is that it is somewhat unclear
how high vs. low prenatal testosterone levels play out later in life. On the
one hand, the 2D:4D ratio correlates with circulating hormone levels (Falter
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et al., 2006; Manning et al., 1998); on the other, it is also associated with
testosterone responsivity (Manning et al., 2003). Thus, direct measures of
circulating levels will be required to rigorously establish the link suggested
by this intriguing study.
2.8.5 Testosterone and Risk Preference
In addition, a growing number of studies implicate testosterone in risk-taking
behavior. For instance, Apicella et al. (2008) had subjects play a simple in-
vestment game to measure their risk preferences: subjects were asked to
decide what fraction of $250 they wanted to invest in a risky asset. The
payoﬀ from the risky asset was determined by a coin ﬂip; it either paid 0, or
a return of 250%, with equal probability for both outcomes. The expected
value of investing the entire $250 is $325.50; thus, expected-value maximizing
subjects should invest the entire amount. The fraction of the initial endow-
ment that is not invested is therefore a measure of subjects risk aversion.
Apicella and colleagues found that subjects with higher baseline testosterone
levels showed less risk aversion, i.e. invested a higher fraction of their endow-
ment in the risky asset. The same was true for subjecst with higher facial
masculinity scores. Facial masculinity is a measure of testosterone exposure
during puberty, and reﬂects the fact that high testosterone exposure during
this period leads to particular facial features such as high jawbones and low
cheekbones (Johnston et al., 2001).
Coates & Herbert (2008) tested whether testosterone correlated with eco-
nomic performance of traders on a London trading ﬂoor. As described above
for cortisol, these authors measured salivary cortisol and testosterone levels
in a sample of 17 traders from a London trading ﬂoor twice daily, at 11am and
4pm. The cortisol results have been described above. The testosterone re-
sults revealed a correlation between testosterone levels and Proﬁts and Losses
(P&L) at the end of the day, i.e. 4pm. Crucially, both the 11am and the
4pm testosterone levels correlated with P&L independently; this suggests, on
the one hand, that higher morning testosterone levels predict higher proﬁts
during the remainder of the day; and, on the other hand, that higher proﬁts
during the day raise testosterone levels in their turn. Thus, these traders show
something like a winner eﬀect in the relationship between their testosterone
levels and their proﬁts: higher testosterone leads to higher proﬁts, which in
turn raises testosterone levels further. It is likely, however, that further rises
in testosterone levels may lead to adverse outcomes; for instance, Booth et
al. (1999) found that high-testosterone men showed a higher incidence of be-
haviors that are harmful health-related behaviors, Daitzman & Zuckerman
(1980) found a correlation between high testosterone and impulsive behavior.
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Reavis & Overman found a correlation between baseline testosterone lev-
els and performance on the Iowa Gambling task: college-age men with higher
baseline testosterone levels performed worse than those with lower levels.
However, this ﬁnding was only signiﬁcant in college-age men, not in older
men or women.
To avoid the correlational nature of such ﬁndings, a number of studies
have manipulated testosterone pharmacologically in health participants to
study its eﬀecst on economic choice. For instance, using chronic testosterone
administration over a period of 4 weeks, Zethraeus et al. studied the eﬀect
of an exogenous testosterone increase on economic behaviors in a sample
of 200 postmenopausal women. No eﬀects of testosterone were found on a
host of studied behaviors, including risk attitudes, altruism, and trust and
trustworthiness; however, it is possible that this was due to the fact that
acute administration has been shown to have stronger eﬀects on behavior.
Van Honk et al. (2004) made this correction: they administered a sin-
gle dose of testosterone to participants who subsequently played the Iowa
Gambling Task. Performance on the task was impaired under testosterone
compared to placebo, with participants on testosterone choosing cards from
the disadvantageous deck more frequently than under placebo conditions.
Thus, it appears that high testosterone leads to present-biased time pref-
erences and risk-seeking risk preferences. To what degree this ﬁnding can
be reconconciled with the literature cited for cortisol above remains to be
seen; in particular, on the one hand, poverty is associated with higher corti-
sol and more risk aversion, while on the other hand povery is also associated
with higher testosertone and less risk aversion. Future studies will have to
elucidate which of these eﬀects dominates, and under which conditions.
2.9 Emerging questions
2.9.1 What about causality?
While laboratory experiments such as that of Porcelli & Delgado (2009) have
already begun to identify casual eﬀects of neurobiological variables on eco-
nomic choice, it remains unclear whether and to what extent the link between
poverty and neurobiological outcomes is causal: to date, all of these rela-
tionships are purely correlational, and reverse or simultaneous causation are
therefore serious concerns. Future RCTs should make it a priority to measure
the eﬀect of poverty alleviation, or exogenous increases in poverty, on lev-
els of cortisol, serotonergic responsivity, and serotonergic gene-environment
interactions. In the following, I outline three potential approaches.
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A laboratory approach
A ﬁrst approach to asking whether neurobiological variables are aﬀected by
poverty is to induce a version of poverty in a laboraty setting, and then
measure its impact on neurobiological variables and economic choice. This
may initially appear to be a hopeless proposition; poverty is an extremely
multi-faceted phenomenon, which, apart from insuﬃcient income, encom-
passes poor access to health facilities, low levels of education, poorly devel-
oped institutional environments, etc. Thus one naturally cannot hope to
capture the full range of what it means to be poor through a simple labo-
ratory manipulation. At the same time, however, experimental economics
has a history of successfully operationalizing complex real-life behaviors in
the laboratory; consider for instance the trust game, which is an established
laboratory measure of trust, and the dictator game, a widely-used measure
of altruism (Bolton et al., 1998; see Camerer, 2003, for an overview). Thus,
it is likely that at least some aspects of poverty can be captured in a lab-
oratory situation. Indeed, the central deﬁning element of poverty, namely
the absence of money, should in principle be quite amenable to study in the
laboratory.
In practice, one could experimentally manipulate both poverty relative to
other individuals' income levels, and poverty relative to a subject's individual
income history. The former could be achieved by giving subjects diﬀerent
initial endowments at the beginning of the experiment, and informing them
about the endowments of other participants; thus, each participant knows
how poor she is relative to others. The latter could be achieved by letting
subjects earn income in the experiment, e.g. in a real eﬀort task such as that
used by Abeler et al. (2009), and then exogenously imposing income shocks
on participants. For instance, a subset of participants might randomly lose a
large proportion of their earned income, while another subset gains a compa-
rable proportion, and yet other participants remain at the same level. One
could then measure how these manipulations aﬀect economic, psychological,
and neurobiological outcomes; i.e., does being poor relative to one's own in-
come history aﬀect economic choice (e.g. time and risk preference, prosocial
behavior, and eﬀort levels), psychological variables (e.g. stress, locus of con-
trol, optimism, and self-esteem), and neurobiological outcomes (e.g. cortisol
and serotonin levels, potentially in interaction with the polymorphisms men-
tioned above)? Despite the obvious limitations of a laboratory study such
as this one, discussed above, the answers to these questions might at least
provide suggestive evidence that could be compared to ﬁeld data.
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A poverty increase in the ﬁeld
Due to the limitations of the laboratory approach, ﬁeld evidence could poten-
tially provide a much more satisfying answer to the causality question. Does
an increase in real-world poverty lead to changes in psychological, economic,
and neurobiological outcomes? Of course it is not possible to experimentally
induce a downward income shock; however, it may be possible to identify
natural experiments which have done just this. As an example, the Maasai
in Kajiado district of Southern Kenya have experienced the worst drought in
over a century in 2008/2009. This meant that almost all households in the
region lost between 50-100% of their livestock. This was a terrible tragedy
for the people in the region, but at the same time it aﬀords an opportu-
nity to study the eﬀect of this negative income shock on welfare. How do
we identify the causal eﬀect of the drought on welfare? One possibility is
to use an instrumental variables approach: in cases where detailed rainfall
data are available, as is the case in this setting, this data can be used as
an instrument for the number of cows owned by each household that died
during the drought. One can then estimate the eﬀect of this negative income
shock on the psychological, economic, and neurobiological outcome variables
of interest.
A poverty decrease in the ﬁeld
Another possible approach to establish causality in the link between poverty
and neurobiological outcomes, and one that is amenable to RCTs, is to test
the psychological, economic, and neurobiological consequences of a reduc-
tion of poverty. The answers to this question could conceivably be quite
diﬀerent to those obtained for an increase in poverty; for instance, one could
easily imagine that while an increase in poverty might lead to depression,
poverty alleviation might not necessarily reduce depression that has already
developed. As an example, imagine an RCT which distributes Unconditional
Cash Transfers (UCTs) among poor residents in rural Kenya. An UCT is, in
essence, free money: a one-time, no-strings-attached payment to a particu-
lar household, based on basic criteria of need. From the point of view of our
research question, namely, what is the eﬀect of poverty alleviation on house-
hold welfare in general and neurobiological outcomes speciﬁcally, UCTs are
an obvious vehicle of choice, since they represent the purest form of poverty
alleviation: the central feature of poverty, as mentioned above, is lack of
funds; UCTs address this characteristic head-on and thus oﬀer the cleanest
poverty manipulation for our purposes. In addition, UCTs are a promis-
ing new approach from a policy perspective, and initial natural experiments
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(Duﬂo, 2000) and RCTs (Paxson & Schady, 2007) showed positive results.
A concern in this literature is that UCTs are bound to have heterogeneous
treatment eﬀects; neurobiological measures of cortisol and serotonin could
potentially detect aggregate eﬀects of these eﬀects, and thus oﬀer a useful
tool to assess the welfare consequences of UCTs. Conversely, UCTs oﬀer an
opportunity to cleanly test the eﬀect of a poverty reduction on neurobiolog-
ical outcomes.
2.9.2 How big are the eﬀects?
Poverty traps require strong feedback loops to have explanatory power. Thus
the question arises whether the neurobiological relationships described above
are strong enough to account for the diﬀerences in economic choice observed
between rich and poor people. For instance, how large are the poverty-related
diﬀerences in cortisol levels that are typically observed between rich and poor
individuals compared to stress-induced cortisol increases in the laboratory,
and what proportion of the observed diﬀerences in economic choice between
rich and poor could potentially be explained by this stress channel?
The problems described above make it diﬃcult to answer this question.
First, it is not clear to what extent laboratory-induced stress eﬀects are
similar in their behavioral eﬀect to chronic cortisol diﬀerences; second, the
question whether the link from poverty to increased cortisol levels is causal
has yet to be answered conclusively. However, with these caveats in mind,
we can at least describe an illustrative example to assess whether the re-
lationships are of an order of magnitude that could potentially account for
a satisfactory amount of the variance in economic choice between rich and
poor.
Cohen et al. (2006a) contains the most detailed information on cortisol
diﬀerences between poor and rich adults. These authors ﬁnd evening cortisol
concentrations of ~3.7 nmol/l for rich, and ~5.5 nmol/l for poor individuals
(where rich and poor are deﬁned as the top and bottom income tertiles).
Thus, the diﬀerence in cortisol levels between poor and rich individuals is 1.8
nmol/l. It is unlikely that this diﬀerence is entirely due to a causal eﬀect of
poverty on stress; rather, it is likely to be bidirectional, with poverty leading
to stress, but stress also exacerbating poverty. For the sake of simplicity and
arugment, let us assume for the moment that 50% of this diﬀerence is due
to a stress-increasing eﬀect of poverty, i.e. poverty raises evening cortisol
levels by 0.9 nmol/l. (Note that it would be not only important to do assess
how large this eﬀect truly is, but also relatively easy: a ﬁrst answer could
be gotten from an RCT which exogenously reduces poverty, e.g. through
unconditional cash transfers or insurance.)
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A typical laboratory stress test induces a cortisol diﬀerence of around 10
nmol/l between stress and control groups (e.g. van den Bos, 2009). What are
the consequences of such an increase in cortisol levels for economic behavior?
Porcelli & Delgado (2009) found that subjects became more risk-averse under
laboratory-induced stress. Estimating the change in the risk premium due
to stress in their study reveals a jump from 43% without stress to 82% under
stress; this corresponds to a 91% increase over baseline levels of the risk
premium.
If poverty raises evening cortisol levels by 0.9 nmol/l, and laboratory-
induced stress raises them by 10 nmol/l, this suggests that the magnitude
of cortisol diﬀerences observed between rich and poor is 9% of that induced
by a standard laboratory test. The assumption that laboratory and ﬁeld
diﬀerences have the same behavioral consequences is both untested and al-
most certainly overstated; however, at the same time it would be somewhat
surprising if the cortisol diﬀerences between rich and poor observed in the
ﬁeld had no behavioral consequences at all. If we assume that only a small
proportion, say 10%, of the behavioral eﬀects of stress in the lab translate to
the ﬁeld, this predicts that poverty would aﬀect people's risk premia in the
ﬁeld at 0.9% of the eﬀect of stress on risk premia observed in the lab. Put
diﬀerently, we should expect risk premia among poor people that are about
1% higher than among rich people, as a consequence of higher cortisol levels
among this group. This would lower the willingness of poor consumers to
invest in risky assets, and thereby lead to reduced growth.
2.10 Conclusion
In the preceding sections, I have summarized evidence suggesting that poverty
has particular neurobiological consequences; in particular, it increases corti-
sol, serotonin, and testosterone levels, and alters the function of these trans-
mitters and hormones in other ways (e.g. it leads to blunted serotonergic
responsivity and modulates serotonergic gene-environment interactions). In
addition, I have shown that each of these changes, in turn, has profound con-
sequences for economic behavior; altered cortisol, serotonin and testosterone
impair decision-making and increase impulsivity. Together, these relation-
ships suggest a neurobiological poverty trap which runs through the channels
of cortisol, serotonin, and testosterone.
A number of caveats are in order. First, none of the relationships between
poverty and neurobiological outcomes has to date been conclusively shown
to be causal, and reverse causality is therefore a serious concern. Future
RCTs should make it a priority to measure the eﬀect of poverty alleviation
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on levels of these neurobiological markers, and search for natural experiments
that allow to assess the eﬀect of poverty increases on them.
Second, it remains to be shown whether any of the mechanisms outlined
above are in fact strong enough to perpetuate poverty. Despite the fact that
many of the eﬀects described are large in magnitude and solidly established
in the literature, the possibility remains that their power is too weak to drive
a poverty trap. Data-informed economic models might assess this possibility
in the future.
Third, the link between poverty and neurobiological outcomes as I have
presented it is somewhat closed-form: the potential eﬀect of poverty on neuro-
biological variables might be more intuitively conceptualized through psycho-
logical variables such as stress, lack of optimism, self-esteem, or depression.
The reason to choose neurobiological instead of psychological constructs here
was for ease of deﬁnition and experimental tractability, even across cultural
contexts. However, future studies will have to assess whether focusing on
neurobiological rather than psychological variables is sensible.
Finally, I have entirely ignored cultural heterogeneity in the eﬀect of
poverty on cortisol, serotonin, and testosterone, and in the eﬀect of these
hormones and transmitters on economic behavior. There is no a priori rea-
son to believe that such physiological fundamentals would operate diﬀerently
across cultures, but the possibility cannot be excluded with complete conﬁ-
dence. Future studies might assess to what extent the neurobiological eﬀects
of poverty, and the behavioral eﬀects of neurobiological variables, are cultur-
ally speciﬁc.
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Chapter 3
Low Income is Associated with
High Baseline Levels and Low
Stress Reactivity of Cortisol, but
Not Alpha Amylase
3.1 Summary
Does poverty have particular neurobiological consequences? We test here
whether low-income individuals show higher baseline levels, or higher stress-
induced reactivity, of the stress hormone cortisol and the sympathetic marker
salivary alpha-amylase. A sample of 80 healthy university students was sam-
pled both at baseline, and while performing the Trier Social Stress Test
(TSST), a standard stress-inducing laboratory task. We ﬁnd that poor in-
dividuals have higher baseline levels of cortisol, and lower cortisol reactivity
to stress, than richer individuals. In contrast, salivary alpha amylase shows
no relationship to income, neither in baseline levels nor stress reactivity. To-
gether, these ﬁndings suggest that poverty is associated with dysregulation
of cortisol; this may lead to adverse health outcomes and disadvantageous
decision-making.
3.2 Introduction
Does poverty get under your skin? A prominent hypothesis is that low-
income environments may be characterized by both greater exposure to
stressful events, and the absence of resources to deal with such stress (Baum
et al., 1999; Steptoe et al., 2002; Brunner, 1997; Kristenson, 2004). This
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hypothesis predicts changes in physiological markers of stress: if low-income
populations are more stressed, they should show higher levels, altered daily
proﬁles, or diﬀerent stress reactivity in stress hormones. In the following,
we refer to this claim as the poverty-stress hypothesis. These changes could
in turn lead to adverse consequences of their own, such as immunosuppres-
sion (Cacioppo et al., 2002) or altered decision-making (Porcelli & Delgado,
2009). Do low-income populations indeed show diﬀerences in physiological
markers of stress? A growing body of literature investigates this question;
however, it will emerge in the following discussion that the answer remains
unclear.
The physiological response to stress in humans is characterized by the
joint activation of two systems: the hypothalamic-adrenal-pituitary (HPA)
axis and its associated stress hormone cortisol, and the sympathetic-adrenal-
medullary (SAM) axis and its associated stress hormone norepinephrine (NE).
Cortisol can be measured directly in saliva, where it is a good indicator of
levels in the blood (Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 1994); sympathetic can be
measured by proxy in saliva, through salivary alpha-amylase (sAA; van Ste-
geren et al., 2006; Ehlert et al., 2006).
Most attention in the literature has been devoted to cortisol. A number of
studies show higher baseline levels of cortisol in populations of low socioeco-
nomic status (SES), consistent with the poverty-stress hypothesis (Cohen et
al., 2006a, 2006b; Evans & Kim, 2009; Evans & English, 2002; Li et al., 2007;
Lupien et al., 2000; Arnetz et al., 1991; see Dowd et al., 2009, for a review).
However, other studies show no associations, or relationships restricted to
certain population groups or parts of the daily cortisol proﬁle (Dowd et al.,
2006; Gersten, 2008; Goodman et al., 2005; Ranjit et al., 2005; Rosmond &
Bjorntorp, 2000; Steptoe et al., 2005; Decker, 2000; Rosero-Bixby & Dow,
2009). Finally, three studies even show a positive association between base-
line cortisol and SES (Brandstadter et al., 1991; Chen & Paterson, 2006;
Fiocco et al., 2007). Thus, it remains unclear to what extent low SES is in
fact associated with higher baseline cortisol levels; the ﬁrst purpose of the
present study was to shed further light on this question.
Second, a question that has received much less attention is whether cor-
tisol reactivity to stress is altered in people with low SES. In the few studies
that have addressed this question, participants are typically presented with
mildly stressful tasks in the laboratory, such as the well-known Trier Social
Stress Task (TSST; Kirschbaum et al., 1993). The results are conﬂicting:
Fiocco et al. (2007) ﬁnd a negative association between cortisol reactivity
and SES, Kristenson et al. (2001) ﬁnd a positive association, Adler et al.
(2000) no association between reactivity and SES, but one between SES and
adaptation to repeated stress; and two other studies ﬁnd no relationship
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(Steptoe et al., 2005; Kapuku et al., 2002). Thus, the second aim of this
paper was to investigate further to what extent cortisol reactivity to stress
is associated with income.
The literature on SES and sAA is smaller yet; two studies show higher
sAA levels in low-SES children (Wolf et al., 2008; Granger et al., 2006), but
one of these only obtained an eﬀect in asthmatic and not healthy children
(Wolf et al., 2008), and no study has investigated this link in adults. In
addition, to our knowledge no study has investigated whether sAA reactivity
to stress is modulated by income. Thus, the ﬁnal goals of this paper were to
investigate whether baseline levels of sAA, and sAA reactivity to stress, are
aﬀected by income in adults.
To address these research questions, we measured both baseline levels of
cortisol and sAA, and cortisol and sAA reactivity to a laboratory stressor,
in a sample of Swiss university students. We ﬁnd that lower income students
have higher levels of baseline cortisol, and reduced cortisol reactivity to stress,
compared to richer students. However, no relationships between income and
baseline sAA levels were found; furthermore, income did not predict sAA
reactivity to laboratory stress.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Participants
We recruited 81 healthy male participants form the subject pool of the Uni-
versity of Zürich. Their mean age was 21.31 ± 1.85 years. We excluded
students of economics and psychology, and those who were acutely or chron-
ically ill, took medications, drugs, smoked more than 5 cigarettes a day,
regularly consumed more than 60g of alcohol per day, suﬀered from allergies
or psychiatric disorders, were in psychological or psychiatric treatment at
the time of the study, had previously participated in a TSST, or had a body
mass index smaller than 18 or greater than 25. Participants were instructed
to not consume medications, alcohol, or coﬀee, and not to engage in sexual
intercourse, for 24h before the experiment. In addition, they were asked to
get up at least 3h before the beginning of the experiment, and to not drink
coﬀee, eat, smoke, or perform strenuous physical activity in the last 2h before
the experiment. All participants were tested in the afternoon between 2pm
and 8pm, when plasma cortisol levels are close to the circadian trough. They
gave written informed consent and were reimbursed for their participation.
An experimental session lasted 2h.
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3.3.2 Stress Manipulation
Psychosocial stress was induced with a grouped version of the Trier Social
Stress Test (TSST-G; Kirschbaum et al., 1993; von Dawans et al., 2010).
The procedure followed closely that described by Dawans et al. (2010), and
involved a preparation period of 5 min, followed by a video- and audio- taped
public speaking task of 12 min (a ﬁctional job interview, see below), and a
mental arithmetic task of 8 min, both in front of an evaluation committee
(one man and one woman wearing white laboratory coats). A maximum of
4 and a minimum of 2 subjects were tested at the same time. In the job
interview component of the task, each participant had 3 minutes to describe
why their personal qualities qualiﬁed them for a job. The committee repeat-
edly interrupted the presentation with questions, following a pre-prepared
script. In the arithmetic task, participants were asked to count backwards in
steps of 16, starting at a random 4-digit number. Mistakes were corrected by
the panel, and the participant had to start over. All Subjects ﬁrst delivered
their speech and after that performed the arithmetic task. Each subject was
called at least twice and in random order for every task, to induce a feeling
of unpredictability. Speaking time for every participant was kept constant.
To keep the cognitive load and circumstances of the control condition as
comparable as possible, only lacking the component of social control, sub-
jects in the control condition underwent the same conditions, with three
important diﬀerences. First, subjects were not video- or audio-taped and
there was no panel in laboratory coats, just a passive observer in a corner
of the room. Second, while the mental arithmetic task was the same, the
ﬁctional job interview was replaced by an account of a memorable experi-
ence with a good friend. The purpose of this task was toe require a similar
amount of creativity and cognitive resources as the job interview, while not
containing the same stressful element of social evaluation and having to talk
oneself up. Finally, all subjects performed their tasks simultaneously with
the other participants; this made the individual contributions unintelligible
to the passive observer and the other participants, thus further reducing the
social evaluative element. Total duration of the task and speaking time for
each participant were matched to the parameters of the stress condition.
3.3.3 Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: control (N=41)
and stress (N=40). Subjects were instructed not to talk to each other dur-
ing the whole experiment. An overview of the study timeline is displayed
in Figure 3.4.1. Twenty minutes after subjects arrived in the laboratory, a
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ﬁrst saliva sample was taken. Subjects were guided to a room where they
received general instructions about the experiment, but not the TSST or
Control tasks, to avoid inducing anticipatory stress before taking the sec-
ond baseline saliva sample. After 20 min, second saliva sample was taken.
Next, subjects received instructions for the TSST, and were given a 5 min
preparation period for the stress or control task. They were then guided to
another room, where they gave their speech. Before subjects were instructed
to perform the arithmetic task, a third saliva sample was taken. Directly
after the whole TSST or control procedure, a fourth saliva sample was taken.
Next, participants were asked to sit at the chair placed behind them and
performed economic choice tasks, the results of which are reported in a sepa-
rate paper. After completing these tasks, participants remained seated, ﬁlled
in a socioeconomic questionnaire, and read a neutral magazine. Additional
saliva samples were taken 10 min, 20 min, and 50 min after the end of the
TSST or control task. After the last saliva sample was taken, participants
were debriefed and paid for their participation.
3.3.4 Salivary Sampling and Biochemical Analysis
Salivary samples were obtained using Salivette sampling devices (Sarstedt,
Nümbrecht, Germany) at 7 time points during the experiments (Figure 3.4.1).
Salivary samples were stored at -20°C until further analysis. Free cortisol lev-
els were measured using a commercially available immunoassay (IBL, Ham-
burg, Germany). Salivary alpha-amylase levels were measured by a quan-
titative enzyme kinetic essay as described elsewhere (van Stegeren et al.,
2006).
3.3.5 Income measure
Information about the individual incomes of participants was elicited with
the following question: How much money do you have available in an av-
erage month (excluding costs of rent and insurance)? The purpose of this
particular formulation was to elicit income data that was reﬂective of the
ﬁnancial liquidity of participants and independent from the source of the
money, e.g. jobs vs. parents. Statistical analysis was performed on both the
untransformed and log-transformed income data (see below).
3.3.6 Covariates
Our regressions control for the following covariates: age, measured in years;
time between waking and the beginning of the experimental session (timeawake);
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body mass index (bmi), deﬁned as weight (kg) / height2 (cm); number of
siblings (numsibs); political orientation (left = 0, right = 100; polright); and
dummy variables for whether subjects had recently smoked (recentsmoke),
eaten (recenteat), or drunk coﬀee (recentcoﬀee) or alcohol (recentalcohol).
To show the robustness of the eﬀects, we report diﬀerent speciﬁcations con-
trolling for various subsets of these covariates.
3.3.7 Statistical Analysis
Baseline cortisol and sAA were determined by averaging the cortisol and sAA
levels from the ﬁrst two of the seven saliva samples. Stress responsivity of
cortisol and sAA was deﬁned as the area under the cortisol or sAA response
curve (AUC) in those subjects exposed to the social stressor (stress group).
The AUC was calculated with respect to the baseline to rule out eﬀects
stemming from baseline diﬀerences. The eﬀectiveness of the stress task in
raising hormone levels was assessed using a 7 (Sample Period: t0 vs. t20 vs.
t30 vs. t40 vs. t50 vs. t60 vs. t90) x 2 (Stress: TSST-G vs. Control) General
Linear Model (GLM) repeated measures ANOVA with Sample Period as a
repeated measure.
The relationship between baseline hormone levels or hormone stress re-
sponsivity and income was assessed with ordinary least squares regression
using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Speciﬁcally, we regressed
hormone levels (either baseline or AUC) on income (either linear or log), and
varying sets of covariates as described above. When assessing stress reactiv-
ity, the regressions were restricted to those subjects who were exposed to the
TSST. Diﬀerent speciﬁcations include diﬀerent subsets of covariates to show
the robustness of our results.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Eﬀectiveness of TSST in raising cortisol and sAA
levels
The experimental groups (stress vs. control) did not diﬀer in age, BMI, or
baseline cortisol and sAA (P's > 0.1). As expected, the stress manipula-
tion signiﬁcantly raised both cortisol and sAA levels: an ANOVA for corti-
sol showed a signiﬁcant Sample Period x Stress interaction (Figure 3.4.1A,
F1.6,124.4=34.70, P<0.001). Furthermore, a main eﬀect of Sample Period
(F1.6,124.4=34.02, P<0.001) and a main eﬀect of Stress (F1,77=38.53, P<0.001)
were found. Planned simple contrasts related to baseline showed that sub-
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jects in the stress condition had increased cortisol levels from t30 (during the
TSST-G) until t90, i.e. at the end of the session (all P's<0.001).
For alpha-amylase, a signiﬁcant Sample Period x Stress interaction (Fig-
ure 3.4.1B, F5.1,395=8.89, P<0.001) and a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Sample
Period (F5.1,395=23.12, P<0.001) were found. Planned simple contrasts com-
pared to baseline showed that alpha-amylase levels were increased in the
stress condition from t30, i.e. during the TSST-G, until after the early test
condition at t50 (P's<0.05).
3.4.2 Cortisol and income
Our ﬁrst main question was whether baseline cortisol is associated with in-
come: do poorer people have higher cortisol levels? To answer this question,
we regressed baseline cortisol levels on income, while controlling for various
subsets of covariates, and using both linear and log speciﬁcations for the in-
come variable. The results are shown in Table 3.4.1 (linear income variable)
and Table 3.4.2 (log income variable). The income coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant in
all speciﬁcations, with higher incomes associated with lower baseline cortisol
levels, and low-income subjects showing higher baseline cortisol levels.
Second, we wished to test whether cortisol reactivity to the TSST was
associated with income: do poorer people have higher or lower stress re-
activity? To answer this question, we regressed cortisol AUC on income,
again using both linear and log speciﬁcations, and controlling for various co-
variates. The results are shown in Table 3.4.3 (linear income variable) and
Table 3.4.4 (log income variable). The coeﬃcient on income is signiﬁcantly
positive in all speciﬁcations except that which does not control for the time
elapsed between waking and testing, or any other covariates. Thus, higher-
income subjects show higher stress reactivity in terms of cortisol AUC than
lower-income participants.
3.4.3 sAA and income
Our third question was whether baseline sAA is associated with income. We
proceeded as above for the relationship between baseline cortisol and income.
The results are presented in Table 3.4.5 (linear income variable) and Table
3.4.6 (log income variable). None of the speciﬁcations resulted in a signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient on income. Thus, baseline sAA does not appear to be related to
income, whether it is speciﬁed linearly or as log.
Finally, we asked whether sAA reactivity to the TSST was associated
with income. Again we proceeded as above for cortisol, using sAA AUC as
the dependent variable. The results are shown in Tables 3.4.7 and 3.4.8.
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Figure 3.4.1: Timecourse of cortisol activation (A) and salivary alpha amylase
(B) throughout the Trier Social Stress Test. The mean of samples 1 and 2
served as baseline samples. Cortisol reactivity to the Trier Social Stress test
was deﬁned as area under the curve in the stress group with respect to this
baseline.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
model1 model2 model3 model4
VARIABLES cortbase cortbase cortbase cortbase
income -0.00420** -0.00351** -0.00324** -0.00304**
(0.00174) (0.00171) (0.00132) (0.00143)
timeawake 0.000168 0.000132 0.000148
(0.000113) (0.000135) (0.000155)
age -0.723 -0.644
(0.491) (0.539)
bmi -0.0350 0.0257
(0.551) (0.535)
polright 0.0185 0.00485
(0.0421) (0.0509)
numsibs 0.228 -0.104
(1.138) (1.458)
recentsmoke -1.506
(3.439)
recenteat 2.502
(2.628)
recentalcohol -1.080
(3.259)
Constant 15.36*** 19.00*** 33.16 30.82
(1.612) (3.145) (21.96) (22.39)
Observations 79 73 72 70
R-squared 0.065 0.086 0.106 0.132
Table 3.4.1: Baseline cortisol and income. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
model1 model2 model3 model4
VARIABLES cortbase cortbase cortbase cortbase
lnincome -3.280** -3.060* -2.859* -2.912*
(1.632) (1.732) (1.699) (1.674)
timeawake 0.000147 0.000126 0.000133
(0.000114) (0.000129) (0.000148)
age -0.568 -0.509
(0.459) (0.529)
bmi -0.193 -0.117
(0.563) (0.546)
polright 0.00381 -0.00967
(0.0442) (0.0493)
numsibs 0.110 -0.182
(1.052) (1.309)
recentsmoke -0.784
(3.344)
recenteat 2.769
(2.514)
recentalcohol -1.074
(3.140)
Constant 33.07*** 35.18*** 49.49* 47.25*
(10.50) (10.53) (25.40) (25.39)
Observations 79 73 72 70
R-squared 0.099 0.130 0.144 0.175
Table 3.4.2: Baseline Cortisol and Log Income. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
model1 model2 model3 model4
VARIABLES cort_AUCi cort_AUCi cort_AUCi cort_AUCi
income 0.150 0.233** 0.446*** 0.434***
(0.155) (0.107) (0.133) (0.148)
timeawake 0.0234 0.0423* 0.0479*
(0.0188) (0.0232) (0.0268)
age 37.21 15.99
(105.8) (116.0)
bmi 80.73 81.66
(60.00) (65.74)
polright -23.09** -23.69**
(9.478) (11.16)
numsibs -206.2 -219.8
(141.0) (178.4)
recentsmoke 157.8
(385.5)
recenteat 18.47
(336.9)
o.recentalcohol 0
(0)
Constant 673.5*** 1,383** 98.29 724.7
(182.4) (530.4) (2,389) (2,700)
Observations 40 34 33 31
R-squared 0.009 0.056 0.285 0.281
Table 3.4.3: Cortisol Stress Reactivity and Income. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
model1 model2 model3 model4
VARIABLES cort_AUCi cort_AUCi cort_AUCi cort_AUCi
lnincome 98.60 216.1*** 302.9*** 299.2***
(84.04) (78.12) (87.39) (102.6)
timeawake 0.0301 0.0469* 0.0524*
(0.0198) (0.0235) (0.0272)
age 3.016 -14.91
(100.9) (110.9)
bmi 111.0* 114.5
(58.00) (67.22)
polright -19.80** -20.90**
(7.970) (9.107)
numsibs -158.6 -168.7
(142.7) (184.3)
recentsmoke 82.20
(303.0)
recenteat 72.75
(284.1)
o.recentalcohol 0
(0)
Constant 163.5 401.6 -1,453 -943.4
(502.8) (456.3) (2,174) (2,531)
Observations 40 34 33 31
R-squared 0.011 0.094 0.322 0.319
Table 3.4.4: Cortisol Stress Reactivity and Log Income. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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No relationship between income and sAA AUC was found, suggesting that
income is not associated with stress reactivity in terms of sAA.
3.5 Discussion
The purpose of this paper was to assess whether low income is associated with
high baseline cortisol or sAA levels, or diﬀerential stress reactivity of cortisol
or sAA as a function of income. We found that low-income subjects indeed
show higher baseline levels of cortisol, and blunted responsivity of cortisol
to a laboratory stress test, compared to richer participants. In contrast, no
eﬀects on income on either baseline sAA levels or sAA responsivity to stress
were found. These results expand the existing literature in several ways.
First, previous studies have yielded conﬂicting results regarding the associ-
ation between baseline cortisol and income: some studies found a negative
correlation, as we do here (Cohen et al., 2006a, 2006b; Evans & Kim, 2007;
Evans et al., 2000; Li et al., 2007; Lupien et al., 2000; Arnetz et al., 1991),
while others ﬁnd no association or mixed results for diﬀerent subgroups of
participants or aspects of the diurnal cortisol proﬁle (Dowd et al., 2006; Ger-
sten, 2008; Goodman et al., 2005; Ranjit et al., 2005; Rosmond & Bjorntorp,
2000; Steptoe et al., 2005; Decker, 2000; Rosero-Bixby & Dow, 2009), or
a positive correlation (Brandstadter et al., 1991; Chen & Paterson, 2006;
Fiocco et al., 2007). Our study adds to this literature by showing that base-
line levels of cortisol taken in the afternoon in healthy male undergraduate
students strongly predict their income. Closer comparison of our study with
those which produced conﬂicting results suggests potential explanations: we
ﬁnd our association between baseline cortisol and income in afternoon levels,
and some previous studies reporting null results measured overnight cortisol
(Dowd & Goldman, 2006; Gersten, 2008) or morning levels (Goodman et
al., 2005). Also, some studies that report null results or associations in the
other direction use children or teenage samples, replacing own income with
parental education (Goodman et al., 2007) or neighborhood SES (Chen &
Paterson, 2006); it may be the case that the association between cortisol
and SES only emerges in adulthood when using own income as a predictor.
Furthermore, instead of income, some studies use self-reported stress about
one's ﬁnancial situation, occupational status, or a discretized income vari-
able, such as quartiles, all of which are likely to be less ﬁne-grained measures
than the continuous income variable we use here (Dowd & Goldman, 2006;
Gersten, 2008; Rosmond & Bjorntorp, 2000). Finally, one study reporting a
null result has only 30 subjects (Decker, 2000), and two do not report corti-
sol as a separate outcome, but in combination with other measures such as
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
model1 model2 model3 model4
VARIABLES saabase saabase saabase saabase
income 0.00990 0.0102 0.0131 0.0122
(0.0171) (0.0174) (0.0170) (0.0151)
timeawake 0.000496 3.83e-06 -0.000666
(0.00155) (0.00181) (0.00180)
age -3.370 -6.481
(7.779) (9.179)
bmi -9.048 -9.509
(5.992) (5.977)
polright 0.186 0.233
(0.511) (0.615)
numsibs -1.676 3.821
(16.58) (15.71)
recentsmoke 68.68
(63.04)
recenteat -35.32
(22.03)
recentalcohol -36.40*
(20.67)
Constant 109.7*** 124.8*** 384.7 441.7
(15.07) (44.23) (233.9) (268.2)
Observations 79 73 72 70
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.037 0.118
Table 3.4.5: Baseline sAA and Income. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
model1 model2 model3 model4
VARIABLES saabase saabase saabase saabase
lnincome 6.314 6.958 5.983 4.598
(13.01) (13.77) (11.97) (11.57)
timeawake 0.000498 -0.000141 -0.000823
(0.00154) (0.00177) (0.00174)
age -3.414 -6.431
(7.810) (9.176)
bmi -8.455 -8.997
(5.892) (5.903)
polright 0.239 0.289
(0.524) (0.613)
numsibs -0.803 4.799
(16.28) (15.35)
recentsmoke 68.65
(62.82)
recenteat -35.97
(22.17)
recentalcohol -34.67*
(19.95)
Constant 76.68 88.09 336.9 401.1
(80.48) (86.66) (235.1) (276.0)
Observations 79 73 72 70
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.035 0.116
Table 3.4.6: Baseline sAA and Log Income. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
model1 model2 model3 model4
VARIABLES sAA_AUCi sAA_AUCi sAA_AUCi sAA_AUCi
income 0.608 0.946 1.036 1.109
(0.792) (0.640) (0.931) (1.029)
timeawake 0.0900 0.121 0.137
(0.0983) (0.113) (0.147)
age -239.0 -241.7
(486.5) (583.8)
bmi -376.2 -299.7
(268.7) (335.1)
polright -29.54 -40.22
(46.06) (55.95)
numsibs 72.85 234.7
(1,046) (1,297)
recentsmoke -1,491
(1,753)
recenteat 1,456
(1,537)
o.recentalcohol 0
(0)
Constant 1,547* 3,779 18,840 17,371
(836.5) (2,846) (14,152) (19,473)
Observations 40 34 33 31
R-squared 0.007 0.036 0.124 0.147
Table 3.4.7: sAA Stress Reactivity and Income. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
model1 model2 model3 model4
VARIABLES sAA_AUCi sAA_AUCi sAA_AUCi sAA_AUCi
lnincome 27.32 252.3 60.03 93.34
(573.8) (620.1) (697.3) (778.7)
timeawake 0.0901 0.0969 0.109
(0.103) (0.123) (0.161)
age -296.1 -291.4
(479.6) (656.6)
bmi -366.1 -297.3
(289.9) (358.8)
polright -16.13 -22.58
(45.38) (57.34)
numsibs 280.0 462.2
(1,048) (1,345)
recentsmoke -933.4
(1,976)
recenteat 1,346
(1,686)
recentcaﬀeine -390.1
(2,248)
o.recentalcohol 0
(0)
Constant 1,735 2,813 18,770 16,928
(3,465) (3,703) (14,801) (21,063)
Observations 40 34 33 31
R-squared 0.000 0.019 0.104 0.126
Table 3.4.8: sAA Stress Reactivity and Log Income. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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epinephrine, or at-risk factors such as BMI (Gersten, 2008; Rosero-Bixby
& Dow, 2009). Thus, it is likely that the signiﬁcant relationship between
baseline cortisol and income that we observe here is due to careful isolation
of afternoon cortisol levels, together with our ﬁne-grained income measure.
Second, this study is the ﬁrst to rigorously show blunted cortisol reac-
tivity to stress in low-income subjects. A previous study by Kristenson et
al. (2001) found a similar result, but compared subjects from Lithuania (low
SES) to subjects from Stockholm (high SES); this cross-country comparison
naturally has a host of potential confounds and is thus less rigorous than the
within-subject pool regression on monthly income we report here. Intrigu-
ingly, Fiocco et al. (2007) found a higher cortisol response to the TSST in
subjects with low compared to high education; since education and income
are usually positively correlated, this ﬁnding appears to contradict that of
the present study. Since we used a sample of university students who were
almost identical in educational achievement, we could not fruitfully address
the respective relationships between income and cortisol reactivity vs. edu-
cation and cortisol reactivity; further studies with more diverse samples will
be required to answer this question.
Third, we ﬁnd no associations between baseline sAA and income, or sAA
reactivity to stress and income. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study of the
relationship between baseline sAA and income in adults. In children, Granger
et al. (2006) reported a negative correlation between baseline sAA levels and
SES, while Wolf et al. (2008) found a similar relationship in asthmatic but
not healthy children. Since these results are conﬂicting and we are the ﬁrst to
have addressed this question with adults, and with a relatively small sample,
we suggest that future studies revisit the relationship between baseline sAA
and income.
Finally, this is the ﬁrst report on the relationship between income and
sAA stress reactivity; we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant association. However, in our
view the hypothesis that sAA stress reactivity may be related to income
remains plausible, as a number of previous studies have found blunted stress
reactivity in terms of other sympathetic markers, in particular cardiovascular
variables such as heart rate and blood pressure (Owens et al., 1993; Lynch
et al., 1998; Carroll et al., 1997, 2000; Steptoe et al., 2002; Brydon et al.,
2004). Thus, future studies might revisit the question of whether low-SES
subjects may have altered sAA stress reactivity.
What is the physiological and behavioral signiﬁcance of higher baseline
cortisol levels, and blunted cortisol reactivity to stress, in low-income sub-
jects? First, higher baseline cortisol levels in low-SES subjects may con-
tribute to the higher rates or morbidity and mortality in this population.
Speciﬁcally, chronically elevated cortisol levels have been shown to lead to
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hippocampal atrophy and memory deﬁcits (Lupien et al., 1998), increased
risk of cardiovascular disease and stroke (Rosmond & Bjorntorp, 2000), and
immunosuppression (Cacioppo et al., 2002). Elevated baseline cortisol lev-
els are also observed in chronically stressed rats (Katz, 1981) and monkeys
(Sapolsky, 1993), as well as human patients suﬀering from depression (Hols-
boer, 2000; Checkley, 1996). Second, altered cortisol reactivity has been
associated with a host of debilitating conditions, such as chronic stress (Kris-
tenson et al., 1998; Benschop et al., 1994; van der Pompe, 1996), eﬀort-reward
imbalance (Siegrist et al., 1997), and vital exhaustion (Nicholson & van Di-
est, 2002); smokers and alcoholics also show attenuated cortisol reactivity
to stress (Errico et al., 1993; Kirschbaum et al., 1993; Roy et al., 1994). In
sum, the cortisol baseline and reactivity diﬀerences that we here associate
with low income are also associated with a host of adverse psychosocial and
health outcomes. Of course, at present it remains unclear in which direction
causality runs: the cortisol diﬀerences we observe could be a cause or a con-
sequence of low income, or even of any of the psychosocial and socioeconomic
factors mentioned above which are usually associated with poverty. What
remains, however, is that once the cortisol diﬀerences have been established,
they lead to adverse health consequences, and thus are one possible channel
that may account for the link between low income and morbidity and mortal-
ity (Steptoe & Marmot, 2002; Baum et al., 1999; Brunner, 1997; Kristenson
et al., 2004).
A less well established, but potentially even more intriguing channel
through which altered cortisol baselines and reactivity may aﬀect long-term
outcomes is through immediate behavioral consequences. It has long been
known that chronically elevated cortisol levels have adverse consequences
for memory processes (for reviews, see McEwen & Seeman, 1999; McEwen,
2004; McEwen & Sapolsky, 1995; de Kloet et al., 1999; Lupien et al., 2007,
2009; Kim & Haller, 2007). In line with these ﬁndings and the present re-
sults, Evans & Schamberg (2009) found that working memory performance
in young adults was lower for individuals coming from poor families; more-
over, the coeﬃcient on poverty became non-signiﬁcant when the authors con-
trolled for allostatic load during childhood. Allostatic load was a composite
measure which included overnight urine levels of cortisol, epinephrine, and
norepinephrine, body mass index, and resting blood pressure. This ﬁnding
suggests that altered cortisol levels may directly contribute to the adverse
cognitive long-term outcomes that are typically observed in children from
poor backgrounds.
Furthermore, a number of studies now show that economic decision-
making is impaired by increased cortisol levels. Speciﬁcally, subjects with
(experimentally) raised cortisol levels subjects perform worse on verbal anal-
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ogy tasks (Keinan, 1987) and are less able to learn the optimal response
among several available options (Gray, 1999; Preston et al., 2007; van den
Bos et al., 2009). Recently, Porcelli and Delgado (2009) found that stressed
subjects are less rational in risky decision-making, showing a greater degree
of risk aversion in the gain domain, and of risk seeking in the loss domain,
than non-stressed subjects. In our own work, we recently found that subjects
with strongly increased cortisol levels became more present-biased in making
choices between amounts of money available at diﬀerent times (Cornelisse et
al., in preparation).
In sum, we have shown that poor individuals have higher baseline corti-
sol levels, and blunted cortisol reactivity to stress, than richer individuals.
Salivary alpha amylase showed no relationship to income, neither in terms
of baseline levels nor stress reactivity. Together, these ﬁndings substantiate
the claim that poverty is characterized by particular neurobiological con-
sequences; these consequences, in turn, may have adverse consequences for
health and decision-making, and thus contribute to exacerbating the poverty
that precipitated them.
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Chapter 4
Poverty Raises Levels of the
Stress Hormone Cortisol:
Evidence from Weather Shocks in
Kenya
4.1 Summary
Does poverty lead to stress? Despite numerous studies showing correlations
between socioeconomc status and levels of the stress hormone cortisol, it
remains unknown whether this relationship is causal. In two studies, we
used random weather shocks in Kenya to address this question. First, we
study the eﬀects of a severe drought in Kajiado district in 2008/2009; during
this drought, the exclusively Maasai population of the region lost 41.5% of
their goats and sheep on average. We show evidence that livestock deaths
were not predicted by observable characteristics, and therefore represent a
random shock to the households. A year later, in 2010, we observe a strong
relationship between the proportion of goats and sheep that a household lost
to the drought, and both the husbands' and wives' baseline levels of the
stress hormone cortisol. In the second study, we obtained salivary cortisol
samples from poor rural farmers in Kianyaga district, Kenya, together with
GPS coordinates for household location, and high-resolution infrared satellite
imagery meausring rainfall. Since rainfall is the main input into agricultural
productivity in the region, the absence of rain constitutes a random negative
income shock. We ﬁnd that low levels of rain strongly raise cortisol levels
with a temporal lag of 10-20 days. Together, these ﬁndings suggest that
increases in poverty lead to increases in the stress hormone cortisol.
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4.2 Introduction
More than 1 billion people in the world still live below the extreme poverty
line of $25 a day deﬁned by the World Bank (2007). The economic and
health consequences of material poverty are well-known; it brings with it
malnutrition, lack of shelter, insuﬃcient health care, low life expectancy,
and poor access to education. However, the psychological consequences have
received less attention; nevertheless, in recent years, a small literature has
emerged that asks whether poverty also has psychological and neurobiological
consequences.
A prominent hypothesis in this domain is that poverty may lead to in-
creases in stress, and in particular the stress hormone cortisol. This hy-
pothesis is supported by several lines of evidence. First, recent work in the
psychology and economics of happiness has documented a robust relationship
between income and happiness, both within and across countries: poor peo-
ple are less happy and satisﬁed with their lives than rich people in the same
country; in addition, people in richer countries are, on average, happier than
people in poorer countries (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2008; see also Easterlin,
1974).
Conversely, the prevalence of depression in developing countries is stag-
gering: while the prevalence rates in Europe and North America hover be-
tween 5-10%, developing countries report numbers such as 19% (Lebanon,
Mexico), 20% (Thailand), 24% (Uganda), 39% (Dominican Republic) and
40% (Cuba; Bolton et al., 2004; Garcia-Alvarez, 1986; Thavichachart et al.,
2001; Sobocki et al., 2006; Patel et al., 2003). This ﬁnding supports the
putative relationship between poverty and stress because stress is a signiﬁ-
cant factor in the etiology of depression: 80% of all patients with depression
have histories of chronic stress or stressful life events (Hammen, 2005), and
depression is marked by dysregulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
(HPA) axis, which controls the release of cortisol (Holsboer, 2000).
Finally, a number of authors have argued that low-income environments
may be characterized by both greater exposure to stressful events, and the
absence of resources to deal with such stress (Baum et al., 1999; Steptoe et
al., 2002; Brunner, 1997; Kristenson, 2004).
Together, these strands of literature suggest that poverty may be char-
acterized by increased levels of stress, and in particular the stress hormone
cortisol. Indeed, this relationship has been conﬁrmed in a number of stud-
ies which ﬁnd signiﬁcant correlations between socio-economic status (SES),
self-reported stress, and cortisol (Cohen et al., 2006a, 2006b; Evans & Kim,
2009; Evans & English, 2002; Li et al., 2007; Lupien et al., 2000; Arnetz et
al., 1991; see Dowd et al., 2009, for a review). Note, however, these studies
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were conducted in developed countries; it remains unclear whether a similar
relationship exists in developing countries. More importantly, these ﬁnd-
ings are merely correlational and therefore do not justify conclusions about
whether poverty causes stress or vice-versa.
The present study aims to ﬁll this gap. Using weather shocks in two re-
gions of Kenya, we identify a causal eﬀect of increases in poverty on increases
in the stress hormone cortisol. Speciﬁcally, we show that Maasai tribespeo-
ple in Kajiado district, who were exposed to a severe drought in 2008/2009
which caused the death of a large number of livestock, show higher cortisol
levels in 2010 depending on how many goats and sheep they lost during the
drought. Second, we use high-resolution satellite rainfall data together with
household-level GPS and cortisol data from Kikuyu farmers in Kinayaga dis-
trict to show that farmers have higher levels of cortisol if the previous 10-20
days brought low amounts of rain. Together, our ﬁndings establish a causal
relationship between exogenous increases in poverty and levels of cortisol.
4.3 Materials and Methods
4.3.1 Subjects and Setting
We studied 152 Maasai tribespeople (77 women) in Kajiado distict, Kenya,
and 283 Kikuyu farmers (115 women) in Kianyaga district, Kenya, between
January and December 2010. Each participant gave written consent; illit-
erate participants gave consent by ﬁngerprint. The study was approved by
the ethics commissions at the University of Zurich, McGill University, Inno-
vations for Poverty Action Kenya (IPAK), and the Kenya Medical Research
Institute (KEMRI). Participants received KSH 100 (USD 1) for participa-
tion; in addition, they could earn money in the economic games that were
part of the questionnaire.
4.3.2 Procedure
In Kajiado district, data were collected in three locations: Elangata Wuas,
Torosei, and Kilonito. Households were chosen by random sampling based
on a list of households obtained from a previous round of surveys in 2008.
New households were added to the sampling frame and also chosen at ran-
dom. In Kianyaga, households were chosen randomly based on household
lists obtained from village elders.
In both locations, data were collected in one-on-one ﬁeld interviews at the
respondents' homestead by trained enumerators. Interviews were conducted
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in Maa, the tribal language of the Maasai, in Kajiado district, and in Kikuyu
in Kianyaga district. To ensure accurate translations of the questionnaire, it
was translated into Maa and Kikuyu by four diﬀerent translators, and then
back-translated into English by another four translators. The four back-
translated versions were then compared to the English original, and the team
of 8 translators plus one supervisor agreed on a ﬁnal translation.
At the beginning of the interview, the consent script was read and consent
was obtained by signature or as a thumbprint. Respondents were paid after
completing the interview. Saliva samples were obtained before and after the
interview.
4.3.3 Questionnaire and GPS data
In both locations, we administered a standard socioeconomic questionnaire
that elicited information about household structure, income, education, health,
and current worries. In Kajiado district, the questionnaire also asked about
the loss of livestock during the 2008/2009 drought; speciﬁcally, respondents
were asked how many cows, goats and sheep they owned before the drought,
how many died during the drought for reasons related to the drought, how
many died or left the herd for other reasons, and how many animals they
owned currently. Since livestock is the main source of wealth among the
Maasai, respondents knew very well how many animals they owned and how
many were lost during the drought.
The questionnaire data from Kianyaga is still being cleaned, and thus only
a subset of the variables are available for analysis. However, for the purpose
of this paper, the crucial data is the GPS coordinates of the households,
which are available. They were collected using a handheld GPS device and
recorded in degrees of latitude and longitude, at a resolution of 1/1000th of
an arcminute, which corresponds to ~0.18 meters at this proximity to the
equator.
4.3.4 Rainfall data
Rainfall data were obtained from the Famine Early Warning Systems Net-
work, FEWSNET (www.fews.net). The data were originally downloaded
in ArcGIS format, and then transferred into Stata format using a custom-
written FORTRAN program. The data are provide a rainfall estimate based
on high-resolution Meteosat infrared data, rain gauge reports from the global
telecommunications system, and microwave satellite observations. The data
cover the years 2000-2011; for the purpose of this study, the relevant time
frame is from 20 days before our surveys began until they ended (see below
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for choice of lag for the rain timeseries), i.e. December 2009  December
2010. The data are dekadal, i.e. averaged over 10-day intervals. The spatial
resolution is 0.1°, which corresponds to 11 km at this proximity to the equa-
tor. To obtain household-speciﬁc rainfall data, the satellite rainfall data was
ﬁrst subjected to bilinear interpolation, and then combined with the GPS
location of each household. This yielded a rainfall estimate that was unique
to each household, for each 10-day interval in the study period.
4.3.5 Salivary cortisol
Salivary samples were obtained using Salivette sampling devices (Sarstedt,
Nümbrecht, Germany), once before and once after questionnaire adminis-
tration. Salivary samples were stored at room temperature for at most 10
days, and then transported to Nairobi, where they were stored at -20°C until
further analysis. Free cortisol levels were measured at Lancet Pathologists,
Nairobi. In a blinded test of this laboratory with duplicate samples, the
correlation across sample pairs was r = 0.995 (N=60). Free cortisol is the
physiologically active component of cortisol, and is closely related to the rate
of cortsiol secretion by the adrenal gland (Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 1989;
Aardal & Holm, 1995; Aardal-Ericsson et al., 1998). During analysis, the
two samples were average to obtain more stable estimates of cortisol levels.
The cortisol data were pre-processed by regressing out the logarithm of time
since waking and keeping only the residuals from this regression; the result-
ing cortisol data can thus be interpreted as the deviations from the typical
declining diurnal cortisol proﬁle (van Cauter et al., 1996).
4.3.6 Statistical analysis
4.3.6.1 Autoregressive Order Selection and Timeseries Order of
Integration
The rainfall data is likely to contain serial correlation. We model this se-
rial correlation as an autoregressive process. We use information criteria to
choose the most appropriate autoregressive order for the rainfall process. We
report both the Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike, 1973, 1974, 1978) and
Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion (SBIC; Schwarz, 1978).
To ensure stationarity of the time series, we test for the presence of a
unit root using the augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (Elliott et al., 1996). The
absence of a unit root implies stationarity of the time series and integration
of order 0. The null hypothesis of the Dickey-Fuller test is the presence of a
unit root; a large negative value rejects this hypothesis. We perform the test
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using the autoregressive order determined with information criteria, both
with and without lag and drift terms.
4.3.6.2 Regression Speciﬁcations
To establish whether the proportion of goats and sheep that died as a re-
sult of the drought can be considered an exogenous shock, we ﬁrst regress
this variable on a number of observables using OLS. Speciﬁcally, we use the
following model on the data from Kajiado district:
prop_goatssheep_died_totali = β0 + β1familyincome30i
+β2goatssheet_beforei + β3femalei + β4numkidsowni
+β5marriedi + β6schoolingi + ui,
where prop_goatssheep_died_totali indicates what proportion of goats
and sheep owned by the respondent died during the 2008/2009 drought,
familyincome30i is family income over the last 30 days in Kenyan Shillings
(KES; 1 KES ≈ 1 USD, October 2011), goatssheep_beforei is the number
of goats and sheep owned by the respondent before the 2008/2009 drought,
femalei is a dummy variable for gender, numkidsowni is the number of own
children living in the household, marriedi is a dummy variable for marital
status, schoolingi is education in years of schooling, and ui is the error term.
Second, to test whether cortisol was aﬀected by the proportion of goats
and sheep that died as a result of the drought, we run the following OLS
regression on the data from Kajiado district:
corti = β0 + β1prop_goatssheep_died_totali + β2goatssheep_beforei
+β3goatssheep_afteri + β4femalei + β5sick7i + β6numkidsowni+
+β7marriedi + β8schoolingi + β9familyincome30i + ui,
where corti is the respondent's salivary cortisol level, sick7 indicates
whether the respondent was ill in the previous week, and the remaining
variables are as described above. Our main research question is whether
the coeﬃcient on prop_goatssheep_died_totali is signiﬁcantly positive; this
would indicate that larger losses of livestock lead to higher cortisol levels a
year later.
We run both of these regressions using heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors; in addition, we correct the standard errors for clustering by Enkang,
which is the small group of houses in which Maasai live.
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Finally, to assess the eﬀect of rainfall shocks on cortisol levels, we run the
following regression on the data from Kianyaga district:
corti,t = β0 + β1raini,t + β2raini,t−1 + β3female+ ui,
where t is the dekad subscript, raini,t is the household-speciﬁc rainfall
measure at time t, and the remainder of the variables are as described
above. Modeling rainfall as an AR(1) process reﬂects the results from the
autoregressive order selection procedure, reported below. Again we use
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The coeﬃcients of interest are
those on the current and lagged rainfall measures: if negative weather shocks
contribute to stress and raise cortisol levels, we should observe negative co-
eﬃcients on these variables.
To assess the overall eﬀect of rain on cortisol in this model, we perform
an F-test for joint signiﬁcance of the current and lagged rainfall measures.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Kajiado: Livestock loss and cortisol
Our ﬁrst question was whether the loss of livestock due to the 2008/2009
drought in Kajiado district had led to an increase in cortisol levels. Figure
4.4.1 shows the monthly average rainfall, in mm, in Kajiado district between
January 2008 and December 2009. The grey line indicates the long-run
average rainfall per month, in mm, in Kajiado district, between 2003-2007;
the black line indicates monthly rainfall in the drought year 2008/2009. The
peaks around November/December and April/May represent the short and
long rains, respectively. It can be seen that the short rains in 2008 and the
long rains in 2009 were signiﬁcantly reduced in magnitude with respect to
the long-run average. Thus, repsondents in this region faced a severe drought
during this period.
Table 4.4.1 shows statistics that summarize the eﬀect that this drought
had on the livelihoods of our 152 respondents in Kajiado district. Most
strikingly, households lost an average of 41.5% of their goats and sheep due
to the drought. This is a serious negative shock for these families, as livestock
is the main source of income and wealth for the Maasai. Moreover, this is
not counting sheep which left the herd for diﬀerent reasons such as being
slaughtered, given away, or lost. This fact explains why the number of goats
and sheep owned by a household after the drought is only 65.17, while it
was 201.1 before the drought; this corresponds to a decrease of 67.6% in
the number of goats and sheep, suggesting that the drought decimated herds
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Figure 4.4.1: Rainfall in Kajiado district. The grey line indicates the long-run
average rainfall per month, in mm, in Kajiado district, between 2003-2007.
The black line indicates monthly rainfall in the drought year 2008/2009. The
peaks around November/December and April/May represent the short and
long rains, respectively.
through channels other than livestock deaths. Thus, the drought represented
an extremely large shock to the economic situation of households in the
region.
Importantly, in addition to a large average decrease in the number of
goats and sheep due to the drought, we also observe substantial variation:
the standard deviation for the proportion of livestock deaths is 0.253, sug-
gesting that not every household was aﬀected equally. This fact creates the
possibility of relating the variation in the proportion of livestock lost to later
outcomes such as cortisol levels.
To make this relationship causal, we need ot establish ﬁrst whether live-
stock deaths due to the drought can be considered a random negative shock.
We therefore regressed the proportion of livestock that a household lost dur-
ing the drought on a number of observables, including family income in the
past 30 days, the number of goats and sheep owned before the drought, a
dummy variable for gender and marital status, the number of children of the
household, and education level in years of schooling. To be able to consider
the proportion of livestock lost to the drought a random shock, we need it
to be unrelated to these observables. The results are shown in Tables 4.4.2
and 4.4.3; each column shows an OLS regression of the proportion of goats
and sheep lost during the drought on the variables described above. In con-
trast to Table 4.4.2, Table 4.4.3 includes cluster correction of the standard
errors at the Enkang level (the Enkang is the group of houses within one
homestead, often belonging to the same family or relatives). It can be seen
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES mean sd median N
prop_goatssheep_died_total 0.415 0.253 0.377 152
goatssheep_before 201.1 261.4 117 152
goatssheep_after 65.17 81.31 37.50 152
familyincome30 3,400 7,521 0 152
female 0.507 0.502 1 152
numkidsown 7.044 7.699 6 152
married 0.776 0.418 1 152
schooling 2.678 4.167 0 152
Table 4.4.1: Descriptive statistics, Kajiado district. The ﬁrst row indicates
the proportion of goats and sheep that families lost to the 2008/2009 drought.
The second and third rows represent the number of goats and sheep that
families owned before and after the drought, respectively. Note that the
diﬀerence between these numbers does not correspond to the proportion of
goats and sheep lost to the drought in the ﬁrst row, as that ﬁgure takes into
account only animals lost to the drought, while the number of animals owned
after the drought also reﬂects animals that left the herd for diﬀerent reasons
(slaughtered, given away, lost), and animals that joined the herd (born, given
to, purcahsed). The fourth row shows family income over the last 30 days,
in Kenyan Shillings (KES). 1 KES ≈ 1 USD (October 2011). The next rows
show the proportion of women in the sample, the number of own children
living in the household, the proportion of married respondents, and average
education in years of schooling.
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that the proportion of goats and sheep that died during the drought is not
predicted by any of the right-hand side variables. Almost all coeﬃcients are
non-signiﬁcant, suggesting that the loss of livestock during the drought was
an exogenous shock which aﬀected families randomly; in particular, even rich
families could not protect themselves from the loss of goats and sheep during
the drought.
Having established that the death of goats and sheep during the drought
aﬀected rich and poor households relatively uniformly and thus appears to
be a random exogenous shock, we next asked whether cortisol levels a year
later (in 2010) were predicted by the proportion of goats and sheep each
household lost during the drought. We therefore regressed cortisol levels (av-
eraged across the two samples that were collected from each respondent, see
Methods) on the proportion of goats and sheep that died during the drought,
and a number of control variables. The results are shown in Tables 4.4.4 and
4.4.5, where again Table 4.4.5 reports the results with Enkang clustering. It
can be seen that for all specﬁcations, a strong positive relationship exists
between the proportion of goats and sheep that died during the drought, and
cortisol levels a year later. In terms of magnitude, the speciﬁcation which
includes the full set of control variables suggests that a 50 percentage point
increase in the number of goats and sheep lost to drought leads to 31% in-
crease in cortisol levels (a 2.8 nmol/l increase in cortisol from a baseline of
9.0 nmol/l).
Together, these results suggest that the death of livestock due to drought
has a strong eﬀect on cortisol levels a year later. A potential remaining
concern with these ﬁndings, however unlikely, is that cortisol levels may
be endogenous to the proportion of goats and sheep that died during the
drought. For instance, one might imagine that unobserved heterogeneity in
the sample for mental health problems might aﬀect both cortisol and the
proportion of livestock lost during the drought. The next study therefore
uses an identiﬁcation strategy that can even more conﬁdently be said to be
completely random with regard to household characteristics: rainfall shocks.
4.4.2 Kianyaga: Rainfall shocks and cortisol
Our second question was whether lack of rainfall in a region of small-scale
farmers would increase levels of cortisol. We study this question in the
Kianyaga district of Kenya, on the slopes of Mt. Kenya, a region popu-
lated by Kikuyu people whose household income and consumption depends
heavily on agriculture, and thus, rain. Small ﬂuctuations in rainfall can have
potentially serious adverse consequences for the harvest and hence household
welfare; we therefore hypothesized that ﬂuctuations in rainfall would lead to
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
model1 model2 model3 model4
VARIABLES cort cort cort cort
prop_goatssheep_died_total 5.092** 4.886** 5.786** 5.626***
(2.043) (2.266) (2.292) (2.032)
goatssheep_before 0.00368 0.00339 0.00195
(0.00342) (0.00330) (0.00308)
goatssheep_after 0.00495 0.00626 0.00765
(0.0116) (0.0114) (0.00984)
female 0.757 0.523
(0.949) (1.029)
sick7 -0.496* -0.537*
(0.288) (0.314)
numkidsown 0.116
(0.0945)
married -0.0583
(1.529)
schooling 0.146
(0.121)
familyincome30 -2.82e-05
(6.50e-05)
Constant 6.933*** 5.955*** 5.616*** 4.973***
(0.870) (1.070) (1.104) (1.216)
Observations 152 152 152 152
R-squared 0.044 0.090 0.106 0.134
Table 4.4.4: Livestock loss due to drought increases cortisol levels in Kajiado
district. Each column shows an OLS regression of baseline cortisol levels,
in nmol/l, on the proportion of goats and sheep that households lost during
the drought, and other observables. All coeﬃcients on the proportion of
goats and sheep lost are positive and highly signiﬁcant, suggesting that loss
of livestock increased cortisol levels a year later. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
model1 model2 model3 model4
VARIABLES cort cort cort cort
prop_goatssheep_died_total 5.092** 4.886** 5.786** 5.626***
(2.024) (2.270) (2.255) (1.996)
goatssheep_before 0.00368 0.00339 0.00195
(0.00368) (0.00343) (0.00292)
goatssheep_after 0.00495 0.00626 0.00765
(0.0122) (0.0118) (0.00970)
female 0.757 0.523
(0.800) (0.910)
sick7 -0.496* -0.537*
(0.277) (0.320)
numkidsown 0.116
(0.0950)
married -0.0583
(1.432)
schooling 0.146
(0.113)
familyincome30 -2.82e-05
(5.17e-05)
Constant 6.933*** 5.955*** 5.616*** 4.973***
(0.890) (1.076) (1.059) (1.192)
Observations 152 152 152 152
R-squared 0.044 0.090 0.106 0.134
Enkang clustering YES YES YES YES
Table 4.4.5: As Table 4, but with standard errors clustered by Enkang. Ro-
bust clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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lag AIC SBIC
0 8.5674324 8.6029573
1 8.4657803* 8.53683*
2 8.4790803 8.5856549
3 8.5134761 8.6555756
4 8.5181849 8.6958093
5 8.5284725 8.7416217
6 8.55317 8.8018441
7 8.5871938 8.8713929
8 8.6155775 8.9353014
9 8.6496751 9.0049239
10 8.6456361 9.0364098
11 8.6712603 9.0975589
12 8.7057429 9.1675663
13 8.7280029 9.2253512
14 8.7592022 9.2920754
15 8.7879705 9.3563686
16 8.8095766 9.4134996
17 8.8424953 9.4819432
18 8.8567348 9.5317075
19 8.811245 9.5217426
20 8.8424854 9.5885079
Table 4.4.6: Lag order selection statistics for rainfall in Kianyaga district.
Column 1 reports Akaike Information Criterion, column 2 reports Schwarz's
Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) for the dekadal rainfall variable. Both
information criteria are minimzed at lag 1.
stress, reﬂected in increased levels of cortisol.
We therefore regressed cortisol levels on lagged values of rainfall data
obtained from FEWSNET satellite imagery. To this end, we ﬁrst analyzed
the autoregressive order of the rainfall timeseries using information criteria.
Speciﬁcally, we computed the Akaike Information Criterion and Schwarz's
Bayesian Information Criterion for the timeseries of dekadal rainfall indices,
up to a maximum lag of 20 dekads (200 days). Table 4.4.6 reports the AIC
and SBIC values resulting from this analysis. Both information criteria are
minimized at lag 1. In the following we therefore regress cortisol on rainfall
for the current and one previous dekad.
Second, to ascertain that the rainfall timeseries is stationary, we per-
formed diﬀerent versions of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the data.
The results are shown in Table 4.4.7. The null hypothesis was rejected in all
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Speciﬁcation Statistic Rainfall
Basic Z -6.042
P 0.000
With trend Z -6.066
P 0.000
With drift Z -6.042
P 0.000
Table 4.4.7: Results of the augmented DickeyFuller test for the rainfall
time-series in Kianyaga district. The trend speciﬁcation includes a trend
term in the associated regression, and assumes that the process under the
null hypothesis is a random walk (possibly with drift). The drift speciﬁcation
assumes that the process under the null hypothesis is a random walk with
nonzero drift. Signiﬁcantly negative test statistics are evidence for station-
arity.
cases, suggesting that the rainfall timeseries is stationary.
These results put us in a position to address our main question of interest:
does lack of rain predict cortisol levels 10-20 days later? We address this
question using a regression of cortisol levels on current and lagged rainfall
data. Table 8 reports the results form this regression. The coeﬃcients on the
0th and 1st lag of the rainfall variable are both negative; those on the 1st lag
are highly signiﬁcant. This result suggests that lack of rainfall indeed leads to
higher cortisol levels in our respondents. To assess the joint signiﬁcance of the
lagged rainfall coeﬃcients, we performed an F-test; in both speﬁcications, the
results were highly signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the suggestion that the absence of
rain indeed leads to raised cortisol levels. In terms of magnitude, we found
that a 10mm decrease in rainfall in the previous dekad leads to a cortisol
increase of 5.5 nmol/l; from a baseline of 35.4 nmol/l, this corresponds to a
15.5% increase. Thus, the lack of rain in an area of Kikuyu farmers has a
strong and temporally contiguous eﬀect on cortisol levels.
4.5 Discussion
In this paper we asked the question whether increases in poverty lead to
stress, measured here by the stress hormone cortisol. We ﬁnd that exogenous
increases in poverty indeed lead to stress, in two diﬀerent settings: ﬁrst, the
proportion of goats and sheep lost to a drought in a sample of 152 Maasai
tribespeople in Kajiado district, Kenya, strongly predicts their cortisol levels
one year later. We show that the proportion of goats and sheep lost to the
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES cort cort
L0rain -0.259 -0.257
(0.209) (0.210)
L1rain -0.549*** -0.547***
(0.142) (0.142)
female -2.211
(6.717)
Constant 41.50*** 42.36***
(4.834) (5.820)
Observations 283 283
R-squared 0.021 0.021
F-test rain 7.676 7.670
Prob > F 0.000568*** 0.000572***
Table 4.4.8: Lack of rain increases cortisol levels in Kianyaga district. Each
column shows an OLS regression of baseline cortisol levels, in nmol/l, on
current and lagged rainfall, in millimeters. The temporal resolution of the
rainfall measures is 10 days (dekadal). The coeﬃcients on the lagged rainfall
measures are negative, and the coeﬃcient on the lagged rainfall measure is
highly signiﬁcant. In addition, F-tests for joint signiﬁcance of the lagged
rainfall coeﬃcients conﬁrm that they are jointly diﬀerent from zero. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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drought is not predicted by observable household characteristics, supporting
the claim that the loss of livestock was a random negative shock against which
even wealthy households could not protect themselves, and that therefore our
ﬁndings reﬂect the causal eﬀect of livestock deaths on cortisol levels. Second,
in a sample of 283 Kikuyu farmers in Kinayaga district, Kenya, we combine
cortisol measures with household-level GPS data and high-resolution satellite
rainfall data and ﬁnd that lack of rain strongly raises cortisol levels, with a
lag of 10-20 days. In both studies, the cortisol increases induced by the
negative shocks were signiﬁcant and large in magnitude. Together, these
results suggest that random exogenous increases in households' economic
situations  either through livestock deaths, or through weather shocks to
agricultural productivity  cause substantial increases in the levels of the
stress hormone cortisol.
These results contribute to the emerging literature on the relationship
between stress and income/socioeconomic status by showing that this rela-
tionship is causal. A growing number of studies have documented that poor
and otherwise disadvantaged people show increased levels of cortisol (Cohen
et al., 2006a, 2006b; Evans & Kim, 2009; Evans & English, 2002; Li et al.,
2007; Lupien et al., 2000; Arnetz et al., 1991; Dowd et al., 2009); however,
to date this relationship has been identiﬁed through correlation, leaving it
unclear in which direction causality runs. One could easily imagine it going
in both directions: the idea that poverty can cause stress is uncontrover-
sial; conversely, however, it is also possible that stressed individuals are more
likely to end up in poverty, e.g. through impaired job performance due to
stress. The contribution of this study is to provide causal evidence for the
ﬁrst channel, i.e. the eﬀect of poverty on stress.
In providing evidence for a causal eﬀect of poverty on stress, our study
is similar to two recent studies that have also attempted to resolve this
correlation-causation dilemma in the opposite direction, namely by measur-
ing the impacts of development programs on stress levels. Fernald & Gunnar
(2009) measured cortisol levels in children who had been exposed to the
Mexican PROGRESA program  a comprehensive conditional cash transfer
program with a focus on health and education. The authors found that chil-
dren who had been exposed to the program exhibited lower baseline cortisol
levels than those children who had not been in the program. In another
study, Fernald et al. (2008) investigated responses to stress and depression
questionnaires in a sample of South-African respondents after they were ran-
domly assigned to receive a loan. Those who had received loans showed lower
levels of depressive symptoms than the control group; interestingly, however,
questionnaire-assessed stress levels were higher after receiving a loan than in
the control group, possibly due to the stress induced by having to pay back
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the loan at a high interest rate (200% p.a.). Thus, these previous programs
studied the eﬀects of poverty decreases on stress levels; note though that
one was in children and the other did not measure stress using cortisol. Our
study contributes by showing a signiﬁcant causal eﬀect of poverty on stress
in the other direction, namely poverty increases; and by providing cortisol
evidence from adults rather than children.
Several caveats are in order. First, in Kajiado district, the possibility
remains that unobserved heterogeneity accounts for both the cortisol results
and livestock deaths; for instance, pre-existing mental health disorders might
lead to both high livestock losses and high levels of cortisol. Indeed, we do ob-
serve high levels of depressive symptoms in this sample; ~80% of respondents
meet the DSM-IV criteria for severe depression. We are currently gathering
GPS location data on all households in this sample, which will make it pos-
sible to relate the livestock deaths directly to drought in the region in future
work. Nevertheless, this alternative explanation does not fully account for
the eﬀects we observe, since
A second potential concern is that respondents who experienced livestock
losses now have to perform more strenuous physical activity, and that our
cortisol results reﬂect this physical strain as opposed to psychological stress.
However, we deem this account unlikely for two reasons. First, controlling
for a Yes/No question about whether the respondent performed strenuous
physical activity prior to the interview did not alter the results reported in
Tables 3-4. Second, the eﬀect in the Kianyaga sample would be predicted
to go in the opposite direction: farmers in this region work harder when it
rains compared to when it does not rain  simply put, there is nothing to do
without rain. Thus, on this account we should observe an increase in cortisol
levels after rain, rather than the decrease that we actually observe.
In addition, the present study raises a number of questions for follow-on
work. In particular, we study the eﬀect of exogenous increases in poverty
on cortisol levels; it remains unclear whether decreases in cortisol have the
converse eﬀect, and could therefore be used as potential stress alleviation in-
terventions. As mentioned above, Fernald et al. (2009) showed that Mexican
children whose mothers had been exposed to the Progresa program in Mexico
show lower cortisol levels than comparison children; however, it is not clear
which of the program's many interventions accounts for this eﬀect, and it
remains unknown to what extent selection of mothers into the study could
be responsible for it. In addition, data on the eﬀect of poverty alleviation
programs on the cortisol levels of adults is not available. We are currently
conducting two randomized controlled trials in Kenya, one on health insur-
ance and one on unconditional cash transfers, which will address these issues.
A further remaining question is through which psychological channels
4.5. DISCUSSION 115
increases or decreases in poverty take their eﬀect on stress. Do people worry
more or less about their economic future? Do they socialize less after having
been hit by an economic shock, either because they fall from grace or because
they have less time given their new economic constraints? It remains an
important task for future work to expand on the closed-form approach
we used here, in which we simply study the relationship between changes in
poverty on cortisol levels; what is on people's mind as these economic changes
take eﬀect is equally important.
The present study is the ﬁrst addressing the relationship between poverty
and stress in a developing country. This is somewhat surprising as existing
data on the prevalence of stress and depression suggest that devleoping coun-
tries are particularly aﬀected; we therefore hope that signiﬁcantly more eﬀort
will be dedicated in the future on elucidating the causes and consequences
of this fact, and on developing interventions to alleviate the problem.
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Chapter 5
The Psychology of Poverty
5.1 Summary
Does poverty have psychological consequences? Beginning with Easterlin
(1974), a growing literature has investigated the association between income
levels on the one hand, and psychological outcomes on the other. However,
this literature remains equivocal on whether a relationship exists; in addi-
tion, it focuses almost exclusively on happiness and life satisfaction, while
little evidence exists about the link between poverty and other psychological
outcomes. Using World Value Survey data from 58,685 respondents in 41
countries, we show here that poverty is associated with a host of psycholog-
ical outcomes other than happiness and life satisfaction. Compared to the
rich, the poor have more internal locus of control, less intrinsic motivation,
less prosocial attitudes, feel more lonely, and show more symptoms of depres-
sion. These ﬁndings hold both for poor compared to rich people in the same
country, and for poor compared to rich countries. The results remain robust
after controlling for socioeconomic variables, and do not depend on whether
income is coded linearly or as the logarithm. Across countries, income level is
more important than income growth in determining psychological outcomes.
In addition, we use coastal access as an instrument for country-level GDP
and ﬁnd evidence for the causality of the link from income to locus of con-
trol using this strategy. Together, our results suggest that poverty may have
broad psychological consequences, and that some of these links are causal.
5.2 Introduction
Poverty is most frequently described in terms of material scarcity. However,
a small number of scholars have suggested over the centuries that the lives
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of the poor may be characterized not only by material deprivation, but also
negative psychological outcomes. In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam
Smith cast poverty in terms of its psychological consequences: [t]he reason
poverty causes pain is not just because it can leave people feeling hungry,
cold and sick, but because it is associated with unfavourable regard. . . .
The poor man . . . is ashamed of his poverty. In his prominent ethnogra-
phy Five Families: Mexian Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty (1959),
anthropologist Oscar Lewis argued that the lives of the poor were charac-
terized by a strong feeling of marginality, of helplessness, of dependency, of
not belonging . . . of inferiority, of personal unworthiness. A few years later,
the controversial Moynihan report claimed that Black (poor) families in the
United States were caught in a tangle of pathology (Moynihan, 1965).
These suggestions are easy to misunderstand as blaming the poor for their
poverty by attributing to them certain psychological shortcomings which
keep them mired in poverty. Possibly for this reason, the suggestion that
poverty may have adverse psychological consequences has only recently re-
ceived attention in the literature. In particular, it was not until the 1970s that
the obvious question that follows from this assertion was posed in earnest: is
it true empirically that poverty has psychological consequences (or at least
correlates)?
Most of the resulting literature has concerned itself with the empirical
relationship between income and self-reported happiness. Are poor people
unhappier than richer people? In a series of papers, Richard Easterlin found
that happiness and income were correlated within countries, but not across
countries; in particular, increases in national income over time did not trans-
late into increases in average self-reported happiness. Within countries, how-
ever, the poor consistently reported lower levels of happiness than the rich
(Easterlin, 1974, 1995, 2001, 2003; Easterlin & Angelescu, 2009).
More recently, however, Easterlin's cross-country ﬁnding has been con-
vincingly overturned by an analysis of a large number of datasets from a
broad panel of countries by Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers (2008).
These authors ﬁnd a robust relationship between self-reported happiness and
life satisfaction both within and across countries.
Thus, it appears that poverty indeed is associated with self-reported hap-
piness and life satisfaction, both within and across countries. However, it
remains unclear whether poverty aﬀects psychological outcomes beyond self-
reported happiness and life satisfaction. In this paper, we use World Value
Survey data from 58,685 respondents in 41 countries and show that both
within and across countries, poor people have more internal locus of control,
less intrinsic motivation, less prosocial attitudes, feel more lonely, and show
more symptoms of depression than richer people.
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A further important question regarding the relationship between income
and psychological outcomes is its causality. One can easily see how poverty
can both be a cause and a consequence of certain psychological outcomes;
e.g., depression may lead to unemployment, and unemployment may in turn
exacerbate depression. In addition, third factors such as culture or religion
may aﬀect both income and psychological outcomes simultaneously. It is im-
portant both for scientiﬁc and policy purposes to elucidate the directionality
and magnitude of the causal realtionships between income and psychologi-
cal outcomes. The reverse and simultaneous causation biases just described
complicate this undertaking. However, they can be overcome using exoge-
nous inﬂuences on one of the variables of interest. In the ideal case, this
is achieved through randomized experiments; in the context of income and
psychological outcomes, for instance, one could randomly assign cash trans-
fers to some households but not others, and thus identify the causal eﬀect of
a change in income on psychological outcomes (we are currently conducting
such experiments in Western Kenya and Nairobi). Across countries, however,
this approach is not feasible; for a host of reasons one cannot randomly as-
sign income shocks to some countries but not others in order to measure their
eﬀect on psychological outcomes. However, natural experiments oﬀer a win-
dow onto the causality of the relationship between income and psychological
outcomes even across countries: if, for instance, some countries happen to
have particular geographical features that aﬀect only income but are unlikely
to aﬀect psychological outcomes through channels other than income, instru-
mental variables regression can be used to isolate the causal eﬀect of income
on psychological outcomes. In this paper we employ this strategy to address
the causality question. Speciﬁcally, we use the proportion of a country's
land area within 100km from the coast, and the poportion of the population
living in this area, as instruments for income. It has long been known that
coast access is a crucial determinant of a country's income, mainly because
it gives the country's economy access to trade routes and foreign markets
(Gallup et al., 1999). On the other hand, we argue that it is unlikely that
coast access aﬀects psychological outcomes through channels other than in-
come (see Methods and Discussion for details). Using this strategy, we ﬁnd
a causal eﬀect of income on locus of control across countries: higher income,
instrumented by coastal access, causes more internal locus of control.
Together, our results suggest that poverty has broad psychological conse-
quences, and that causality runs from income to psychology in at least some
cases. We suggest that these psychological outcomes could serve as welfare
indicators against which development policies are evaluated; moreover, to the
extent that these psychological variables themselves inﬂuence income levels,
they could become promising targets for development interventions.
5.3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 122
5.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
5.3.1 Data sources
5.3.1.1 Psychological variables
The psychological outcome variables were taken from the World Value Survey
and the European Value Survey (www.wvs.org). For our variables of interest,
the data cover 58,685 respondents in 41 countries. Most of the country-
speciﬁc samples are nationally representative; we exlude countries for which
the national samples are not representative or for which sampling weights
are not available. The World Value Survey is administered in discrete waves;
some of our variables were collected in all waves, while others were collected
only in some waves (see Table 5.3.1). Altogether, our data cover the years
1980-2008. In all regressions, we use year ﬁxed eﬀects to account for any
possible time trends.
Table 5.3.1 summarizes the psychological variables we tested. They were
chosen to tap into the following constructs: locus of control, intrinsic moti-
vation, prosocial attitudes, loneliness, and depression symptoms (meaning-
lessness). These constructs were chosen because they are both economically
important and relevant for psychological well-being and welfare.
5.3.1.2 Within-country income data
Within-country income data was also obtained from the World Value Sur-
vey and European Value Survey data. Speciﬁcally, the questionnaires for all
countries countained a variable asking respondents about their household in-
come. This variable was coded on a scale from 1-10, corresponding to income
deciles for the country of residence. Thus, 1 means than the respondent was
in the lowest 10% of income earners in their country of residence; 10 indicates
that they were in the top 10%. We use this variable as the main independent
variable in the within-country regressions.
5.3.1.3 GDP and growth data
GDP and GDP growth data were taken from the World Development Indi-
cators published by the World Bank. The data cover the years 1960-2010.
GDP is measured per capita at purchasing power parity in constant 2005 US
dollars. Growth is measured in % of real GDP. These variables are the main
independent variables in the cross-country regressions.
5.3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 123
V
ar
ia
b
le
n
am
e
C
on
st
ru
ct
m
ea
su
re
d
S
u
rv
ey
q
u
es
ti
on
W
av
es
N
u
m
b
er
of
re
sp
on
d
en
ts
N
u
m
b
er
of
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
sh
ap
ef
at
ey
rs
el
f
L
o
cu
s
of
co
n
tr
ol
S
om
e
p
eo
p
le
b
el
ie
ve
th
at
in
d
iv
id
u
al
s
ca
n
d
ec
id
e
th
ei
r
ow
n
d
es
ti
n
y,
w
h
il
e
ot
h
er
s
th
in
k
th
at
it
is
im
p
os
si
b
le
to
es
ca
p
e
a
p
re
d
et
er
m
in
ed
fa
te
.
P
le
as
e
te
ll
m
e
w
h
ic
h
co
m
es
cl
os
es
t
to
yo
u
r
v
ie
w
on
th
is
sc
al
e
on
w
h
ic
h
1
m
ea
n
s
"e
ve
ry
th
in
g
in
li
fe
is
d
et
er
m
in
ed
b
y
fa
te
,"
an
d
10
m
ea
n
s
th
at
"p
eo
p
le
sh
ap
e
th
ei
r
fa
te
th
em
se
lv
es
."
20
05
-2
00
8
65
,9
58
48
in
tr
in
si
c
In
tr
in
si
c
m
ot
iv
at
io
n
I
d
o
th
e
b
es
t
I
ca
n
re
ga
rd
le
ss
of
p
ay
(0
=
n
o,
1=
ye
s)
19
89
-1
99
3
52
,5
60
38
h
el
p
n
ei
gh
b
or
h
o
o
d
P
ro
so
ci
al
at
ti
tu
d
es
W
ou
ld
yo
u
b
e
p
re
p
ar
ed
to
ac
tu
al
ly
d
o
so
m
et
h
in
g
to
im
p
ro
ve
th
e
co
n
d
it
io
n
s
of
p
eo
p
le
in
yo
u
r
n
ei
gh
b
ou
r-
h
o
o
d
/c
om
m
u
n
it
y
?
(1
=
ab
so
lu
te
ly
n
o
..
.
5=
ab
so
lu
te
ly
ye
s)
19
99
-2
00
4
37
,9
40
31
h
el
p
fa
m
il
y
P
ro
so
ci
al
at
ti
tu
d
es
W
ou
ld
yo
u
b
e
p
re
p
ar
ed
to
ac
tu
al
ly
d
o
so
m
et
h
in
g
to
im
p
ro
ve
th
e
co
n
d
it
io
n
s
of
yo
u
r
im
m
ed
ia
te
fa
m
il
y
?
(1
=
ab
so
lu
te
ly
n
o
..
.
5=
ab
so
lu
te
ly
ye
s)
19
99
-2
00
4
38
,1
79
31
lo
n
el
y
L
on
el
in
es
s
D
o
yo
u
ev
er
fe
el
ve
ry
lo
n
el
y
?
(1
=
n
ev
er
..
.
4=
fr
eq
u
en
tl
y
)
19
81
-1
98
4
19
,1
29
16
li
fe
m
ea
n
in
gl
es
s
D
ep
re
ss
io
n
sy
m
p
to
m
s
H
ow
of
te
n
,
if
at
al
l,
d
o
yo
u
h
av
e
th
e
fe
el
in
g
th
at
li
fe
is
m
ea
n
in
gl
es
s?
(1
=
n
ev
er
..
.
4=
of
te
n
)
19
81
-1
98
4
18
,9
65
16
T
ab
le
5.
3.
1:
P
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
va
ri
ab
le
s
of
in
te
re
st
.
5.3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 124
5.3.1.4 Geographical data
For the instrumental variables regression, we obtained country-level data on
coastal access from the Center for International Development at Harvard Uni-
versity (http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/geographydata.htm#general).
The speciﬁc variables we use are a) the proportion of land area of the country
that is within 100km from an icefree coast (lc100km), and the proportion of
the population that lives within 100km from an icefree coast (pop100km).
5.3.2 Model speciﬁcations
5.3.2.1 Within-country regressions
Our ﬁrst question is whether within countries, poorer respondents show dif-
ferent psychological outcomes compared to richer respondents. Do poorer
people diﬀer in locus of control, diﬀerent intrinsic motivation, prosocial atti-
tudes, loneliness, or meaninglessness? To answer these questions, we regress
each variable of interest on the within-country income categories for each
respondent household. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁt the following OLS model for each
variable of interest:
Psychi,c,t = αc + µt + βInci,c,t + γi,c,tXi,c,t + ui,c,t,
where Psychi,c,t is the household-, country-, and year-speciﬁc response
on the psychological variable of interest, Inci,c,t is the household's income
category on a scale from 1 (low) to 10 (high), coded either linearly or as
the logarithm (see Results), the coeﬃcients αc and µt represent country and
year ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively, and uc,t is the error term. Xi,c,t is a vector
of controls that includes dummy variables for gender and marital status, as
well as education (in years), number of children, a quartic in age, and the
quartic in age interacted with gender.
5.3.2.2 Cross-country regressions
Cross-section: Across countries, we ﬁrst obtained aggregate indices for
each of the psychological variables by ﬁtting an ordered probit model of the
form
Psychc,t, = γc + δt + εc,t,
where Psychc,t is the country- and year-speciﬁc aggregate response on the
psychological variables of interest, γc and δt are country and year ﬁxed ef-
fects, and εc,t is the error term. We use the sampling weights provided in the
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WVS data. This regression generates predicted values for the psychoogical
variables net of country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. We then ﬁt the following ordi-
nary least squares model to the resulting country- and year-speciﬁc aggregate
probit index:
̂Psychc,t = αc + µt + βIncc,t + µc,t,
where ̂Psychc,t is the probit index of the psychological outcome variable
in question for country c in year t, Inci,c,t is either GDP, log GDP, GDP
growth, or a combination of two of these variables, for country c in year t. The
coeﬃcients αc and µt represent country and year ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively,
and uc,t is the error term. Standard errors are clustered by country.
Instrumental variables: For the ﬁrst stage of the instrumental variables
regression of psychological outcomes on income, when income is instrumented
by coastal access, we regress income on coastal access using the following OLS
speciﬁcation:
Incc,t = αc + µt + θ1pop100kmc + θ2lc100kmc + uc,t,
where the variables are as described above. In the second stage, we regress
psychological outomces  in particular, locus of control  on the predicted
income variable from the ﬁrst-stage regression:
Psychc,t = αc + µt + βÎncc,t + uc,t,
where Încc,t represents the income variable instrumented by coastal ac-
cess, i.e. free from reverse and simultaneous causality bias.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Within-country results
Figure 5.4.1 plots responses to the psychological survey questions against
within-country income category. The corresponding regression results are
shown in Table 5.4.1. Each column represents one psychological outcome
variable, corresponding to Table 5.3.1; the rows represent the regression co-
eﬃcients on the predictor variables and their signiﬁcance levels. The crucial
row for our purposes is that showing the coeﬃcients on the income vari-
able. It can be seen that all of these coeﬃcients are diﬀerent from zero and
highly signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcally, poorer individuals show more internal locus
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of control, less intrinsic motivation, less prosocial attitudes, more feelings of
loneliness, and more symptoms of depression than richer individuals. These
results are robust to the inclusion of control variables for gender, marital sta-
tus, education, number of children, a quartic in age, and the quartic in age
interacted with gender, and to controlling for country- and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Thus, this table reveals a robust relationship between the six psychological
outcomes of interest and the household's income.
5.4.2 Cross-country results
We next asked whether the relationship between income and psychological
outcomes that we observe within countries is also evident across countries.
In other words, do richer countries have, on average, more intrinsic locus
of control, etc.? In addition, to countries that grow fast than others show
diﬀerences on any of these variables?
Figure 5.4.2 illustrates the relationship between psychological outcomes
and GDP across countries, and Figure 5.4.3 illustrates the relationship be-
tween psychological outcomes and GDP growth across countries. The cor-
responding cross-country regression results are shown in Table 5.4.2, where
diﬀerent subsections show results for the regressions on GDP levels, growth,
or both, and expressing levels and growth rates either in linear or log terms.
As can be seen from Figure 5.4.2 and Table 5.4.2, poorer countries show
more internal locus of control, less intrinsic motivation, less prosocial atti-
tudes, more feelings of loneliness, and more symptoms of depression than
richer countries. These results are all statistically signiﬁcant in at least one
speciﬁcation, and identical in sign compared to the within-country results.
In contrast, however, the growth results are overwhelmingly non-signiﬁcant.
This suggests that people in richer countries have, on average, more inter-
nal locus of control, more intrinsic motivation, more prosocial attitudes, less
loneliness, and fewer feelings of meaninglessness than people in poorer coun-
tries. However, the same is not true for countries that grow at higher vs.
lower rates; GDP growth is not signiﬁcantly related to any of these variables.
To address the question of causality in the relationship between income
across countries and psychological outcomes, we next used instrumental vari-
ables regression to ask whether income has a causal eﬀect on psychological
outcomes when it is instrumented using coastal access. We focus on locus of
control as an outcome variable, since we have 41 datapoints (countries) for
this variable, while the other variables are only available in fewer countries.
Two criteria need to be fulﬁlled for the validity of coastal access as an
instrument. The ﬁrst is the exclusion restriction: the instrument should not
aﬀect the outcome variable (in our case, psychological outcomes) through
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Figure 5.4.1: Psychological variables against income category within coun-
tries. The lines represent the mean response to each psychological survey
question for the particular income category (from 1-10), collapsed across
countries. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
People shape Do the best Help Help Feel Life is
VARIABLES own fate regardless of pay neighborhood family lonely meaningless
Income (steps 1-10, log) 0.359*** 0.0211 0.0220** 0.0583*** -0.144*** -0.126***
(15.28) (1.193) (2.200) (7.252) (-7.871) (-6.903)
Female 0.446 -1.600 0.372 0.621 0.897 0.741
(0.437) (-0.335) (0.795) (1.582) (1.445) (1.085)
Education (years) 0.131*** 0.0164** 0.0186*** 0.0202***
(21.37) (2.433) (6.440) (9.027)
Married 0.0888*** 0.000904 0.0992*** 0.119*** -0.502*** -0.193***
(3.040) (0.0407) (7.563) (11.11) (-20.86) (-8.269)
Number of children -0.027*** -0.00233 0.0134*** 0.0240*** -0.00160 -0.00145
(-3.170) (-0.576) (3.193) (7.130) (-0.424) (-0.395)
Age -0.0808 0.00681 -0.0641** -0.0131 0.0891** -0.0435
(-1.101) (0.0170) (-2.077) (-0.515) (2.062) (-0.915)
Age^2 0.00240 -0.000671 0.00238** 0.000527 -0.00221 0.00159
(0.973) (-0.0390) (2.375) (0.634) (-1.526) (0.995)
Age^3 -3.19e-05 1.81e-05 -3.28e-05** -8.93e-06 2.01e-05 -2.38e-05
(-0.923) (0.0576) (-2.407) (-0.784) (0.992) (-1.059)
Age^4 1.53e-07 -1.52e-07 1.52e-07** 4.72e-08 -4.72e-08 1.22e-07
(0.889) (-0.0731) (2.309) (0.850) (-0.469) (1.087)
Female x Age -0.0781 0.219 -0.0255 -0.0432 -0.0334 -0.0526
(-0.793) (0.384) (-0.580) (-1.151) (-0.560) (-0.792)
Female x Age^2 0.00304 -0.0103 0.000612 0.000899 0.000373 0.00157
(0.915) (-0.424) (0.425) (0.717) (0.188) (0.698)
Female x Age^3 -4.77e-05 0.000203 -4.78e-06 -4.77e-06 4.02e-06 -1.86e-05
(-1.024) (0.454) (-0.243) (-0.272) (0.146) (-0.589)
Female x Age^4 2.52e-07 -1.41e-06 3.04e-09 -1.32e-08 -6.25e-08 7.04e-08
(1.083) (-0.475) (0.0317) (-0.151) (-0.463) (0.446)
Constant 5.863*** 1.700 3.266*** 2.993*** 0.297 1.843*
(3.515) (0.226) (4.424) (4.894) (0.302) (1.699)
Observations 58685 1677 31072 31258 15823 15703
R-squared 0.175 0.016 0.184 0.137 0.143 0.050
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 5.4.1: Within-country regression results. Each column shows the eﬀect
of within-country income category (from 1-10) and control variables on one
psychological variable of interest. All models include country and year ﬁxed
eﬀects. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 5.4.2: Cross-country scatterplots showing psychological outcomes
against GDP.
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Figure 5.4.3: Cross-country scatterplots showing psychological outcomes
against growth.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
People shape Do the best Help Help Feel Life is
own fate regardless of pay neighborhood family lonely meaningless
Model 1:
GDP (log)
GDP (log) 0.145*** 0.480*** 0.458*** 0.230* -0.246 -0.388**
(3.527) (4.798) (4.096) (2.011) (-1.724) (-2.415)
Constant -1.350*** -4.244*** -3.767*** -1.921 2.203 3.981**
(-3.321) (-4.335) (-3.362) (-1.684) (1.583) (2.483)
R-squared 0.190 0.431 0.423 0.136 0.063 0.311
Model 2:
GDP
GDP 1.03e-05*** 2.57e-05*** 2.08e-05** 1.02e-05* -1.44e-05 -2.28e-05*
(2.712) (3.718) (2.655) (1.745) (-1.527) (-2.141)
Constant -0.187* -0.0435 0.265 0.115 0.0652 0.607**
(-1.728) (-0.294) (1.336) (0.695) (0.344) (2.639)
R-squared 0.112 0.360 0.282 0.085 0.063 0.309
Model 3:
GDP growth
GDP growth -0.000913 0.0225 0.0171 0.00576 -0.0110 -0.000620
(-0.0567) (1.705) (0.435) (0.228) (-0.489) (-0.0337)
Constant -0.0309 0.449*** 0.629*** 0.301*** -0.218*** 0.157***
(-0.316) (7.141) (4.112) (2.811) (-3.250) (3.060)
R-squared 0.000 0.121 0.010 0.001 0.007 0.000
Model 4: GDP &
GDP growth
GDP 1.37e-05*** 2.66e-05** 2.39e-05** 1.20e-05 -1.59e-05* -2.38e-05*
(2.904) (2.494) (2.689) (1.464) (-2.067) (-2.178)
GDP growth 0.0287 -0.000611 -0.0294 -0.0176 -0.0183 -0.0119
(1.383) (-0.0349) (-0.665) (-0.525) (-0.817) (-0.815)
Constant -0.398** -0.0697 0.304 0.138 0.0977 0.628**
(-2.069) (-0.304) (1.562) (0.938) (0.603) (2.677)
R-squared 0.147 0.367 0.306 0.096 0.080 0.324
Model 5: GDP (log)
& GDP growth
GDP per capita (log) 0.178*** 0.532*** 0.508*** 0.261* -0.267** -0.401**
(3.741) (3.431) (4.061) (1.800) (-2.221) (-2.450)
GDP growth (%) 0.0296 -0.00660 -0.0306 -0.0188 -0.0173 -0.0106
(1.507) (-0.396) (-0.806) (-0.629) (-0.769) (-0.735)
Constant -1.810*** -4.758*** -4.150*** -2.156 2.414* 4.116**
(-3.477) (-3.112) (-3.536) (-1.592) (2.061) (2.517)
R-squared 0.231 0.440 0.450 0.149 0.079 0.322
All models:
Observations 41 25 28 28 15 14
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustering by country YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 5.4.2: Cross-country regression results. Each model shows the eﬀect
of GDP, log GDP, or growth, and their combinations, on the psychological
variables of interest. All models include country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by country. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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other channels than the endogenous variable (in our case, income). In our
view, it is very plausible that coastal access aﬀects locus of control only
through the income channel. In particular, it is widely known that coastal
access is a strong predictor of trade opennness and access to foreign markets;
it ths directly contributes to the economic success of a country. On the
other hand, it is more diﬃcult to imagine how it would aﬀect psychological
outcomes through channels other than income. We can only think of one
candidate channel, i.e. religion: it may be the case that countries with easy
coastal access are more likely than other to get missionarized. However, in
this case we would likely observe the opposite eﬀect than the one we actually
see: in all likelihood the eﬀect of religiosity on locus of control is, if anything,
to make it more internal; thus we would expect these countries to show
more internal locus of control than others. However, we actually observe
the opposite, as will be detailed below. Thus, in our view the coastal access
instrument satisﬁes the exclusion restriction.
The second criterion for instrument validity is relvance: the instrument
has to signiﬁcantly predict the endogenous variable, in this case, GDP. This
is tested in the ﬁrst-stage regression, the results of which are shown in Table
5.4.3. The rule of thumb for instrument relevance is an F-statistic greater
than 10 in the ﬁrst-stage regression. Indeed, we obtain F-statistics greater
than 10 in all speciﬁcations, whether GDP is speciﬁed in linear or log terms,
and whether pop100km or lc100km or both variables are used as the instru-
ments. Thus, the instruments are clearly relevant.
We are now in a position to assess the causal eﬀect of GDP on locus of
control, using the version of GDP that is instrumented with coastal access.
We estimate this model using two-stage least squares (2SLS); the results
are shown in Table 5.4.4. It can be seen that all eﬀects are positive and
weakly signiﬁcant; thus, to the extent we trust the validity and exogeneity
of our instrment, we conclude that higher incomes cause more internal locus
of control.
5.5 Discussion
The purpose of this paper was to ask whether poverty has particular psy-
chological consequences. A long-standing literature has investigated the as-
sociation between income and happiness; the most recent contributions to
this literature document an assocation between income and happiness that
obtains both within countries, as well as across countries. Our ﬁndings add
to this literature in three ways:
First, we extend previous ﬁndings to other psychological outcome vari-
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ables. For decades, the literature on income and psychological outcomes has
mainly been concerned with happiness and life satisfaction; however, data
for a host of other important psychological outcome variables is available,
and our results show that these variables, too, show strong associations with
income. In demonstrating the associations described above, our study lends
support to a small number of studies that have shown similar associations
for optimism, locus of control, and self-esteem (Maqsud & Rouhani, 1997;
Sherman & Hofmann, 1978; Twenge & Campbell, 2002; Scheier & Carver,
1985; Robb et al., 2009; Lynch et al., 1997; Taylor & Seeman, 1999). How-
ever, note that these ﬁndings were largely obtained in much smaller samples,
often in particular population subgroups, and without attempts to establish
causal relationships.
Second, our ﬁndings lend support to the most recent results by Steven-
son & Wolfers, which show that the correlation between income and happi-
ness also holds across countries, in contrast to the early ﬁndings by East-
erlin (1974). In particular, we ﬁnd that for all variables under considera-
tion, there is both a within-country correlation with income category, and a
cross-country correlation with country GDP. In contrast, however, we ﬁnd
no association between any of our psychological outcome variables and GDP
growth; thus, as countries get richer, they do not appear to cahnge much in
the psychological variables we consider here. A potential explanation for this
somewhat surprising result is that yearly GDP growth, which we used here
as the growth variable, may be too volatile and short-term to be reﬂected
in psychological outcomes; a variable that aggregates growth over a longer
time horizon may show more of an association with psychological outcomes
in future work.
Finally, our ﬁndings add to the literature on the relationship between
income and psychological variables in general by using coastal access as an
instrument, and by showing that income in fact has a causal eﬀect on some
psychological outcomes. In our view this approach is superior to other instur-
mental variable approaches used in this literature. Speciﬁcally, Stevenson &
Wolfers instrumented income using country and education as income pre-
dictors; these instruments are likely to fail the exclusion restriction  it is
easy to imagine that both country and education might aﬀect psychological
variables in other ways than through income. The instrumental variable we
use, coastal access, appears to us to be a much more promising candidate for
a good instrument.
In sum, we show a robust eﬀect of income on a variety of psychological
outcomes. This relationship is robust to a number of control variables and
to country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. It holds both within and across countries,
and obtains in the cross-country speciﬁcations for GDP levels, but not GDP
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growth. Finally, insturmental variable estimates suggest that the relation-
ship between high income and internal locus of control is causal. Together,
our ﬁndings suggest that poverty may have signiﬁcant psychological costs
that go beyond economic welfare. In our view these costs should be on the
radar of policymakers, since they imply that poverty alleviation programs,
to the extent that they aﬀect these measures of psychological welfare, have
to be evaluated not only in terms of their economic eﬀects, but also on their
contributions to psychological well-being.
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Chapter 6
Negative Income Shocks Increase
Present Bias in Intertemporal
Choice
6.1 Summary
Poor individuals often exhibit more present-focused time preferences than
richer individuals, and negative income shocks have been linked to increases
in present-biased intertemporal choice. However, it remains unknown whether
this eﬀect is causal, and whether is due to beliefs or preferences: increases
in present focus in poverty or after negative income shocks could either be
due to more severe environmental constraints in contexts of poverty, or to
direct eﬀects of poverty or income shocks on preferences. Here we address
these questions in a laboratory experiment in which subjects receive diﬀerent
starting endowments which create rich and poor groups; in addition, all
participants then perform a real eﬀort task to earn money, following which
subgroups of participants receive positive and negative income shocks. Sub-
sequently we measure time preferences. We ﬁnd that negative income shocks,
but not positive income shocks, lead to an increase in present bias during in-
tertemporal choice. In contrast, positive income shocks have no such eﬀect;
similarly, time preferences are not aﬀected by mean levels of wealth (rich
vs. poor). The eﬀect of negative income shocks on time preference is spe-
ciﬁc to present bias and does not aﬀect impatience per se. Furthermore, no
eﬀects were found on reservation wages. Together, these ﬁndings suggest
that negative income shocks have a direct causal eﬀect on preferences that is
not explained by wealth levels and individual characteristics.
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6.2 Introduction
Both empirically and theoretically, poverty has been linked to present-focused
time preferences (see literature review below). However, it remains unknown
to what extent this relationship is causal; in addition, it is unknown whether
an eﬀect of poverty on time preferences is due to beliefs about environmental
constraints, or changes in pure preferences. Evidence exists for both views.
In favor of the former hypothesis, it has frequently been argued that high
rates of time preference may be entirely rational in conditions of poverty
 e.g., Becker & Mulligan (1997) show how existing economic conditions
such as wealth, and environmental inﬂuences such as mortality and risk, can
endogenously lead to behavior that looks like impatience. Others have ar-
gued that market imperfections, e.g. in insurance and credit markets, are
responsible for behavior that resembles high rates of time preference in poor
countries, since they may imply that investments with immediate ﬁxed costs
and delayed beneﬁts are less attractive than immediate-return investments
(Banerjee, 2001; Holden et al., 1998; Pagiola, 1996, Shiferaw & Holden,
2001). Similarly, present-focused decisions may be rational if returns to in-
vestment are low, which has also been argued to be the case in developing
countries (Rosenzweig, 1995; van Walle, 2003). Finally, present-focused be-
havior among the poor may occur if people are severely calorie-constrained
and have to focus on eating suﬃciently today in order to survive until to-
morrow (Murphree, 1993; Bardhan, 1996; Lumley, 1997; Dasgupta, 1997).
Endogenous time preferences may have signiﬁcant long-run consequences:
Strulik (2011) argued that such endogenous time preferences can account for
the growth paths taken by many countries better than the standard Ramsey
model, and Chakrabarty (2011) suggested that they can create poverty traps.
However, it could also be the case that conditions of poverty also aﬀect
time preferences directly, above and beyond a rational response to environ-
mental conditions. A number of authors have suggested that environments of
poverty may have direct impacts on preferences (Bertrand et al., 2004; Hall,
2008). Here we present evidence for this view; speciﬁcally, we show that
negative income shocks  a salient feature of the lives of many of the world's
poorest people  increase present bias in intertemporal choice. Because of
the diﬃculty of studying income shocks while holding constant wealth, this
paper takes a laboratory approach, which allows to study the eﬀect of shocks
while holding constant individual wealth by a) random assignment to treat-
ment condition, and b) comparison of an income shock group to a control
group with the same absolute wealth level.
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6.2.1 Poverty and time preference
Numerous papers document empirically that a relationship exists between
rates of time preference and poverty. In one of the earliest studies of this
kind, Hausman (1979) found that poorer households had higher rates of time
preference than richer households. Lawrance (1991) estimated time prefer-
ences from Euler equations in a panel of US households, and found that
poorer families had signiﬁcantly higher rates of time preference than richer
families. Similar results were found by Harrison et al. (2002) in Denmark;
Sullivan (2011) ﬁnds weak evidence in a sample from China that house-
holds with lower wealth have higher discount rates. Pender & Walker (1990)
elicited rates of time preference from Indian peasants, and found that the
wealth of the participants signiﬁcantly predicted the rates of time prefer-
ence, again with wealthier subjects being more patient. Similar results were
found by Yesuf & Bluﬀstone (2008), who elicited time preferences from 262
households in rural Ethiopia and found that discount rates were signiﬁcantly
negatively correlatd with wealth variables such as the amount of land owned,
the value of a household's capital stock, and, to some degree, the number of
oxen owned. Note, however, that a number of studies show no signiﬁcant re-
lationship between poverty and time preferences (Cagetti, 2003; Gourinchas
& Parker, 2002; Stephens & Krupka, 2006; Ogaki & Atkeson, 1997).
Nevertheless, the ﬁndings summarized above suggest that may be at
least a correlational inverse relationship between rates of time preference
and poverty. To test the causal role of poverty in aﬀecting decision-making,
Tanaka et al. (2010) elicited time preferences from 5340 individuals in Viet-
nam and ﬁt a number of discounting models to the data, including the quasi-
hyperbolic model we use here. They ﬁnd that income is negatively related
to delta (denoted as r in their paper), i.e., richer households show less ex-
ponential discounting; interestingly and in contrast to our ﬁndings, no such
relationship is evident for the beta parameter. A particularly elegant feature
of this study is the use of rainfall as an instrumental variable for income:
the negative relationship between delta (but not beta) and income persists
when income is instrumented using the exogenous rainfall data, and thereby
establishes a causal channel from low income to high discounting. A sim-
ilar approach was taken by di Falco et al. (2011), who found in a sample
of 1237 households in rural Ethiopia that income shocks caused by severe
droughts led to increases in the rate of time preference. Note, however, that
it is not possible in this setting to disentangle the income eﬀect of the shock
from any psychological eﬀects of the shock itself; i.e., increased rates of time
preference after a shock may be entirely rational responses to the changed
economic circumstances, rather than a genuine change in preferences.
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In a study closely related to ours, Spears (2010) randomly assigned poor
participants in India to one of four conditions: they could either be rich or
poor, in the sense that they received either two (rich) or one (poor) good
from a choice set of three options. In addition, each participant could either
be in a "choice" or a "no choice" condition, where the former meant that
participants could choose which item(s) from the choice set they wanted to
receive, whereas in the latter case the items were randomly assigned. Spears
then asked participants to perform two tasks that are frequently used to
measure cognitive control: squeezing two handlebars for as long as possible,
and performing a Stroop-like task. In this task, participants have to name
the number of items in a display, which, confusingly, are numbers themselves;
thus, a display might be "3 3", in which case the correct answer would be
"two" since there are two items in the display. Spears found that participants
performed worse on the two cognitive-control tasks if they had been randomly
assigned to both the poor and the choice conditions. Thus, requiring people
to make a choice appeared to deplete cognitive control, but this was only true
for poor participants. Since cognitive control has frequently been related to
hyperbolic discounting in the psychology literature (Shamosh et al., 2008;
Shamosh & Gray, 2008), the study by Spears (2010) is similar in spirit to ours;
however, note that while Spears focuses on low absolute levels of income, we
hold levels constant and focus instead on negative income shocks. In addition,
we measure economic choice rather than performance in psychological games.
6.2.2 Emotion and time preference
Our paper is also related to the literature that studies the eﬀect of emotions
on time preference: if negative income shocks aﬀect the participants' aﬀect,
any eﬀects on time preferences may be mediated by this channel. Indeed,
emotions can have strong inﬂuences on time preference; Loewenstein (1996,
2000) points out that in the presence of visceral factors such as rage, people
sometimes exhibit extreme discounting of future events, e.g. when politicians
put their careers at risk by engaging in extramarital sex. Laboratory exper-
iments that randomly assigned participants to particular emotion induction
conditions conﬁrm this hypothesis. For instance, Raeva et al. (2010) stud-
ied the eﬀect of experienced regret on time preference. They elicited regret
in participants by ﬁrst letting them choose one of two lotteries, and then
revealing that the other choice would have produced a better outcome. Con-
trol participants only saw the result of their chosen lottery, not that of the
alternative, and thus could not experience regret. After this manipulation,
participants completed a time preference task; those participants who had
experienced regret had a lower indiﬀerence point for an outcome that was
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available tomorrow, i.e. were less patient than control subjects. Conversely,
participants who had experienced rejoicing, i.e. their chosen lottery was su-
perior to the alternative, were more patient than controls. A similar paper by
Ifcher & Zarghamee (AER, forthcoming) showed that positive aﬀect, induced
by a video clip of a stand-up comedian, made participants more patient than
a control clip showing nature scenes.
6.2.3 Reference points and time preference
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature on reference-dependent
utility and prior outcomes. Existing evidence suggests that people evaluate
options against existing reference points (Köszegi & Rabin, 2006, 2007); in
our experiment, it is likely that unexpected negative income shocks in our
experiment put participants below the reference point, i.e. in a loss frame,
while unexpected positive income shocks put them above the reference point,
i.e, in a gain frame. In prospect theory, making decisions in the loss domain
is associated with risk-seeking behavior, while the gain domain is associated
with risk aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Payne et al., 1980; Hershey
& Schoemaker, 1980; Hershey et al., 1982; Slovic et al., 1982). Together with
the theoretical and empirical relationship between risk and time preferences
(Epper et al., 2011), according to which risk aversion correlates positively
with present-focused time preferences (Leigh, 1986; Rachlin et al., 1991; An-
derhub et al., 2001; Myerson et al., 2003; Eckel et al., 2004; Andersen et al.,
2008), this literature suggests that negative income shocks might make sub-
jects risk-seeking and therefore lead to an increase in preferences for delayed
outcomes.
However, a competing account is the eﬀect of prior losses on subsequent
risky choice described by Thaler & Johnson (1990). These authors suggest
that participants may edit the options available to them before making a
choice; according to the hedonic editing rule, they do this in such a way as
to make the resulting prospects appear most pleasant. In particular, this
rule dictates that gains are segregated (i.e. considered independently from
prior outcomes), losses are integrated with prior outcomes. Interestingly, the
implication of this rule is this is risk aversion after previous losses. Thaler
& Johnson present empirical evidence in favor of this view: prior monetary
losses lead to increased risk aversion among their participants. In the context
of the present paper, this ﬁnding suggests that negative income shocks may
in fact lead to more present-focused time preferences.
In sum, it remains open to what extent poverty and negative income
shocks aﬀect time preference. We test here whether positive or negative in-
come shocks, or absolute levels of wealth, aﬀect time preference. To this
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end, subjects receive diﬀerent starting endowments which create rich and
poor groups; in addition, all participants then perform a real eﬀort task
to earn money, following which subgroups of participants receive positive
and negative income shocks. Subsequently we measure time preferences. We
ﬁnd that negative income shocks, but not positive income shocks, lead to
an increase in present bias during intertemporal choice. In contrast, positive
income shocks have no such eﬀect; similarly, time preferences are not aﬀected
by mean levels of wealth (rich vs. poor). The eﬀect of negative income
shocks on time preference is speciﬁc to present bias and does not aﬀect impa-
tience per se. Together, these ﬁndings suggest that negative income shocks
may exacerbate behavioral biases in intertemporal choice.
6.3 Methods
6.3.1 Participants
We recruited 148 healthy male participants form the subject pool of the Uni-
versity of Zürich. Their mean age was 22 ± 2.47 years (mean ± S.D.). We
excluded students of economics and psychology, and those who were acutely
or chronically ill, took medications, drugs, smoked more than 5 cigarettes
a day, regularly consumed more than 60g of alcohol per day, suﬀered from
allergies or psychiatric disorders, were in psychological or psychiatric treat-
ment at the time of the study, or had a body mass index smaller than 18 or
greater than 25. Participants were instructed to not consume medications,
alcohol, or coﬀee, and not to engage in sexual intercourse, for 24h before
the experiment. In addition, they were asked to get up at least 3h before
the beginning of the experiment, and to not drink coﬀee, eat, smoke, or per-
form strenuous physical activity in the last 2h before the experiment. All
participants were tested in the afternoon between 2pm and 8pm. They gave
written informed consent and were reimbursed for their participation. An
experimental session lasted 2h.
6.3.2 Selection of subjects
We restricted our experiment to men since controlling for ovarian cycle in
women is logistically diﬃcult. Furthermore, psychology and economics stu-
dents, self-reported heavy smokers (consumption of > 5 cigarettes per day),
heavy alcohol consumers (consumption of > 60 g alcohol per day) and drug
users were excluded. Participants were German native speakers and would
stay in Zurich at least for the next 12 months (for payment of their reward).
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The study was approved by the ethical committee of the University of Zurich
and all participants provided written informed consent. Participants received
a variable reimbursement for their participation, depending on the choices
they made during the experiment.
6.3.3 Procedure
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant was informed about the
nature of the tasks to be performed and trained to use the saliva sampling
devices (Salivettes). Participants were also told that they might experience
a change in their wealth during the real eﬀort task that they would perform.
They were told that they would experience either exactly zero or exactly one
such wealth change, but were not told the timing, magnitude, or direction of
this change.
After these instructions, each participant completed a PANAS question-
naire (Watson et al., 1988) and ﬁve visual analog scales, which asked to what
extent participants currently felt a) stressed, b) self-control, c) optimistic,
d) self-conﬁdent, e) government vs. individual responsibility. Participants
marked their current feelings on a 10 cm line; responses were coded as be-
tween 0 and 100.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four treatment con-
ditions, unbeknownst to them: stay rich; stay poor; negative income
shock; positive income shock. When the experiment began, participants
in the stay rich and negative income shock groups had a high initial en-
dowment of 1000 points; in contrast, the stay poor and positive income
shock groups had a low initial endowment of 100 points. 70 points were
converted into 1 CHF at the end of the experiment and paid out.
Throughout the experiment, participants were informed of their own cur-
rent wealth through bars and numbers on the screen; the size of the bar
corresponded to the current wealth of the participant. In addition, bars
were also shown for current maximum wealth, minimum wealth, and aver-
age wealth across all participants. Thus, participants could continually keep
track of their own wealth, and its relation to the wealth of the entire group
of participants. Bars were always normalized to the maximum wealth bar
for ease of display.
6.3.4 Real eﬀort task
Participants then participated in a real eﬀort task for 15 periods, which
resembled that used by Abeler (2009). Each period lasted 2 minutes. The
task consisted of counting the number of zeros in a 7 x 5 random table to
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zeros and ones, which was presented on the left side of the screen. The
right side of the screen displayed the wealth variables described above  own
wealth, and maximum, minimum, and average wealth of all participants; the
purpose of displaying this information even during task performance was to
make own wealth in comparison to that of the entire group as salient as
possible. After counting the zeros in a given table, participants entered their
answer in a text ﬁeld at the bottom of the screen. The next table was then
displayed, without feedback about performance to minimize learning eﬀects.
Participants counted as many tables as they could within each 2 minute
period, and earned 5 points for every correctly counted table. After each
period, the accumulated points from the period were added to the wealth
of the participant and displayed for 20 seconds in the middle of the screen,
again also showing minumu, maximum, and average wealth. After these 20
seconds, the next period began.
Participants played 15 periods of the real eﬀort task, which lasted 35
minutes. After 15 periods of earning income, the two income shock groups
received their income shocks. The timing, magnitude, and direction of these
shocks was unanticipated; however, participants were informed at the begin-
ning of the experiment that they might experience a sudden change in their
wealth levels. No justiﬁcation was given for the income shocks; participants
were informed of the shock through a screen that read Your income has
decreased by x points or Your income has increased by y points. The
participants in the stay rich and stay poor groups were also told at the
beginning of the experiment that they might experience sudden changes in
their wealth levels during the experiment, but they did not receive income
shocks after period 15, nor were they told when the other participants expe-
rienced the income shocks.
The magnitude and direction of the income shock for the downward
income shock group was such that the post-shock average wealth of this
group was equal to the pre-shock average wealth of the stay poor group.
Similarly, the magnitude and direction of the income shock for the upward
income shock group was such that the post-shock average wealth of this
group was equal to the pre-shock average wealth of the stay rich group. Put
diﬀerently, the two groups switched positions from the poor into the rich
group, and vice-versa. This allows us to then compare the eﬀect of income
shocks on economic choice, holding constant current wealth: comparing the
behavior of the negative income shock group to the stay poor group
reveals the eﬀect of a negative income shock, holding constant current wealth,
while comparing the behavior of the positive income shock group to the
stay rich group reveals the eﬀect of a positive income shock, again holding
constant current wealth.
6.3. METHODS 147
After receiving the income shock, participants were again presented with
their updated wealth and the maximum, minimum, and average wealth across
participants. This information was displayed for one minute to make their
new wealth salient to participants in the shock groups. Participants then
played two more periods of the real eﬀort task; the purpose of these two pe-
riods was again to make participants fully aware of their new wealth situation
and their position relative to others.
After period 17, participants performed the behavioral tasks of interest, in
particular, an intertemporal choice task and a BDM auction. The following
sections describe these tasks in greater detail.
6.3.5 Intertemporal Choice Task
Participants performed three blocks of an intertemporal choice task with
varying delays, where decisions between a sooner smaller reward and a later
larger reward were oﬀered. In the ﬁrst two blocks subjects had the choice
between a smaller reward tomorrow, and a larger reward in a) 6 months and
1 day, or b) 12 months and 1 day. The short delay was set to tomorrow
rather than today to keep transaction costs the same for sooner and later
payments. In the last block, subjects chose between a smaller reward in 6
months and 1 day, and a larger reward in 9 months and 1 day. Each block
consisted of 6 binary choice trials, resulting in a total of 18 trials. The larger
reward was kept constant at an amount of 30 Swiss Francs (CHF), while
the sooner smaller reward started at CHF 15 and was then adjusted with a
titration method according to the choices the subject made.
Reimbursement consisted of a ﬂat rate of CHF 10 and a variable payment
depending on participants' choices. In particular, as was explained to the
participants at the beginning of the study, one of all the choices made was
randomly selected at the end of the study, and the chosen option on this trial
was paid out for real, i.e., participants could pick up the chosen amount on
the chosen day of delivery, using a voucher valid at the University cashier's
oﬃce. As mentioned, transaction costs were kept constant by setting the
soonest outcome to tomorrow.
Titration is a standard method for identifying time preferences in the
discounting literature (Mazur, 1988; Green & Myerson, 2004; Kable & Glim-
cher, 2007; Rachlin et al., 1991). The titration worked as follows: for each
choice of the later reward, the sooner reward was increased by half the dif-
ference between it and 30 CHF; for instance, if a subject chose CHF 30 in
12 months and 1 day over CHF 15 tomorrow, the next trial would oﬀer the
subject a choice between CHF 30 in 12 months and 1 day and CHF 22.50
tomorrow; if the subject still chose CHF 30 in 12 months and 1 day, the next
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oﬀer would be CHF 30 in 12 months and 1 day vs. CHF 26.25 tomorrow, and
so on. For each choice of the sooner reward, the sooner reward was decreased
by half of the diﬀerence between it and the previously oﬀered soon reward.
For instance, if a subject chose CHF 15 tomorrow over CHF 30 in 12 months
and 1 day, the next trial would oﬀer the subject a choice between CHF 7.50
tomorrow and CHF 30 in 12 months and 1 day; if the subject chose CHF
7.50 tomorrow, the next oﬀer would be CHF 3.75 tomorrow vs. CHF 30 in
12 months and 1 day, and so on. The titration procedure lasted for 6 trials at
each combination of delays; this means that each indiﬀerence point was iden-
tiﬁed to a precision of CHF 0.23 (CHF 15 * 0.5^6, i.e. the initial diﬀerence
between CHF 15 and CHF 30/ CHF 0 was halved six times). The amount
of the sooner reward at the end of this titration procedure was taken as the
indiﬀerence point for the particular delay combination, i.e. the amount of
the sooner smaller reward where participants switched between the smaller
sooner and the later larger reward.
This procedure resulted in an individual discount function for each sub-
ject, which was used as the basis for ﬁtting parameters of several models
of intertemporal choice, described below. Note that this procedure collapses
subjects' choices in the time preference task into one or two parameters; thus,
each subject entered the statistical analysis only once, i.e. we are not using
multiple (non-independent) data points for each subject.
Possible serial correlation and order eﬀects in subjects' responses were
controlled for by randomizing the order of trials across blocks, i.e. the order
in which the various indiﬀerence points were determined.
Note that the soonest option subjects could choose in the intertemporal
choice task was tomorrow. One may ask whether this delay can be con-
sidered small enough to be useful in identifying present bias. We chose this
design for the following reasons:
First, we found it diﬃcult to include an earlier reward in the design
without confounding transaction costs: the chosen option on one of the trials
in the intertemporal choice task was paid out for real, i.e., participants could
pick up the chosen amount on the chosen day of delivery, using a voucher valid
at the University cashier's oﬃce. If the smallest delay was today, choosing
this option would result in lower transaction costs compared to choosing a
more delayed option, because subjects are already at the University, while
at any other delay than today (i.e. tomorrow, but also in several months)
subjects may have to travel to the University speciﬁcally to pick up their
payment. Therefore, in this case we would have been unable to dissociate
transaction costs from present bias.
Second, we did consider other forms of payment than cash vouchers, but
they all suﬀered from similar problems: we judged that getting a check or
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cash on the day vs. receiving a check or cash in the mail later did not equate
the perceived risk of the transaction; bank transfers cannot be eﬀected on
the same day and also have to be picked up at the bank before they can
be consumed; Amazon vouchers cannot be turned into consumption immedi-
ately because of the delays associated with mail orders; mobile phone money
transfers and pre-paid debit cards are not available in Switzerland. Thus, the
tomorrow option seemed to us the cleanest way of eliciting time preference
without risk of transaction cost confounds.
Third, note that even with a today option, when using money as a
reward, it is almost impossible to study true present bias in the sense of the
immediate present; at best, one could hope for a time frame of a few hours,
since subjects are unable to spend the money they earn in the experiment
until they leave the lab. Thus, even a today option would not fully address
the disconnect between the present and the earliest time at which the
reward can actually be consumed.
Fourth, to the extent that we observe present bias in our behavioral data
(we consistently ﬁnd beta < 1), we argue that people actually do consider
tomorrow as part of the extended present. Thus, in our view it is likely that,
even if it were possible to overcome the diﬀerence in transaction costs, similar
results would be found if all the payoﬀs had been one day earlier (i.e. today,
in 3 months, in 6 months etc.).
Fifth, note that the delays in our temporal choice task are relatively long,
ranging from 6 months to 12 months. In comparison, the delay between to-
day and tomorrow is very small in magnitude, making it likely that tomorrow
is in fact interpreted as part of the extended present by our subjects. In sup-
port of this claim, comparable studies where the soonest payoﬀ was on the
same day ﬁnd similar discount rates as we do when the soonest payoﬀ is
tomorrow (Benizon et al., 1989; Thaler, 1981; Frederick et al., 2002). In par-
ticular, estimates of the beta parameter reported in the literature involving,
among others, immediate outcomes in real-life or laboratory situations are
very similar to those obtained for our control group (Laibson et al., 1998,
2007).
Finally, note that if tomorrow is not considered part of the extended
present by our subjects, it is likely that we in fact underestimated the behav-
ioral eﬀect of negative income shocks on present bias. Conversely, we would
predict that the eﬀect of negative income shocks on present bias would be
stronger if a today option was included.
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6.3.6 BDM Auction Task
We next asked whether the income shocks changed participants' reservation
wage; for instance, might participants who just lost a substantial proportion
of their wealth be more willing to work at a lower wage? We therefore
conducted a Becker-deGroot-Marschak (1964) auction in which participants
could bid against the computer on the opportunity to complete the real
eﬀort task for another eight periods. Participants entered their bid into a text
ﬁeld, the computer played the auction immediately, and winning participants
performed the real eﬀort task for another 8 periods, while the remainder of
the subjects waited until they had completed the experiment. The advantage
of this type of auction is that it is incentive-compatible and elicits subjects'
true willingness to pay for playing a further eight periods.
The computer bid was randomly drawn from a uniform distribution be-
tween 0 and the expected earnings from a further 8 periods of play, based on
performance of each subject in the ﬁrst 15 periods of the real eﬀort task. If
participants' willingness exceeded the computer bid, they could perform the
real eﬀort task for the remaining 8 periods.
At the end of the study, participants completed another PANAS ques-
tionnaire and ﬁve visual-analog scales (see above). Finally, they completed
a socioeconomic questionnaire and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton
et al., 1995), and were paid and excused.
6.3.7 Model Fits
For every subject and every delay level, we determined the amount at which
a subject was indiﬀerent between the immediate and delayed option (in items
with an immediate option), or the delayed and the very delayed option (in
items with an added front-end delay) based on the individual switching points
(see above). This allowed us to express the subjective value of the delayed
reward as a fraction of the subjective value of the immediate reward. We then
plotted the relative values of the delayed rewards as a function of time. Next,
for every subject, we ﬁtted three diﬀerent models to the obtained indiﬀerence
points.
Beta-delta quasi-hyperbolic discount model. Laibson's beta-delta model
(Laibson, 1997) was ﬁtted to the indiﬀerence points to obtain an estimate of
the degree of impatience and present bias:
Vt = v (rt) +
T−t∑
τ=1
δtv (rt+τ ) ,
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where Vt indicates the discounted value at time t of a stream of rewards
r with subjective values v as a function of time τ . This equation contains
a constant, exponential discount function whose discount rate is ln 1
δ
, thus
whose steepness can be characterized by δ. The β parameter deﬂects the
exponential discount curve and its inverse can be interpreted as the extra
weight added to immediate rewards. Hence, δ can be interpreted as measur-
ing impatience and β as measuring present bias.
6.3.8 Statistical Analyses
The eﬀect of negative income shocks on the outcome variables was assessed
using OLS regressions of the following form:
yi = β0 + β1negshocki + β2Xi + ui
yi = β0 + β1posshocki + β2Xi + ui,
where yi are the three outcome variables, i.e. βi, δi, and bdmi. βi and δi
are the present bias and impatience parameters, respectively, in Laibson's
discounting model, negshocki and posshocki are dummy variables indicating
whether subject i was in the negative income shock group, the positive in-
come shock group, or the control group, Xi is a vector of covariates including
age, body mass index, and number of siblings, and ui is the error term. The
regression with the negshocki term was only run for subjects in the stay
poor and negative income shock groups, since these two groups are identi-
cal in terms of their average wealth at the beginning of the economic choice
tasks. Similarly, the regression with the posshocki term was only run for
subjects in the stay rich and positive income shock groups.
6.4 Results
The main question of this study was whether income shocks aﬀect time pref-
erence, while wealth levels are held constant. Our design allows us to test this
hypothesis as follows: ﬁrst, comparing the negative income shock group to
the stay poor group after the income shock identiﬁes the eﬀect of negative
income shocks on time preference; second, comparing the positive income
shock group to the stay rich group after the income shock identiﬁes the ef-
fect of positive income shocks. Crucially, the two groups being compared have
identical wealth levels after the income shock, thus enabling us to compare
the eﬀect of income shocks on preferences without confounds from diﬀerent
wealth levels.
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To ascertain that the income shock manipulations worked as intended, we
ﬁrst report the evolution of wealth levels while performing the real eﬀort task.
The stay rich and negative income shock groups started the experiment
with an endowment of 1000 points; during the ﬁrst 15 periods, the average
wealth level in these two groups grew to 1948.38 ± 28.60 (mean ± SEM)
points, with no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between groups (as is expected, since
the groups were identical up to that point; data not shown). Similarly, the
stay poor and positive income shock groups started the experiment with
an endowment of 100 points; during the ﬁrst 15 periods, the average wealth
level in these two groups grew to 1029.46 ± 27.17 points, again with no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the groups. The magnitude and direction of
the income shock was -918.92 ± 5.84 for the negative income shock group,
and +918.92 ± 5.84 for the positive income shock group. Note that these
shocks are equal in magnitude and opposite in sign by design, since the
two groups simply switched positions; i.e., each participant in the negative
income shock group lost the same number of points, and each participant
in the positive income shock group gained the same number of points. The
non-zero variance of the income shocks stems from the fact that the pre-
shock diﬀerence between the groups diﬀered somewhat across experimental
sessions. In sum, the real eﬀort task and the experimental manipulation
of wealth levels through income shocks worked as intended. Figure 6.4.1
shows the evolution of wealth levels as a function of period throughout the
experiment; it can be seen that the post-shock wealth levels match exactly
those of the stay rich and stay poor groups, respectively.
We next asked whether the negative income shock indeed had an eﬀect
on time preferences. To this end, we ﬁt participants' responses in the time
preference task using Laibson's (1997) quasi-hyperbolic discounting model.
The results are shown in Figure 6.4.1 and Table 6.4.1. It can be seen that
participants in the negative income shock group exhibit lower post-shock
levels of beta than participants in the stay poor group; speciﬁcally, the
mean beta parameter in the stay poor control group is 0.77 ± 0.03, while
that in the negative income shock group is 0.65 ± 0.04. Crucially, the
wealth levels of these two groups are identical at the time of testing, and thus
any diﬀerences in beta must be attributed to the negative income shock per
se, rather than to wealth diﬀerences. Table 6.4.1 shows the results of an OLS
regression eﬀect of Laibson's present bias parameter beta on negative income
shocks, for only the participants in the negative income shock and stay
poor groups. Each of the three regression speciﬁcations reports diﬀerent
sets of control variables. In all cases, the coeﬃcient on beta is signiﬁcant and
negative, suggesting that negative income shocks decrease beta. The eﬀect
is also economically signiﬁcant; the magnitude of the coeﬃcients is around
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(1) (2) (3)
model1 model2 model3
VARIABLES beta beta beta
negshock -0.116** -0.116** -0.106**
(0.0490) (0.0492) (0.0524)
income -5.77e-06 3.61e-05
(5.37e-05) (7.30e-05)
age -0.0152
(0.0107)
bmi -0.000536
(0.0132)
numsibs -0.00772
(0.0192)
Constant 0.769*** 0.773*** 1.095***
(0.0307) (0.0484) (0.325)
Observations 74 74 74
R-squared 0.073 0.073 0.100
Table 6.4.1: Eﬀect of Negative Income Shocks on Beta. OLS regression of the
present bias parameter beta on having received a negative income shock, for
the stay poor and negative income shock conditions only. These partic-
ipants had the same wealth levels when they performed the time preference
task; thus any diﬀerences in behavior are attributable to the negative in-
come shock. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
0.1 in all specﬁciations, corresponding to a change in beta induced by the
negative income shock of about 0.1/0.77 = 13%.
Is this eﬀect of income shocks on beta speciﬁc to negative income shocks,
or does it also obtain for positive income shocks? Figure 6.4.1 and Table 6.4.2
show the eﬀect of positive income shocks on beta: in the positive income
shock group, mean beta is 0.73 ± 0.04, while in the stay rich control group,
it is 0.75 ± 0.03. Table 6.4.2 shows that this diﬀerence is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
We next tested whether the eﬀect of negative income shocks was speciﬁc
to the present bias parameter beta, or whether it also extended to the impa-
tience parameter delta. We ﬁnd no eﬀect of income shocks on the impatience
parameter delta: in the negative income shock group, mean delta is 0.97
± 0.01, while in the stay poor group, it is 0.96 ± 0.01. Table 6.4.3 shows
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(1) (2) (3)
model1 model2 model3
VARIABLES beta beta beta
posshock -0.0109 -0.00685 -0.00982
(0.0459) (0.0454) (0.0457)
income 4.76e-05 5.65e-05
(3.71e-05) (4.34e-05)
age -0.0125
(0.00954)
bmi 0.00907
(0.0113)
numsibs -0.00325
(0.0203)
Constant 0.745*** 0.709*** 0.788**
(0.0292) (0.0383) (0.370)
Observations 74 74 74
R-squared 0.001 0.016 0.049
Table 6.4.2: Eﬀect of Positive Income Shocks on Beta. OLS regression of the
present bias parameter beta on having received a positive income shock, for
the stay rich and positive income shock conditions only. These partici-
pants had the same wealth levels when they performed the time preference
task; thus any diﬀerences in behavior are attributable to the positive income
shock. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
6.4. RESULTS 156
(1) (2) (3)
model1 model2 model3
VARIABLES delta delta delta
negshock 0.00922 0.00929 0.00893
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0120)
income 4.29e-06 -3.93e-06
(1.31e-05) (1.20e-05)
age 0.00369*
(0.00192)
bmi -0.00303
(0.00246)
numsibs 0.00129
(0.00545)
Constant 0.961*** 0.958*** 0.949***
(0.00820) (0.0116) (0.0660)
Observations 74 74 74
R-squared 0.010 0.011 0.046
Table 6.4.3: Eﬀect of Negative Income Shocks on Delta. OLS regression of the
impatience parameter delta on having received a negative income shock, for
the stay poor and negative income shock conditions only. These partic-
ipants had the same wealth levels when they performed the time preference
task; thus any diﬀerences in behavior are attributable to the negative in-
come shock. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
that this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant. Similarly, positive income shocks have
no eﬀect on delta: in the positive income shock group, mean delta is 0.97
± 0.01, while in the stay rich group, it is 0.97 ± 0.01. Again this diﬀerence
is not statistically signiﬁcant, as shown in Table 6.4.4.
Thus, we ﬁnd two dissociations in the eﬀect of income shocks aﬀect on
time preference: ﬁrst, only negative income shocks aﬀect time preference,
but positive income shocks do not; second, income shocks aﬀect only present
bias, but not impatience.
We next asked whether income shocks also aﬀect reservation wages. To
this end, participants were given the opportunity to make a bid in a BDM
auction on the right to play the real eﬀort task for a further 8 periods after
the end of the behavioral tasks that followed period 17. The bid made by
participants is an incentive-compatible estimate of the true value to each par-
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(1) (2) (3)
model1 model2 model3
VARIABLES delta delta delta
posshock 0.000892 -0.00104 -0.00364
(0.0112) (0.0107) (0.0102)
income -2.27e-05*** -2.20e-05**
(8.30e-06) (9.80e-06)
age -0.000357
(0.00265)
bmi -0.00102
(0.00248)
numsibs 0.00884
(0.00556)
Constant 0.965*** 0.982*** 0.999***
(0.00956) (0.00941) (0.0963)
Observations 74 74 74
R-squared 0.000 0.059 0.095
Table 6.4.4: Eﬀect of Positive Income Shocks on Delta. OLS regression of
the impatience parameter delta on having received a positive income shock,
for the stay rich and positive income shock conditions only. These partic-
ipants had the same wealth levels when they performed the time preference
task; thus any diﬀerences in behavior are attributable to the positive income
shock. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3)
model1 model2 model3
VARIABLES bdm_auction bdm_auction bdm_auction
negshock 27.08 26.48 29.49
(57.42) (57.37) (59.87)
income -0.0358 0.0626
(0.0582) (0.0600)
age -19.83*
(9.947)
bmi -8.596
(14.54)
numsibs -47.24***
(17.36)
Constant 274.6*** 298.4*** 937.2***
(33.20) (49.59) (303.5)
Observations 74 74 74
R-squared 0.003 0.007 0.094
Table 6.4.5: Eﬀect of Negative Income Shocks on BDM Auction Oﬀer. OLS
regression of the BDM auction oﬀer on having received a negative income
shock, for the stay poor and negative income shock conditions only. These
participants had the same wealth levels when they performed the BDM auc-
tion; thus any diﬀerences in behavior are attributable to the negative income
shock. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
ticipant of playing a further 8 periods, and is thus a proxy for the reservation
wage of our participants. We found that income shocks did not aﬀect BDM
bids: participants in the negative income shock group made average bids
of 301.73 ± 46.85, while those in the stay poor group made average bids of
274.65 ± 33.20. Similarly, participants in the positive income shock group
made average oﬀers of 311.59 ± 34.50, while those in the stay rich group
made oﬀers of 333.68 ± 49.03. None of these diﬀerences were statistically
signiﬁcant, as shown in Table 6.4.5 for negative income shocks and Table
6.4.6 for positive income shocks. Thus, income shocks had no statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on reservation wages in our study, as measured by BDM
bids.
Finally, we asked whether the eﬀect of negative income shocks on the
present bias parameter beta might be mediated through eﬀects of the negative
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(1) (2) (3)
model1 model2 model3
VARIABLES bdm_auction bdm_auction bdm_auction
posshock -22.08 -26.06 -22.81
(59.94) (60.50) (64.36)
income -0.0468 -0.0517
(0.0484) (0.0520)
age 3.217
(13.27)
bmi 4.961
(15.17)
numsibs -13.55
(32.92)
Constant 333.7*** 368.9*** 212.1
(49.03) (64.84) (382.4)
Observations 74 74 74
R-squared 0.002 0.011 0.015
Table 6.4.6: Eﬀect of Positive Income Shocks on BDM Auction Oﬀer. OLS
regression of the BDM auction oﬀer on having received a positive income
shock, for the stay rich and positive income shock conditions only. These
participants had the same wealth levels when they performed the BDM auc-
tion; thus any diﬀerences in behavior are attributable to the positive income
shock. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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income shock on psychological outcomes. We therefore computed the after-
before diﬀerence of participants' responses on the ﬁve visual analog scale
questions, and the after-before diﬀerences in positive and negative aﬀect as
measured by the PANAS scale. The VAS questions elicited self-reported
stress, self-control, optimism, self-esteem, and responsibility. The results of
OLS regressions of these variables on negative income shocks are shown in
Table 6.4.7; we observe a mild negative eﬀect of negative income shocks on
self-reported stress, but no other signiﬁcant eﬀects. Similarly, the results
of OLS regression of the psychological outcomes on positive income shocks
are shown in Table 6.4.8; we observe a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of positive
income shocks on self-reported stress levels, but no other signiﬁcant eﬀects.
Thus, participants in the income shock groups appear to report lower levels
of stress than those in the control groups; we discuss this ﬁnding further
below.
6.5 Discussion
The purpose of this study was to test whether income shocks aﬀect prefer-
ences. It has already been shown that a correlation exists between income
levels and time preference; in particular, poor people tend to be more impa-
tient than rich people (Lawrance,1991; Harrison et al., 2002; Sullivan, 2011;
Pender & Walker, 1990; Yesuf & Bluﬀstone, 2008; but see Cagetti, 2003;
Gourinchas & Parker, 2002; Stephens & Krupka, 2006; Ogaki & Atkeson,
1997). These studies suﬀer from the familiar correlation-causality problem:
it remains unclear whether poverty actually causes changes in time prefer-
ences; in addition, it is not clear to what extent observed diﬀerences in dis-
counting behavior actually reﬂect diﬀerences in preferences, or whether they
may instead reﬂect actual or perceived environmental constraints in condi-
tions of poverty. The former question has been addressed to some extent
by studies using rainfall data as a source of exogenous variation in income,
allowing identiﬁcation of a causal eﬀect from wealth to discounting behavior
(Tanaka et al., 2010; di Falco et al., 2011). However, the second problem
persists: it remains unclear whether these observed diﬀerences in behavior
are reﬂective of preferences or beliefs.
To address this question, we conducted a laboratory experiment in which
subjects receive either positive or negative income shocks; crucially, after
the shock they have the same level of wealth as a control group that did
not receive a shock, allowing a comparison of time preferences across groups
which diﬀer only in whether or not they received a shock, not in their levels
of wealth. We ﬁnd that negative income shocks, but not positive income
6.5. DISCUSSION 161
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
m
o
d
el
1
m
o
d
el
2
m
o
d
el
3
m
o
d
el
4
m
o
d
el
5
m
o
d
el
6
m
o
d
el
7
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
st
re
ss
se
lf
co
n
tr
ol
O
p
ti
m
is
m
se
lf
es
te
em
re
sp
on
si
b
il
it
y
p
an
as
_
p
os
p
an
as
_
n
eg
n
eg
sh
o
ck
-9
.7
03
*
3.
92
2
-1
.7
96
3.
63
9
1.
39
8
-0
.2
50
0.
08
62
(5
.7
84
)
(4
.1
31
)
(4
.4
61
)
(3
.5
90
)
(2
.8
31
)
(0
.1
67
)
(0
.1
04
)
C
on
st
an
t
18
.0
9*
**
-5
.6
57
*
-6
.0
57
*
-1
.2
57
-1
.4
57
-0
.0
65
8
0.
19
2*
*
(4
.1
97
)
(2
.8
88
)
(3
.3
76
)
(2
.8
89
)
(2
.1
90
)
(0
.1
31
)
(0
.0
79
3)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
69
69
69
69
69
74
74
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
04
0
0.
01
3
0.
00
2
0.
01
5
0.
00
4
0.
03
0
0.
00
9
T
ab
le
6.
4.
7:
E
ﬀ
ec
t
of
N
eg
at
iv
e
In
co
m
e
S
h
o
ck
s
on
P
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
O
u
tc
om
es
.
O
L
S
re
gr
es
si
on
of
p
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
ou
tc
om
es
on
h
av
in
g
re
ce
iv
ed
a
n
eg
at
iv
e
in
co
m
e
sh
o
ck
,
fo
r
th
e
s
ta
y
p
o
or

an
d
n
eg
at
iv
e
in
co
m
e
sh
o
ck

co
n
d
it
io
n
s
on
ly
.
E
ac
h
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
d
iﬀ
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
'
an
sw
er
s
on
th
e
p
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
sc
al
es
af
te
r
th
e
in
co
m
e
sh
o
ck
v
s.
b
ef
or
e
th
e
b
eg
in
n
in
g
of
th
e
re
al
eﬀ
or
t
ta
sk
.
S
p
ec
iﬁ
ca
ll
y,
th
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
in
th
e
ﬁ
rs
t
ﬁ
ve
co
lu
m
n
s
is
th
e
af
te
r
v
s.
b
ef
or
e
d
iﬀ
er
en
ce
in
se
lf
-r
ep
or
te
d
st
re
ss
,
se
lf
-c
on
tr
ol
,
op
ti
m
is
m
,
se
lf
-e
st
ee
m
,
an
d
re
sp
on
si
b
il
it
y,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
;
in
th
e
la
st
tw
o
co
lu
m
n
s,
it
is
th
e
af
te
r
v
s.
b
ef
or
e
d
iﬀ
er
en
ce
in
p
os
it
iv
e
aﬀ
ec
t
(c
ol
u
m
n
6)
an
d
n
eg
at
iv
e
aﬀ
ec
t
(c
ol
u
m
n
7)
.
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
**
*
p
<
0.
01
,
**
p
<
0.
05
,
*
p
<
0.
1
6.5. DISCUSSION 162
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
m
o
d
el
1
m
o
d
el
2
m
o
d
el
3
m
o
d
el
4
m
o
d
el
5
m
o
d
el
6
m
o
d
el
7
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
st
re
ss
se
lf
co
n
tr
ol
op
ti
m
is
m
se
lf
es
te
em
re
sp
on
si
b
il
it
y
p
an
as
_
p
os
p
an
as
_
n
eg
p
os
sh
o
ck
-1
1.
17
**
0.
18
9
4.
17
3
5.
34
4
-2
.0
87
0.
00
66
1
-0
.1
10
(5
.2
05
)
(3
.4
75
)
(4
.3
20
)
(3
.7
67
)
(1
.7
73
)
(0
.1
64
)
(0
.0
70
4)
C
on
st
an
t
11
.2
6*
**
0.
11
4
-1
.1
43
-1
.8
29
0.
05
71
-0
.1
26
0.
11
8*
*
(3
.4
97
)
(2
.6
54
)
(3
.1
17
)
(2
.3
80
)
(1
.3
85
)
(0
.1
13
)
(0
.0
54
1)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
68
68
68
68
68
74
74
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
06
5
0.
00
0
0.
01
4
0.
03
0
0.
02
0
0.
00
0
0.
03
3
T
ab
le
6.
4.
8:
E
ﬀ
ec
t
of
P
os
it
iv
e
In
co
m
e
S
h
o
ck
s
on
P
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
O
u
tc
om
es
.
O
L
S
re
gr
es
si
on
of
p
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
ou
tc
om
es
on
h
av
in
g
re
ce
iv
ed
a
p
os
it
iv
e
in
co
m
e
sh
o
ck
,
fo
r
th
e
s
ta
y
ri
ch

an
d
p
os
it
iv
e
in
co
m
e
sh
o
ck

co
n
d
it
io
n
s
on
ly
.
E
ac
h
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
d
iﬀ
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
'
an
sw
er
s
on
th
e
p
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
sc
al
es
af
te
r
th
e
in
co
m
e
sh
o
ck
v
s.
b
ef
or
e
th
e
b
eg
in
n
in
g
of
th
e
re
al
eﬀ
or
t
ta
sk
.
S
p
ec
iﬁ
ca
ll
y,
th
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
in
th
e
ﬁ
rs
t
ﬁ
ve
co
lu
m
n
s
is
th
e
af
te
r
v
s.
b
ef
or
e
d
iﬀ
er
en
ce
in
se
lf
-r
ep
or
te
d
st
re
ss
,
se
lf
-c
on
tr
ol
,
op
ti
m
is
m
,
se
lf
-e
st
ee
m
,
an
d
re
sp
on
si
b
il
it
y,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
;
in
th
e
la
st
tw
o
co
lu
m
n
s,
it
is
th
e
af
te
r
v
s.
b
ef
or
e
d
iﬀ
er
en
ce
in
p
os
it
iv
e
aﬀ
ec
t
(c
ol
u
m
n
6)
an
d
n
eg
at
iv
e
aﬀ
ec
t
(c
ol
u
m
n
7)
.
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
**
*
p
<
0.
01
,
**
p
<
0.
05
,
*
p
<
0.
1
6.5. DISCUSSION 163
shocks, aﬀect time preferences; in addition, what is aﬀected is the present
bias parameter beta, but not the impatience parameter delta. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd no eﬀect of income shocks on reservation wages in a BDM auction,
nor on psychological outcomes such as positive and negative aﬀect, perceived
self-control, optimism, self-esteem, and responsibility.
However, we do ﬁnd a mild eﬀect of income shocks on self-reported stress.
In particular, we observe a weakly signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of negative in-
come shocks on stress, i.e. participants in the negative income shock group
showed somewhat lower self-reported levels of stress after than before the
shock in comparison to the control group. This ﬁnding is somewhat surpris-
ing; it is possible that it may reﬂect a coping strategy to deal with the stress-
ful experience of having received a substantial negative income shock. Less
surprising is the highly signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of positive income shocks
on self-reported stress; participants who received positive income shocks re-
port lower levels of stress after the income shock compared to before the
income shock and compared to the control group. This ﬁnding is plausible
in light of the fact that subjects perceived the positive income shocks as a
pleasant event; however, it should be noted that this psychological eﬀect ap-
parently was not strong enough to also manifest itself in altered economic
preferences, as we observe no detectable eﬀect of positive income shocks on
time preferences.
Our ﬁndings also distinguish between to alternative accounts of the ef-
fect of reference points on time and risk preferences (Köszegi & Rabin, 2006,
2007). The ﬁrst of these is that the negative income shock put partici-
pants below their reference point, which was built up during the real eﬀort
task. It has been argued that being below the reference point induces risk-
seeking behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); this would predict a decrease
in present-focused time preference because temporally remote outcomes are
riskier. Another account by Thaler & Johnson (1990), in contrast, suggests
that prior losses introduce risk-averse behavior; this eﬀect in turn should
induce present-focused time preferences. Our study therefore contributes to
the literature on the eﬀect of reference points on preferences by showing that
the second of these accounts is more plausible.
Together, our ﬁndings suggest that negative income shocks have a direct
eﬀect on economic preferences; in particular, they increase present bias in
intertemporal choice. It is widely held that humans are more present-biased
than is good for their own long-run welfare; the mechanism we present here
suggests a positive feedback loop that may account for some of this eﬀect.
In particular, if falling into poverty leads to present bias in intertemporal
choice, then this eﬀect is likely to perpetuate poverty by leading to imprudent
intertemporal decisions.
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Chapter 7
Bi-directional Eﬀect of Stress on
Present Bias in Intertemporal
Choice
7.1 Summary
Intertemporal choices, involving decisions which trade oﬀ instant and delayed
outcomes, are often made under stress. It remains unknown, however, how
stress aﬀects intertemporal choice. Here we use theory and evidence from be-
havioral economics and cellular neuroscience to demonstrate a bi-directional
eﬀect of stress on intertemporal choice. First, we distinguish between two dis-
tinct motives within intertemporal choice, i.e. present bias and impatience,
and show that stress aﬀects the former, but not the latter. Second, consis-
tent with evidence from cellular neurobiology, we show that present bias is
increased immediately after stress, but decreased when subjects are tested
20 minutes later. Furthermore, the degree to which individual participants
show these opposite eﬀects of stress on present bias correlates strongly with
individual cortisol changes in response to stress, suggesting that cortisol may
drive these behavioral eﬀects. Thus, deferring an economic decision after
stress can have a signiﬁcant impact on the outcome.
7.2 Introduction
Many everyday decisions entail trading oﬀ immediate and delayed outcomes.
In such intertemporal choices, both humans and animals tend to attach spe-
cial signiﬁcance to short-term rewards, a phenomenon known as present
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bias (1-4). As a consequence of present bias, people frequently ﬁnd it diﬃ-
cult to act in accordance with their own long-term interest (4, 5).
Intertemporal choices in private or professional contexts are often made
under stress; managers, politicians, investment bankers, medical doctors and
other professionals make vital decisions under a considerable amount of pres-
sure. This applies, for instance, to a corporate executive who needs to trade-
oﬀ the usefulness of long-term business strategies with succumbing to the
pressure of reporting short-term proﬁts, or a medical doctor who needs to
decide on the spot between quick ﬁxes relieving the symptoms of his patients,
or slower therapies. How stress aﬀects intertemporal choice, though, is un-
known. Here we combine theory and evidence from behavioral economics
and cellular neuroscience to answer this question.
In behavioral economics, both models and evidence on intertemporal
choice now distinguish between present-bias on the one hand, and impa-
tience on the other (4). While impatience is simply the subject's preference
about consumption at diﬀerent times (i.e. as soon as possible in case of high
impatience), present bias is normatively irrational because it leads subjects
to fail executing the future plans that they make today. Here we economet-
rically and experimentally distinguish between these two motives, and can
thus ask whether stress diﬀerentially aﬀects present bias or impatience.
In cellular and behavioral neuroscience, it has become evident in recent
years that stress aﬀects neurobiological processes and cognitive function in
two distinct temporal domains (6-8). Broadly, the picture that emerges from
this research is that immediately after stress, the stress-induced changes in
hormone and neurotransmitter levels facilitate short-term solutions to the
stressful situation; in contrast, beginning approximately 1 h after stress onset,
slower physiological changes promote restoration and long-term protection af-
ter stress. More speciﬁcally, shortly after stress, corticosteroid hormones and
noradrenaline synergistically promote rapid increases in neuronal activity,
such as activity caused by the neurotransmitter glutamate (9, 10), the main
excitatory neurotransmitter in the nervous system. Rapid eﬀects of corticos-
teroids have been described for several emotion- and arousal-related brain
regions such as the hippocampus, amygdala, and medial prefrontal cortex
(11). These early physiological responses to stress likely facilitate the rapid
focused attention, hypervigilance and choice of strategy required to imple-
ment the organism's ﬁght-or-ﬂight response (6); in particular, they promote
habitual, reﬂex-like behavior at the expense of goal-directed behavior (12).
In contrast, the slow actions of cortisol focus on long-term restoration and
protection after stress. Through changes in gene transcription that require
55-65 minutes to develop and last for several hours (13), stress-induced cor-
ticosteroid actions shut down the eﬀects of noradrenaline (14-16) and change
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neuronal activity in frontal brain regions such that the stress-induced release
of hormones from the pituitary is terminated (17, 18). Behaviorally, these
delayed eﬀects of stress promote consolidation of stress-related memories for
future use (6, 19) and stimulate restoration of cognitive self-control (7, 20,
21). Although these slow corticosteroid actions develop within an hour, their
implications stretch well beyond this time-domain (22, 23).
We hypothesized that this bi-directional pattern is also apparent in more
complex behavioral responses carried out after stress, such as intertemporal
choice. Because the early physiological responses facilitate an increased focus
on the here and now, we expect to see stronger present bias immediately after
stress. By contrast, because the restorative functions of the slower actions
of stress hormones that prepare the organism for the future engage dorso-
lateral prefrontal networks, which are also recruited during self-controlled,
far-sighted decision making (24-26), we expected to ﬁnd less present-bias (cf.
longer time-horizons) in the recovery phase some time after stress.
7.3 Results
To test this hypothesis, 81 healthy male participants were randomly assigned
to one of four conditions. The experimental groups did neither diﬀer in
age, BMI nor on the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (P's > 0.1). Half of the
participants were subjected to a group-wise Trier Social Stress Test (TSST-
G; 27, 28), in which a maximum of 4 individuals sequentially had to deliver
a public speech and perform mental arithmetic in front of a non-responsive
panel and a video camera (Materials and Methods). The subjects in the
control groups underwent the exact same conditions, except that they all
delivered their speech and performed arithmetic simultaneously with one
another and without active observers; this removed the stressful component
of social control, while holding cognitive load constant as much as possible.
Salivary cortisol and alpha-amylase (sAA; an index of adrenergic activity;
29) levels were measured at several time points during the experiment as
an index of the individual's stress responsivity. Subsequently, individuals of
both the control and stress groups performed an intertemporal choice task,
in which they made a series of choices between sooner-smaller and larger-
later rewards with varying delays (Materials and Methods). Critically, half
of the subjects in the stress and control groups performed this task directly
after stress exposure to target rapid nongenomic actions of stress hormones
(early groups), while the other half performed the task 20 minutes later (late
groups), i.e. between 55 and 65 min after onset of the stressor. The latter
time-point was selected such that it would just allow the development of
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genomic actions in the PFC (approximately one hour after onset of the TSST-
G; 16, 17) while noradrenergic activity is restored, and yet be as close as
possible to the earlier time-point (a 20 minutes diﬀerence), to avoid unwanted
inﬂuences that could not be controlled for such as circadian variations in
hormone release.
7.3.1 Stress Induction
The experimental groups did not diﬀer on any of the measured baseline vari-
ables (cortisol, PANAS and VAS; all P's > 0.40). As expected, the ANOVA
for cortisol showed a signiﬁcant Sample Period x Stress interaction (Figure
7.3.1a, F1.6,124.4 = 34.70, P < 0.001). Furthermore, a main eﬀect of Sample
Period (F1.6,124.4 = 34.02, P < 0.001) and a main eﬀect of Stress (F1,77 =
38.53, P < 0.001) were found. Planned simple contrasts related to baseline
showed that subjects in the stress condition had increased cortisol levels from
30 minutes after TSST-G onset (t30) until t90, i.e. at the end of the session
(all P's < 0.001).
For sAA, a signiﬁcant Sample Period x Stress interaction (F5.1,395=8.89,
P<0.001, Fig. 1b) and a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Sample Period (F5.1,395=23.12,
P<0.001) were found. Planned simple contrasts compared to baseline showed
that sAA levels were increased in the stress condition from t30, i.e. during
the TSST-G, until after the early test condition at t50 (P's<0.05). Negative
aﬀect (PANAS; F1,77 = 15.60, P < 0.001) as well as subjective stress ratings
(VAS; F1,77 = 15.82, P < 0.001) both increased in the stress group compared
to the control group immediately after the stress task compared to baseline.
As expected, no eﬀects of Timing (Early vs. Late groups) were found on the
stress induction measurements.
7.3.2 Intertemporal Choice Performance
In intertemporal choice, present bias can be discerned from impatience:
whereas the latter refers to the degree of discounting of future outcomes
as a function of time, the former refers to extra value placed on short-term
outcomes (4). We dissociated the eﬀects of stress on present bias and im-
patience by characterizing our participants' choices over time with Laibson's
(4) quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, in which present bias is character-
ized by the beta parameter, and impatience by the delta parameter. Strong
present bias and strong impatience are associated with low betas and high
deltas, respectively (Materials and Methods).
We found that stress diﬀerentially aﬀects present bias, but not impa-
tience, depending on the time-of-testing after stress. Speciﬁcally, we ob-
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Figure 7.3.1: Experiment timeline and evolution of cortisol (a) and alpha-
amylase (b) levels. Subjects were subjected to a group-wise Trier Social Stress
Test (TSST-G) or a control task, which lasted 20 minutes (light gray region,
TSST/Control). Subsequently, they performed an intertemporal choice
task lasting approximately 8 min, either immediately following the TSST-
G/Control task (dark gray region, Early test), or 20 min later i.e. 55 min
after onset of the stressful situation (medium gray region, Late test). Sali-
vary cortisol (a) and alpha-amylase (sAA) (b) levels were measured through-
out the experimental session and are shown separately for the stress groups
(black line) and control groups (gray line). Error bars indicate one SEM.
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served a two-way stress x time interaction on the beta parameter with age
and BMI included as covariates (F2,67 = 4.12, P = 0.02 (two-tailed)). Planned
comparisons revealed that when tested immediately after stress, cortisol re-
sponders to stress (see SI Materials and Methods for deﬁnition) exhibited
stronger present bias than controls (F1,32 = 4.46, P = 0.02 (one-tailed) /
P = 0.04 (two-tailed); Figure 7.3.2a). By contrast, individuals tested at the
later time-point were less present-biased than controls (F1,34 = 5.63, P = 0.01
(one-tailed) / P = 0.02 (two-tailed)). Similar results were obtained when age
and BMI were not included as covariates (stress x delay interaction: F1,70 =
7.45, P = 0.008 (two-tailed); early stress vs. control: F1,36 = 5.10, P = 0.003
(two-tailed)/ P = 0.002 (one-tailed); late stress vs. control: F1,34 = 2.75, P =
0.107 (two-tailed) / P = 0.053 (one-tailed)), or when non-responders were in-
cluded in the data pool (see SI Results). To further corroborate this ﬁnding,
we regressed the probability of being a cortisol non-responder to stress on a
number of observable variables and found that non-responders are similar to
responders on important variables, and show that their exclusion is unlikely
to have introduced signiﬁcant selection bias (see SI Results).
No signiﬁcant eﬀects of stress and timing were found on impatience (delta)
(interaction: F1,68 = -0.09, P = 0.77; early stress vs. control: F1,32 = 0.02,
P=0.88; late stress vs. control: F1,34 = 1.39, P = 0.25; Figure 7.3.2b).
How large are these eﬀects of stress on present-bias in real-life terms?
The beta-parameter cannot be translated into an implied interest rate, since
it represents the same decrease of subjective value for all delayed outcomes,
while interest rates accrue exponentially. However, we can ask how particular
choices a subject might be faced with would be aﬀected by stress. Consider
a decision between receiving CHF 40 in 3 months and 1 day vs. receiving a
smaller amount tomorrow. In the control condition, beta = 0.82; with this
degree of present bias, subjects will just accept CHF 32.80 tomorrow instead
of CHF 40 in 3 months and 1 day. In the early condition, beta changes to
0.75; this implies that the same subject would now accept CHF 30 tomorrow
instead of CHF 40 in 3 months and 1 day. Conversely, in the late condition,
beta changes to 0.92; this implies that the same subject would require CHF
36.80 tomorrow to forgo CHF 40 in 3 months and 1 day Together, the eﬀects
of stress on present bias span 17 percentage points of the amount in question,
which is a large eﬀect.
We opted for Laibson's quasi-hyperbolic model to characterize our sub-
jects' choices because it allows to dissociate present-bias from impatience, but
also because our data were better described by the quasi-hyperbolic model
than the standard hyperbolic discounting model or the standard exponen-
tial model (Akaike Information Criteria: Laibson model, -11.80; hyperbolic
model, -9.22; exponential model, -8.46). Nevertheless, to support our ﬁnd-
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Figure 7.3.2: Eﬀect of stress on time preference. a) The present bias pa-
rameter beta was lower in the stress than the control group immediately
after stress (Early). Since lower betas reﬂect increased present bias, this
ﬁnding suggests that the immediate eﬀect of stress was to increase present
bias in intertemporal choice. In contrast, beta was higher in the stress than
in the control group when tested 20 min later (Late), suggesting reduced
present bias. b) The impatience parameter delta was not aﬀected by stress
either during early or late testing. c) Scatter plot representing individual
stress responsivity to the TSST-G in the stress groups, measured by area-
under-the-curve (AUC) for salivary cortisol. Individuals in the stress groups
with higher stress responsivity showed a larger stress eﬀect on present bias.
Crucially, this eﬀect went in opposite directions in the early and late groups:
high stress responsivity predicted lower beta (higher present bias) in the early
stress group (slope coeﬃcient: t19 = -1.95, P = 0.03), while it predicted higher
beta (reduced present bias) in the late stress group (t19 = 2.24, P = 0.02). d)
Individual cortisol responsivity to stress did not predict changes in the delta
(impatience) parameter (early stress group: t19 = -0.30, P = 0.77; late: t19
= -0.52, P = 0.61).
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ings, we also ﬁt the standard hyperbolic model (30) and the standard expo-
nential model. The results were comparable to those obtained for the beta
parameter in Laibson's quasi-hyperbolic model (see SI Results).
We next tested whether this bi-directional eﬀect of stress on present
bias might be associated with stress responsivity, here probed by the stress-
induced increases in salivary cortisol and sAA levels (area-under-the-curve,
AUC; SI Materials and Methods). To this end, we used regression to predict
the beta parameters from the stress-induced cortisol and sAA responses of
individuals in the early or late groups. Indeed, the individual betas were
predicted by cortisol AUC, and crucially, the sign of this eﬀect diﬀered as a
function of time-of-testing after stress: immediately after stress, high cortisol
responses predicted greater present bias (lower betas; signiﬁcance of coeﬃ-
cient on cortisol AUC: t19 = -1.95, P = 0.03; Figure 7.3.2c), whereas later on,
high cortisol responses predicted decreased present bias (higher betas; t19 =
2.24, P = 0.02). Correlations in the same directions were also observed when
considering only cortisol measurements until the time of the intertemporal
choice task for calculating area under the curve (see SI Results). However,
no association was found between changes in present bias and stress-induced
sAA increases (signiﬁcance of coeﬃcient on sAA area-under-the-curve, early:
t=1.136, P=0.189; late: t=0.23, P=0.817). Thus, the bi-directional eﬀect
of stress on intertemporal choice might be driven speciﬁcally by diﬀeren-
tial time-dependent eﬀects of cortisol. Interestingly, present-bias was nearly
indistinguishable for the early and late groups at the intersect of the beta-
trendline and cortisol AUC = 0 (i.e. no rise in salivary cortisol level in
response to the Trier Social Stress Test), further strengthening a causative
role of corticosteroid hormones in the bi-directional eﬀect. The impatience
parameter delta was not predicted by cortisol increases (early stress group:
t19 = -0.30, P = 0.77; late: t19 = -0.52, P = 0.61; Figure 7.3.2d).
A possible confound to our results is that subjects' responses to the time
preference questions may be inconsistent, and that this inconsistency may be
modulated by stress. However, additional analyses showed that this appeared
not to be the case (see SI Results).
A further potential concern is that the responses in the intertemporal
choice task themselves may have inﬂuenced cortisol levels; in particular, in
the early group, subjects may have made particular choices to regulate their
own mood after stress induction. However, the mood changes induced by the
stress task, if anything, counterveiled the relationship between cortisol and
present bias in the stress group (for details and additional analyses see SI
Results). Mood regulation is therefore unlikely to be the underlying driver
of our results. We also did not ﬁnd any evidence that cortisol levels diﬀer
between the early and late groups (see SI Results), rendering it unlikely that
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choices in the time preference task aﬀected cortisol levels.
7.4 Discussion
We here demonstrate two dissociations in the eﬀect of stress on intertem-
poral choice: stress aﬀects present bias, but not impatience; second, stress
increases present bias immediately after stress, but decreases it when subjects
are tested 20 minutes later, consistent with evidence from cellular neurobiol-
ogy. In addition, we supply evidence for the biological mechanism underlying
our eﬀects: the degree to which individual participants show these opposite
eﬀects of stress on decision-making correlates strongly with individual corti-
sol responsivity to stress.
This bi-directional eﬀect of stress on present bias is in line with current
views that shortly after stress individuals turn to simple behavioral strate-
gies. For instance, humans exposed to a psychosocial stressor use a sim-
pler (striatal) stimulus-response rather than a more complex spatial learn-
ing strategy (31). Individuals also shift from goal-directed to habitual con-
trol in instrumental behavior shortly after stress (12). Underlying biological
mechanisms of these rapid stress eﬀects are thought to involve both cate-
cholamines and corticosteroid hormones (7, 8, 12, 31), the latter probably
accomplishing non-genomic actions (9). Our results show that higher indi-
vidual cortisol responses predicted greater present bias, while no associations
were found with the noradrenergic marker alpha-amylase (sAA). Whether the
rapid behavioral eﬀects involving the prefrontal-striatal circuitry are due to
non-genomic corticosteroid cellular actions similar to those described e.g.
for hippocampal neurons (9)- is presently unknown. Furthermore, sAA lev-
els correlate with peripheral adrenaline levels, which may not entirely reﬂect
(nor)adrenaline levels in the brain, despite the fact that adrenaline can indi-
rectly cause release of noradrenaline in the brain (32). Moreover, we cannot
exclude that other stress-induced factors, such as the peptide corticotrophin
releasing hormone, may play a role in intertemporal choices. The later ef-
fects of stress may serve the function of normalizing the stress response and
preparing the organism for the future (7, 20, 21); consistent with this view
is the ﬁnding that slow genomic corticosteroid eﬀects induced by stress im-
prove spatial memory formation in mice (19). At this stage we can only
speculate about a role of glucocorticoid receptors in this phase; these recep-
tors play a prominent role in the delayed restorative capacity after stress (6,
19) including in the prefrontal cortex (17, 18, 20, 21) but the 55 minute delay
between onset of the stressor and behavioral measurements is relatively short
(though not unprecedented; 33) for genomic actions to take place. Clearly,
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future studies will need to vary the delay between stress onset and task perfor-
mance in order to support a role of long-term, gene-mediated glucocorticoid
actions.
An intriguing facet of our ﬁndings is that we found a dissociation between
stress eﬀects on present bias and impatience. What might be the reason for
this ﬁnding? One possibility is that impatience is a stable trait, while present
bias, although correlated within subjects over time, is more susceptible to
situational inﬂuences; in particular, it is conceivable that present bias reﬂects
the need of escaping a potentially threatening situation, and that therefore
it is modulated by short-term ﬂuctuations in stress levels.
Our results complement and extend several previous studies of the eﬀect
of stress on decision-making. Keinan (34) found that subjects were impaired
in a verbal analogy task when they were threatened with uncontrollable com-
pared to controllable electric shocks. Gray (35) found that subjects made
suboptimal decisions in a temporally extended choice task when the task
was presented in a negative emotional compared to a neutral context. Van
den Bos et al. (36) and Preston et al. (37) found that performance on the
Iowa Gambling Task was impaired under stress, particularly in men. Finally,
Porcelli & Delgado (38) induced stress using the cold-pressor task, in which
subjects immerse their hand in ice-cold water, and found that this stress
induction increased the reﬂection eﬀect in risky decision-making: stressed
subjects showed stronger risk aversion in the gains domain, and stronger risk
seeking in the loss domain. Our study extends these previous ﬁndings on
risky choice into the intertemporal domain; to our knowledge, our experi-
ment is the ﬁrst to test the eﬀect of stress relative to intertemporal choice,
and its dependency on the timing of choice relative to stress onset. Notably,
we report here on diﬀerences in present bias for future rewards after two
delays: directly after a brief period of stress, when both corticosteroids and
noradrenergic mechanisms play a role, and 20 minutes later, i.e. 55 minutes
after individuals start to be exposed to stress, allowing genomic actions of
corticosteroid hormones, while keeping other factors as constant as possible.
Furthermore, in the current study the diﬀerent delays of reward choices were
limited, with the soonest reward delay being tomorrow (and, for practical
reasons, not a more present choice like today). Future studies will need to
explore diﬀerent time scales, varying the delay between stress onset and the
task as well as reward delays within the intertemporal choice task, to fully
understand the complexity of the eﬀects of stress and stress hormones on
intertemporal choice. In general, our ﬁndings suggest that time preference is
not a stable trait, as traditionally assumed in economic theory (39, 40) but
is strongly susceptible to environmental and somatic factors, such as indi-
viduals' responses to stress and variations in hormonal balance. Regardless
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of the internal mechanisms, the fragility of time preference and its complex
dependence on stress need to be considered in the design of optimal poli-
cies aiming at decisions that are consistent with an individual's long-term
economic interests.
7.5 Materials and Methods
7.5.1 Stress manipulation
81 male undergraduate students from the University of Zurich ranging in age
from 19 to 30 (M = 21.31 ± 1.85) participated in the study (for details of
the criteria see SI Material & Methods).
Psychosocial stress was induced with a grouped version of the Trier Social
Stress Test (TSST-G; 27, 28). The procedure followed closely that described
by Dawans et al. (28) and involved a preparation period of 5 min, followed
by a video- and audio- taped public speaking task of 12 min (a ﬁctional
job interview, see below), and a mental arithmetic task of 8 min, both in
front of an evaluation committee (one man and one woman wearing white
laboratory coats). A maximum of 4 and a minimum of 2 subjects were tested
at the same time. The subjects in the control groups underwent the exact
same conditions, except that they all delivered their speech and performed
arithmetic simultaneously with one another and without active observers;
this removed the stressful component of social control, while holding cognitive
load constant. A more detailed description of the TSST-G and the control
task can be found in the SI Materials and Methods.
7.5.2 Salivary Sampling and Biochemical Analysis
Salivary samples were obtained using Salivette sampling devices (Sarstedt,
Nümbrecht, Germany) at 7 time points during the experiments (Figure 7.3.1).
Salivary samples were stored at -20°C until further analysis. Free cortisol lev-
els were measured using a commercially available immunoassay (IBL, Ham-
burg, Germany). Salivary alpha-amylase (sAA) levels were measured by a
quantitative enzyme kinetic essay as described elsewhere (29).
7.5.3 Questionnaires
Mood measurements and stress ratings were assessed shortly before and di-
rectly after the TSST-G or control task (at t=15 and t=50 min, see Figure
7.3.1). Subjects ﬁlled out the 10 negative aﬀect items (rated on a 5-point
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scale) of the Positive and Negative Aﬀect Scale (PANAS; 41), resulting in
a score of negative aﬀect before and after the TSST-G or control task. At
the same time points they rated how stressed they felt at that moment on
a Visual Analogue Scale (later coded as ranging from 1 to 100). To assess
impulsivity as a personality trait (42), subjects ﬁlled out the 30-item Barratt
Impulsivity Scale (BIS) after the experimental tasks.
7.5.4 Intertemporal Choice Task
Participants performed 6 blocks of an intertemporal choice task with varying
delays, where decisions between a sooner smaller reward and a later larger
reward were oﬀered. In the ﬁrst four blocks subjects had the choice between
a smaller reward tomorrow, and a larger reward in a) 3 months and 1 day,
b) 6 months and 1 day, c) 9 months and 1 day, and d) 12 months and 1
day. The short delay was set to tomorrow rather than today to keep
transaction costs the same for sooner and later payments. In the last two
blocks, subjects chose between a smaller reward in 6 months and 1 day,
and a larger reward in e) 9 months and 1 day, and f) 12 months and 1
day. Each block consisted of 7 binary choice trials, resulting in a total of 42
trials. The larger reward was kept constant at an amount of 40 Swiss Francs
(CHF), while the sooner smaller reward started at CHF 20 and was then
adjusted with a titration method according to the choices the subject made
(for details on the titration method and calculation of the indiﬀerence points
see SI Materials and Methods).
Reimbursement consisted of a ﬂat rate of CHF 10 and a variable payment
depending on participants' choices. In particular, as was explained to the
participants at the beginning of the study, one of all the choices made was
randomly selected at the end of the study, and the chosen option on this trial
was paid out for real, i.e., participants could pick up the chosen amount on
the chosen day of delivery, using a voucher valid at the University cashier's
oﬃce. As mentioned, transaction costs were kept constant by setting the
soonest outcome to tomorrow.
7.5.5 Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: control-early,
control-late, stress-early or stress-late. Three groups contained 20 partici-
pants and one group (control-late) 21 participants. The study was conducted
between 14:00 and 20:00 in the (late) afternoon, when plasma cortisol levels
are close to the circadian trough. Participants were instructed to refrain from
smoking, eating, or drinking caﬀeine containing beverages at least 2h before
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the study, and were asked not to consume alcohol 24h before participating.
An overview of the study timeline is displayed in Figure 7.3.1. Subjects were
instructed not to talk to each other during the whole experiment.
Twenty minutes after subjects arrived in the laboratory, a ﬁrst saliva
sample was taken. Subjects were guided to a room where they received in-
structions and practice questions for the intertemporal choice task, to be able
to administer the task directly after the stress situation without delay. No-
tably, subjects only received general instructions, but were not provided with
any information about the actual rewards and delays during the intertempo-
ral choice task. It is therefore unlikely that they would have decided on their
choices already at this timepoint. When all subjects had understood the
task and answered the practice questions correctly, a second saliva sample
was taken and a PANAS/VAS questionnaire was ﬁlled out. Next, subjects
received instructions for the TSST-G or the control task, and after the 5 min
preparation period participants were guided to another room, where they
gave their speech. Before subjects were instructed to perform the arithmetic
task, a third saliva sample was taken. Directly after the whole TSST-G or
control procedure, a fourth saliva sample was taken and a further PANAS/-
VAS questionnaire was ﬁlled out. Next, participants were asked to sit at the
chair placed behind them and, depending on the experimental condition, di-
rectly perform the intertemporal choice task on a laptop placed before them
on a table (the early groups), or ﬁll out the Barratt and a socioeconomic
questionnaire and read neutral magazines (the late groups). The total delay
between the start of the TSST-G and testing of intertemporal choice in the
early groups including transportation time from one room to another, bio-
logical measurements and ﬁlling out forms was 35 minutes. 10 min and 20
min after the end of the TSST-G or control task, the ﬁfth and sixth saliva
samples were taken, after which subjects in the late groups performed the
intertemporal choice task (20 minutes after the early groups), and subjects
in the early groups ﬁlled out the questionnaires and read magazines. After
they ﬁnished, participants waited until the last saliva sample was taken 50
min after the end of the TSST-G or control task, after which they were de-
briefed and got their payment results (depending on the choices they made
during the intertemporal decision making task), and instructions for picking
up their payment.
The choice of timing of the behavioral tasks after the stress task was
based on the following reasoning. The ﬁrst time-point was selected to tar-
get nongenomic actions of corticosteroid hormones and other rapidly acting
stress hormones like noradrenaline, i.e. immediately after the TSST. At this
point in time, levels of the stress hormones (including of (nor)adrenaline) are
still high, so that they can evoke non-genomic actions (9, 10); however, the
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time-frame is too short to allow the development of gene-mediated events.
The second time-point was selected such that it would just allow the de-
velopment of genomic actions. Speciﬁcally, earlier ﬁndings in neurobiology
show that genomic corticosteroid actions are apparent after one hour, both
in the hippocampus (see e.g. 43) and the prefrontal cortex (17). However,
we wished to not test later than approximately one hour after stress onset in
order to be as close as possible to the earlier time-point, to avoid unwanted
inﬂuences that cannot be controlled for, such as circadian variations in hor-
mone level. For this reason we tested individuals between 55 and 65 minutes
after onset of the TSST.
7.5.6 Model Fits
For every subject and every delay level, we determined the amount at which
a subject was indiﬀerent between the immediate and delayed option (in items
with an immediate option), or the delayed and the very delayed option (in
items with an added front-end delay) based on the individual switching points
(see above). This allowed us to express the subjective value of the delayed
reward as a fraction of the subjective value of the immediate reward. We then
plotted the relative values of the delayed rewards as a function of time. Next,
for every subject, we ﬁtted three diﬀerent models to the obtained indiﬀerence
points. The hyperbolic discounting model and the exponential discounting
model are described in the SI Materials and Methods.
Beta-delta quasi-hyperbolic discount model. Laibson's beta-delta model
(4) was ﬁtted to the indiﬀerence points to obtain an estimate of the degree
of impatience and present bias:
Vt = v (rt) +
T−t∑
τ=1
δtv (rt+τ ) ,
where Vt indicates the discounted value at time t of a stream of rewards
r with subjective values v as a function of time τ . This equation contains
a constant, exponential discount function whose discount rate is ln 1
δ
, thus
whose steepness can be characterized by δ. The β parameter deﬂects the
exponential discount curve and its inverse can be interpreted as the extra
weight added to immediate rewards. Hence, δ can be interpreted as measur-
ing impatience and β as measuring present bias.
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7.5.7 Statistical Analysis
All measures that showed a skewed distribution with the Shapiro-Wilk test of
normality (cortisol, sAA, PANAS and VAS measurements) were log-transformed
and further Analysis of Variance (ANOVAs) were performed on the trans-
formed data. Hormone measurements were analyzed using a 7 (Sample Pe-
riod: t0 vs. t15 vs. t40 vs. t50 vs. t60 vs. t70 vs. t100) x2 (Stress: TSST-G
vs. Control) x2 (Timing: Early vs. Late) General Linear Model (GLM)
repeated measures ANOVA with Sample Period as a repeated measure. To
assess if choices in the time preference task might have aﬀected cortisol lev-
els, the above GLM repeated measures ANOVA was performed separately for
cortisol measurements in the stress and control groups, with Timing (Early
vs. Late) as a between-subjects factor. Subjective aﬀect and stress measures
were analyzed using a 2 (Sample Period: pre vs. post) x2 (Stress: TSST-G
vs. Control) x2 (Timing: Early vs. Late) General Linear Model (GLM)
repeated measures ANOVA with Sample Period as a repeated measure.
For our main analysis, performance on the intertemporal choice task was
analyzed by testing the model parameters with a 2 (Stress: TSST-G vs.
Control) x 2 (Timing: Early vs. Late) MANOVA with age and body mass
index (BMI) as covariates (for details see SI Methods). Results without
covariates are reported in the Results section.
In case of signiﬁcant main eﬀects (to assess the stress manipulation) and
interaction eﬀects (to assess the eﬀects of stress and timing on delay discount-
ing) planned comparisons were performed. Since we had speciﬁc hypothe-
ses about the direction of the behavioral eﬀects at the two diﬀerent delays,
one-tailed tests are justiﬁed here; in particular, previous literature predicted
that immediately after stress, present bias would be increased, while later it
would be decreased. Nevertheless, our main results remain signiﬁcant when
performing two-tailed hypothesis tests, as reported in the Results section.
The relationship between hormone increases and stress-induced changes
in discount parameters was assessed by OLS regression of model parameters
on area-under-the-curve for cortisol and sAA using heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors (for details see SI Methods).
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7.6 Supporting Materials and Methods
7.6.1 Selection of subjects
We restricted our experiment to men since controlling for ovarian cycle in
women is logistically diﬃcult. Before admission to the study, all subjects
were screened in a telephone interview to exclude medication intake, somatic
diseases, or any neurological or psychiatric disorders. Furthermore, psychol-
ogy and economics students, self-reported heavy smokers (consumption of
> 5 cigarettes per day), heavy alcohol consumers (consumption of > 60 g
alcohol per day) and drug users were excluded. Participants were German
native speakers, had not participated in a Trier Social Stress Test (TSST)
before and would stay in Zurich at least for the next 12 months (for pay-
ment of their reward). The study was approved by the ethical committee of
the University of Zurich and all participants provided written informed con-
sent. Participants received a variable reimbursement for their participation,
depending on the choices they made during the experiment.
7.6.2 Stress Manipulation
Psychosocial stress was induced with a grouped version of the Trier Social
Stress Test (TSST-G; (1, 2). The procedure followed closely that described
by Dawans et al.(2) and involved a preparation period of 5 min, followed
by a video- and audio- taped public speaking task of 12 min (a ﬁctional job
interview, see below), and a mental arithmetic task of 8 min, both in front of
an evaluation committee (one man and one woman wearing white laboratory
coats). A maximum of 4 and a minimum of 2 subjects were tested at the
same time. In the job interview component of the task, participants had 3
minutes to describe why their personal qualities qualiﬁed them for a job. The
committee repeatedly interrupted the presentation with questions, following
a pre-prepared script. In the arithmetic task, participants were asked to
count backwards in steps of 16, starting at a random 4-digit number. When
a mistake was made the panel told the participant to start over. Subjects all
delivered their speech and after that performed the arithmetic task. Each
subject was called at least twice and in random order for every task, to induce
a feeling of unpredictability. Speaking time for every participant was kept
constant.
To keep the cognitive load and circumstances of the control condition as
comparable as possible, only lacking the component of social control, subjects
in the control condition underwent the same conditions, with three important
diﬀerences. First, subjects were not video- or audio- taped and there was no
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panel in laboratory coats, just a passive observer in a corner of the room.
Second, the public speech was replaced by an account of what would qualify a
good friend for a job. The purpose of this task was to require a similar amount
of creativity and cognitive resources as the personal job interview, while not
containing the same stressful element of social evaluation and having to talk
oneself up. Finally, all subjects performed their tasks simultaneously with
the other participants; this made the individual contributions unintelligible
to the passive observer and the other participants, thus further reducing the
social evaluative element. One draw-back of subjects talking simultaneously
in the control condition is that actual performance during the control task
could not be assessed and compared to performance of subjects in the stress
groups. Therefore, although the tasks that subjects performed were very
similar, we have no comparison of actual cognitive load during the stress
and control tasks. Total duration of the task and speaking time for each
participant were matched to the parameters of the stress condition, when the
speaking time for each part of the control task was ﬁnished (3 minutes for
the speech and 2 minutes for the arithmetic task), participants were asked to
keep a standing position and read neutral magazines for the remaining time.
7.6.3 Intertemporal Choice Task
Titration is a standard method for identifying time preferences in the dis-
counting literature (3-6). The titration worked as follows: for each choice
of the later reward, the sooner reward was increased by half the diﬀerence
between it and 40 CHF; for instance, if a subject chose CHF 40 in 12 months
and 1 day over CHF 20 tomorrow, the next trial would oﬀer the subject a
choice between CHF 40 in 12 months and 1 day and CHF 30 tomorrow; if the
subject still chose CHF 40 in 12 months and 1 day, the next oﬀer would be
CHF 40 in 12 months and 1 day vs. CHF 35 tomorrow, and so on. For each
choice of the sooner reward, the sooner reward was decreased by half of the
diﬀerence between it and the previously oﬀered soon reward. For instance, if
a subject chose CHF 20 tomorrow over CHF 40 in 12 months and 1 day, the
next trial would oﬀer the subject a choice between CHF 10 tomorrow and
CHF 40 in 12 months and 1 day; if the subject chose CHF 10 tomorrow, the
next oﬀer would be CHF 5 tomorrow vs. CHF 40 in 12 months and 1 day,
and so on. The titration procedure lasted for 7 trials at each combination of
delays; this means that each indiﬀerence point was identiﬁed to a precision
of CHF 0.156 (CHF 20 x 0.57, i.e. the initial diﬀerence between CHF 20
and CHF 40/ CHF 0 was halved seven times). The amount of the sooner
reward at the end of this titration procedure was taken as the indiﬀerence
point for the particular delay combination, i.e. the amount of the sooner
7.6. SUPPORTING MATERIALS AND METHODS 191
smaller reward where participants switched between the smaller sooner and
the later larger reward.
This procedure resulted in an individual discount function for each sub-
ject, which was used as the basis for ﬁtting parameters of several models
of intertemporal choice, described below. Note that this procedure collapses
subjects' choices in the time preference task into one or two parameters; thus,
each subject entered the statistical analysis only once, i.e. we are not using
multiple (non-independent) data points for each subject.
Possible serial correlation and order eﬀects in subjects' responses were
controlled for by randomizing the order of trials across blocks, i.e. the order
in which the various indiﬀerence points were determined. In addition, the
side of the screen (left or right) on which the late and soon options were
presented on each trial was randomized across trials.
Note that the soonest option subjects could choose in the intertemporal
choice task was tomorrow. One may ask whether this delay can be con-
sidered small enough to be useful in identifying present bias. We chose this
design for the following reasons:
First, we found it diﬃcult to include an earlier reward in the design
without confounding transaction costs: the chosen option on one of the trials
in the intertemporal choice task was paid out for real, i.e., participants could
pick up the chosen amount on the chosen day of delivery, using a voucher valid
at the University cashier's oﬃce. If the smallest delay was today, choosing
this option would result in lower transaction costs compared to choosing a
more delayed option, because subjects are already at the University, while
at any other delay than today (i.e. tomorrow, but also in several months)
subjects may have to travel to the University speciﬁcally to pick up their
payment. Therefore, in this case we would have been unable to dissociate
transaction costs from present bias.
Second, we did consider other forms of payment than cash vouchers, but
they all suﬀered from similar problems: we judged that getting a check or
cash on the day vs. receiving a check or cash in the mail later did not equate
the perceived risk of the transaction; bank transfers cannot be eﬀected on
the same day and also have to be picked up at the bank before they can
be consumed; Amazon vouchers cannot be turned into consumption immedi-
ately because of the delays associated with mail orders; mobile phone money
transfers and pre-paid debit cards are not available in Switzerland. Thus, the
tomorrow option seemed to us the cleanest way of eliciting time preference
without risk of transaction cost confounds.
Third, note that even with a today option, when using money as a
reward, it is almost impossible to study true present bias in the sense of the
immediate present; at best, one could hope for a time frame of a few hours,
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since subjects are unable to spend the money they earn in the experiment
until they leave the lab. Thus, even a today option would not fully address
the disconnect between the present and the earliest time at which the
reward can actually be consumed.
Fourth, to the extent that we observe present bias in our behavioral data
(we consistently ﬁnd beta < 1), we argue that people actually do consider
tomorrow as part of the extended present. Thus, in our view it is likely that,
even if it were possible to overcome the diﬀerence in transaction costs, similar
results would be found if all the payoﬀs had been one day earlier (i.e. today,
in 3 months, in 6 months etc.).
Fifth, note that the delays in our temporal choice task are relatively long,
ranging from 3 months to 12 months. In comparison, the delay between today
and tomorrow is very small in magnitude, making it likely that tomorrow
is in fact interpreted as part of the extended present by our subjects. In
support of this claim, comparable studies where the soonest payoﬀ was on
the same day ﬁnd similar discount rates as we do when the soonest payoﬀ
is tomorrow (7-9). In particular, estimates of the beta parameter reported
in the literature involving, among others, immediate outcomes in real-life or
laboratory situations are very similar to those obtained for our control group:
our control subjects have beta = 0.82 on average, which is close to the beta
= 0.7 reported by Laibson et al. (10), and falls squarely within the realistic
range of beta from 0.8  0.85 argued by Laibson et al. (11).
Finally, note that if tomorrow is not considered part of the extended
present by our subjects, it is likely that we in fact underestimated the behav-
ioral eﬀect of stress on present bias. Conversely, we would predict that the
bi-directional eﬀect of stress on present bias would be stronger if a today
option was included, since biological theory (see Introduction) suggests that
organisms will be less oriented towards the future directly after stress.
7.6.4 Classiﬁcation into present-biased and non-present-
biased subjects
Our experimental design aﬀorded classiﬁcation of subjects into present-biased
and non-present-biased: present-biased subjects are those whose discounting
over a given period is greater when that period is in the near future compared
to when it is in the more distant future. In our design, a present-biased sub-
ject would discount more between tomorrow and 3 months and 1 day than
between 3 months and 1 day and 6 months and 1 day; similarly, they would
discount more between tomorrow and 6 months and 1 day than between 6
months and 1 day and 12 months and 1 day. We can use this feature of
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our experimental design to directly classify subjects into present-biased and
non-present-biased, without assumptions about the shape of the discount
function. We classiﬁed a subject as present-biased as follows: we obtained
the diﬀerence between their tomorrow vs. 3 months and 1 days indiﬀer-
ence point and the 3 months and 1 day vs. 6 months and 1 day indiﬀerence
points from the intertemporal choice task; similarly, we computed the diﬀer-
ence between their tomorrow vs. 6 months and 1 days indiﬀerence point
and the 3 months and 1 day vs. 12 months and 1 day indiﬀerence points.
A subject was classiﬁed as present-biased when the average of these two dif-
ferences was greater than zero, i.e. when on average they discounted more
over periods of 3 to 6 months when those periods were in the near future (be-
ginning tomorrow) compared to the distant future (beginning in 6 months
and 1 day). The resulting classiﬁcation is a dummy variable that is 1 when
a subject is present-biased based on this deﬁnition, and zero otherwise.
7.6.5 Model Fits
7.6.5.1 Hyperbolic discounting model
In addition to the beta-delta model, we also ﬁtted a standard hyperbolic
model (12-16) of the following shape:
Vt =
A
1 + kt
,
where Vt indicates the discounted value at time t, A is the amount of re-
ward, t the delay until reward delivery, and k is a single parameter describing
the shape of the hyperbola. Because we expressed the value of the delayed
rewards as a fraction of the value of the immediate reward, A = 1.
7.6.5.2 Exponential discounting model
Finally, we ﬁt a standard exponential discount function of the following
shape:
Vt = A exp
(−δt) ,
where Vt indicates the discounted value at time t, A is the amount of
reward, t the delay until reward delivery, and δ is the parameter describing
the steepness of the exponential discount function. Because we expressed
the value of the delayed rewards as a fraction of the value of the immediate
reward, A = 1.
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7.6.6 Statistical Analyses
7.6.6.1 Deﬁnition of cortisol responders
Cortisol responders were deﬁned by an absolute cortisol increase of at least
2.5 nmol/l (1, 17) in response to the stressor (t5-t2). This resulted in 16 of
20 cortisol responders in the early stress group and 17 of 20 responders in
the late stress group. Stress-induced increases in salivary cortisol and alpha-
amylase (sAA) to probe stress reactivity were calculated with a formula for
area-under-the-curve increases (AUCi) from baseline (18).
7.6.6.2 Performance on the intertemporal choice task
For our main analysis, performance on the intertemporal choice task was
analyzed by testing the model parameters with a 2 (Stress: TSST-G vs.
Control) x 2 (Timing: Early vs. Late) MANOVA with age and body mass
index (BMI) as covariates. Cortisol is known to be inﬂuenced by age and BMI
(19-25); for this reason it is standard procedure to include these variables as
covariates in statistical analyses in stress research (based on (26); e.g. (27).
In regression terms, this analysis can be written as
betai = β0 + β1stressi + β2delayi + β3stressi · delayi + β4Xi + ui
deltai = β0 + β1stressi + β2delayi + β3stressi · delayi + β4Xi + ui,
where betai and deltai are the present bias and impatience parameters,
respectively, in Laibson's discounting model, stressi is a dummy variable
indicating whether subject i was in the stress group or the control group,
delayi is a dummy variable indicating whether subject i was tested immedi-
ately after stress (early) or 20 minutes later (late), Xi is a vector of covariates
including age and body mass index, and ui is the error term.
7.6.6.3 Classiﬁcation into present-biased and non-present-biased
subjects
For a more direct test of whether stress increased present bias, we asked
whether the number of subjects classiﬁed as present-biased based on the
dummy variable described above was aﬀected by stress and delay. To this
end, we performed a 2 (Stress: TSST-G vs. Control) x 2 (Timing: Early
vs. Late) ANOVA with the present bias dummy as the dependent variable
and age and body mass index (BMI) as covariates. We report results both
when cortisol responders are excluded from the analysis and when they are
included. In regression terms, this analysis can be written as
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presentbiasedi = β0 + β1stressi + β2delayi + β3stressi · delayi + β4Xi + ui,
where presentbiasedi is the dummy variable classifying subjects into
present-biased and non-present-biased, and the other variables are as de-
scribed above. Results without covariates are reported in the Supplementary
Results section.
As in the main analysis, in case of signiﬁcant main and interaction eﬀects,
planned comparisons were performed, for which one-tailed tests are justiﬁed;
however, we report the results for two-tailed tests as well.
7.6.6.4 Exclusion of non-responders and selection bias
To assess whether the exclusion of non-responders led to selection bias, we
regressed the probability of being a non-responder on a number of observable
variables. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁt the following model using OLS:
nonresponderi = β0 + β1agei + β2bmii + β3baselinestressi
+β4baselinecorti + β5betai + β6deltai + β7barratti + ui,
where nonresponderi is a dummy for being a cortisol non-responder to stress
(for subjects in the stress condition), baselinestressi is self-reported stress
before the stress induction procedure on a scale from 0 (not at all stressed)
to 100 (very stressed), baselinecorti is baseline cortisol in nmol/l, betai and
deltai are the present bias and impatience parameters, respectively, in Laib-
son's discounting model, and barratti is trait impulsivity as measured by the
Barratt scale. ui is the error term.
7.6.6.5 Relationship between hormone increases and stress-induced
changes in discount parameters
The relationship between hormone increases and stress-induced changes in
discount parameters was assessed by OLS regression of model parameters
on area-under-the-curve for cortisol and sAA using heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors. Speciﬁcally, separately for the early and late stress groups,
we ﬁt the following models:
betai = β0 + β1cortAUCi + ui
deltai = β0 + β1cortAUCi + ui,
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where cortAUCi is cortisol area-under-the-curve, and betai and deltai
are the present bias and impatience parameters, respectively, in Laibson's
discounting model. ui is the error term.
7.7 Supplementary Results
7.7.1 Classiﬁcation into present-biased and non-present-
biased subjects
Our experimental design aﬀorded classiﬁcation of subjects into present-biased
and non-present biased without assumptions about the shape of their dis-
count function: a subject was classiﬁed as present-biased when their dis-
counting over a given period was larger on average when that period was
in the near future compared to when it was in the more distant future (see
SI Materials and Methods). In line with the ﬁndings reported above, stress
diﬀerentially aﬀected the number of subjects who were classiﬁed as present
biased: in the early testing group, 15 out of 20 subjects were classiﬁed as
present-biased under control conditions, while 19 out of 20 subjects who had
undergone the TSST-G were classiﬁed such. In the late testing group, 20
out of 21 control subjects, but only 15 out of 20 TSST-G subjects, were
present-biased. These diﬀerences were statistically signiﬁcant: we observed
a two-way stress x time interaction on the present bias dummy variable (F1,68
= 7.82, P = 0.007 (two-tailed)). Planned comparisons revealed that when
tested immediately after stress, stressed subjects were more likely to be clas-
siﬁed as present biased than controls (F1,32 = 6.43, P = 0.008 (one-tailed) /
P = 0.016 (two-tailed)). By contrast, stressed individuals tested at the later
time-point were less likely to be classiﬁed as present-biased than controls
(F1,34 = 3.48, P = 0.036 (one-tailed) / P = 0.071 (two-tailed)). These eﬀects
remained signiﬁcant when cortisol non-responders were included in the anal-
ysis (stress x delay interaction: F1,74 = 5.76, P = 0.019 (two-tailed); early
stress vs. control: F1,36=3.90, P = 0.028 (one-tailed); late stress vs. control:
F1,36=3.14, P = 0.043 (one-tailed)), and when no covariates were included in
the model (stress x delay interaction: F1,70 = 7.89, P = 0.006 (two-tailed);
early stress vs. control: F1,34 = 5.04, P = 0.015 (one-tailed); late stress vs.
control: F1,36 = 2.97, P = 0.046 (one-tailed)). Note that this analysis is
only based on whether a subject is present biased or not. Conclusions about
the degree of present bias, and diﬀerences in the degree between stress and
control group are not addressed here, but reported in the main article.
Stress and intertemporal choice performance including non-responders.
To ascertain that the exclusion of non-responders does not lead to selection
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bias, we included non-responders in the data pool and re-ran the analysis:
We replicated the interaction eﬀect between stress and timing on present
bias (beta parameter in the beta-delta model) in the intertemporal choice
task when all subjects (also non-responders) were included (stress x time
interaction: F1,74 = 4.07, P = 0.047 (two-tailed); early stress vs. control:
F1,36 = 1.22, P = 0.27 (two-tailed)/ P = 0.14 (one-tailed); late: F1,36 = 4.34,
P = 0.044 (two-tailed)/ P = 0.022 (one-tailed)).
7.7.2 Exclusion of non-responders and selection bias
To corroborate on the ﬁnding that the exclusion of non-responders does not
lead to selection bias, we regressed the probability of being a cortisol non-
responder to stress (see SI Materials and Methods for deﬁnition) on a number
of observable variables, including age, body mass index (BMI), baseline cor-
tisol levels, baseline self-reported stress on the visual-analog scale, Laibson's
beta and delta parameters, and trait impulsivity as measured by the Barratt
scale. None of these variables successfully predicted whether a participant
was a responder or a non-responder (OLS coeﬃcients and P-values: age, co-
eﬀ = -0.033, P = 0.270; bmi, coeﬀ = 0.013, P = 0.607; baseline self-reported
stress, coeﬀ = -0.002, P = 0.689; baseline cortisol, coeﬀ = 0.007, P = 0.397;
beta, coeﬀ = 0.347, P = 0.330; delta, coeﬀ = -0.583, P = 0.554; barratt,
coeﬀ = -0.099, P = 0.153). Thus, non-responders are similar to responders
on important variables, and their exclusion is unlikely to have introduced
signiﬁcant selection bias.
Model Fits. Our data were better described by Laibson's quasi-hyperbolic
model than the standard hyperbolic discounting model or the standard ex-
ponential model (Akaike Information Criteria: Laibson model, -11.80; hy-
perbolic model, -9.22; exponential model, -8.46). Nevertheless, to support
our ﬁndings, we also ﬁt the standard hyperbolic model (12)) and examine
the eﬀect of stress on the model's k parameter. The results were similar to
those obtained for the beta parameter in Laibson's quasi-hyperbolic model
(excluding non-responders: stress x time interaction: F1,68 = 4.46, P = 0.038
(two-tailed); early stress vs. control: F1,32 = 2.72, P = 0.055 (one-tailed);
late: F1,34 = 2.18, P = 0.075 (one-tailed); including non-responders: stress x
time interaction: F1,74 = 3.24, P = 0.076 (two-tailed); early stress vs. con-
trol: F1,36 = 2.23, P = 0.072 (one-tailed); late stress vs. control: F1,36 = 1.12,
P = 0.148 (one-tailed)). Similarly, the results from the standard exponential
model were similar to those obtained with Laibson's quasi-hyperbolic model
(excluding non-responders: stress x time interaction: F1,68 = 4.32, P = .042
(two-tailed); early stress vs. control: F1,32 = 2.41, P = 0.066 (one-tailed);
late stress vs. control: F1,34 = 2.03, P = 0.082 (one-tailed); including non-
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responders: stress x time interaction: F1,74 = 3.47, P = 0.066 (two-tailed);
early stress vs. control: F1,36 = 2.31, P = 0.069 (one-tailed); late stress vs.
control: F1,36 = 1.18, P = 0.142 (one-tailed)). Note that these results reach
lower levels of signiﬁcance than those from the quasi-hyperbolic model; this is
expected, as our data is best described by the quasi-hyperbolic model (see in-
formation criteria above), and the functional forms imposed by the standard
exponential model and the standard hyperbolic model may not adequately
account for the structure of the data. In particular, these models conﬂate
present bias and impatience; however, as shown above, this distinction is
necessary because the behavioral eﬀect of stress on discounting appears to
be driven by present bias and not impatience.
7.7.3 Inconsistency of responses in the time preference
task
A possible confound to our results is that subjects' responses to the time
preference questions may be inconsistent, and that this inconsistency may be
aﬀected by stress. This is an important concern, since it has been shown that
e.g. the eﬀect of working memory load on discounting can be explained by
increased randomness in responses under higher working memory load, rather
than truly diﬀerent time preferences (28, 29). In principle, this mechanism
could underlie our results as well.
However, this possibility is unlikely for the following two reasons. First,
note that inconsistency would have to be aﬀected by stress in two diﬀerent
directions to account for our results: in the early condition, stress would
have to increase inconsistent responding, while in the late condition, stress
would have to decrease inconsistent responding. We are not aware of theory
or evidence that would predict such a bidirectional eﬀect.
Second, we can directly assess whether our subjects showed inconsistent
responses in the time preference task, and whether these responses were
aﬀected by stress. To answer this question, we analyzed whether our subjects
showed non-monotonic discount functions, i.e. whether any indiﬀerence point
identiﬁed by our titration algorithm at a particular delay was lower than
any indiﬀerence point at a later delay. Note that our experimental design
did not make it possible for subjects to give inconsistent responses when
identifying any particular indiﬀerence point, since the indiﬀerence points were
approximated by a titration algorithm. Thus, any particular indiﬀerence
point, by the nature of the algorithm, was obtained through choices that
were consistent by deﬁnition. However, mistakes that subject made during
the titration would manifest themselves in inconsistent indiﬀerence points;
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this is what we analyze in the following.
Overall, 24% of indiﬀerence points showed evidence of inconsistency.
However, the proportion of inconsistent responses for a particular subject
was not dependent on whether this subject was in the stress or control con-
ditions; in an OLS regression with the percentage of inconsistent indiﬀerence
points as the dependent variable, and stress and delay, and their interaction,
as the independent variables, no coeﬃcient was signiﬁcant (stress: t=0.94,
p=0.35; delay: t=-0.32, p=0.75; stress x delay: t=-0.91, p=0.37). Thus,
the eﬀect of stress on present bias that we observe is not due to diﬀerential
likelihood of inconsistent responses across the stress and control conditions.
7.7.4 Partial cortisol correlations and mood regulation
account
A further potential concern is that the responses in the intertemporal choice
task themselves may have inﬂuenced cortisol levels; in particular, in the early
group, subjects may have made particular choices to regulate their own mood
after stress induction. However, note that we observe the opposite: subjects
in the early group who are particularly likely to choose immediate rewards
in fact show higher overall cortisol levels, rather than lower levels. This is
even true for cortisol levels after the intertemporal choice task (from 0 to 50
minutes after the TSST-G or control task): subjects with particularly low
betas (i.e. strong present-bias) in fact show somewhat higher cortisol levels
even during this period; a regression of cortisol area-under-the-curve for only
the time period after the behavioral task on beta yields a non-signiﬁcant
but negative coeﬃcient on beta (coeﬀ: -987.3, P = 0.364). This means that
cortisol levels after the behavioral task cannot be predicted by choices in the
behavioral task, and if anything, this eﬀect goes in the opposite direction as
the one we would expect based on a mood regulation account. Conversely,
the correlation between stress-induced cortisol increases and present bias is
also observed in the early group when considering only cortisol measurements
until the time of the intertemporal choice task for calculating area under the
curve, although this result has poor statistical power due to the reduction in
the number of measurements per subject (regression of beta on cortisol area
under the curve, coeﬀ = -0.001, P = 0.114). Note that behavioral testing of
the late group occurred immediately before the end of the experiment, thus
precluding that observed cortisol levels are biased by task performance in
this group. In the late group, no correlation between stress-induced cortisol
increase and present bias is observed when considering only timepoints until
just after the stress task (coeﬀ = 4 x 10-5, P = 0.256); this supports our con-
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jecture that late-developing eﬀects of cortisol are responsible for the reversed
ﬁnding in this group compared to the early group.
A further test of whether mood regulation might account for our results
is to attempt to predict the time preference parameters in the stress group
not with stress-induced cortisol increases, but with stress-induced changes
in negative aﬀect and subjective stress (we thank a reviewer for this sugges-
tion). A relationship between the change in these variables due to the stress
task and the change in time preference parameters that goes in the same
direction as the cortisol eﬀect would suggest that changes in aﬀect could un-
derlie this eﬀect. However, if anything we observe the opposite: a greater
response to the stress task in terms of negative aﬀect or subjective stress is
not signiﬁcantly associated with present bias; there is a trend, but it goes in
the opposite direction as the cortisol eﬀect: a larger response to the TSST-G
in terms of negative aﬀect or subjective stress is non-signiﬁcantly associated
with larger beta parameters in the early group (OLS regression of beta on the
after-before diﬀerence in negative aﬀect: coeﬀ = 0.026, P = 0.080; subjective
stress after-before: coeﬀ = 0.004, P = 0.111), and smaller beta parameters in
the late group (negative aﬀect: coeﬀ = -0.007, P = 0.088; subjective stress:
coeﬀ = -0.002; P = 0.255). Thus, the mood changes induced by the stress
task have an eﬀect on the discount parameters that counterveils the rela-
tionship between cortisol and present bias in the stress group, and also runs
against the eﬀect of stress across stress and control groups. Mood regulation
is therefore unlikely to be the underlying driver of our results.
7.7.5 Cortisol proﬁles in the early and late groups
A further test of whether choices in the time preference task might have
aﬀected cortisol levels is to compare the cortisol proﬁles of the early and
late groups separately for both the stressed and control subjects: if the in-
tertemporal choice task aﬀected cortisol levels, then cortisol levels should
be diﬀerent in the early vs. late groups, since the early group performed
the behavioral task early enough that it might be reﬂected in cortisol lev-
els, while the late group did not. The ANOVAs showed that interactions
between Sample Period and Delay were not signiﬁcant for subjects in either
the control (F1.9,73.4 = 0.102, P = 0.893) or the stress groups (F1.4,54.7 =
0.781, P = 0.425). Furthermore, for both the stress and control groups none
of the planned simple contrasts related to baseline were signiﬁcant (all Ps >
0.10). In addition, cortisol AUC levels did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer between
the early and late subjects within both the control (t39 = -0.095, P = 0.925)
and the stress groups (t38 = -0.853, P = 0.399). Thus, we did not ﬁnd any
evidence that cortisol levels diﬀer between the early and late groups, ren-
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dering it unlikely that choices in the time preference task aﬀected cortisol
levels.
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Chapter 8
The Social Costs of
Randomization
8.1 Summary
Randomized allocation of treatment to participants is the gold standard for
identifying the welfare eﬀects of medical and social interventions. Here we
show that this allocation mechanism has social costs, in the sense that partici-
pants, in particular those in the control group, perceive the random allocation
mechanism as unfair and incur costs to signal this. Second, we show that
the perceptions of fairness diﬀer systematically between those who receive
treatment and those who decide about its allocation; speciﬁcally, recipients
perceive randomization as uniformly unfair, whereas allocators judge it as
fair when the relative wealth of recipients is similar. These ﬁndings have
implications for the value of targeting: investing resources into ﬁnding de-
serving participants is justiﬁed because not doing so generates social costs in
terms of perceived unfairness of random allocation.
8.2 Introduction
The core question of economics is: how are scarce resources distributed (Rob-
bins, 1932)? Throughout history, humans have made decisions about the
allocation of resources not only for themselves, but also on behalf of others:
parents distribute food among their children, rulers allocate unemployment
beneﬁts and healthcare among their citizens, NGOs distribute aid among
people in developing countries. But according to what criteria should scarce
resources be distributed among potential recipients? This question lies at
the heart of Social Choice Theory, and has been the subject of intense de-
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bate for centuries (Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1970; Bentham, 1789; Arrow, 1951;
Harsanyi, 1955). Most social choice theory today operates within a util-
itarian framework. At a minimum, this means that the utility that each
individual gains from being given a particular resource should be considered
in the allocation decision: the blind don't beneﬁt much from being given
spectacles, the hungry may beneﬁt more from food than the satiated, and to
the utilitarian, these facts should inform the decision about who gets what.
However, considering the utility of the aﬀected individuals also makes so-
cial choice in this framework exceedingly diﬃcult, since it requires making
interpersonal comparisons of utility (ICU); Robbins (1932) famously argued
that such comparisons are almost impossible in principle. In the extreme
case, when no information is available about the mental states or material
resources of potential recipients, how should allocation proceed?
The most common answer to this question is randomization: when no
detailed information is available about potential recipients, it is standardly
argued that randomization should be the method of choice (Eckhoﬀ, 1989;
Katta & Sthuraman, 2006). The casting of lots is an ancient and well-
trodden path to achieve fair allocations; its history goes back at least to
ancient Greece, where membership in the Athenian Council of 500 in the
4th and 5th centuries B.C. was determined by drawing lots among all qual-
iﬁed persons (Eckhoﬀ, 1989). United States juries are still chosen through
randomization today. In an 1842 case of a sinking boat in which passengers
had to be thrown overboard to ease the load on the leaking vessel, the crew
decided to throw single men overboard and spare married men, children, and
women; a court later held that this decision mechanism was unjust, and that
lots should have been drawn instead (US vs. Holmes, 1842). Randomization
is also widely used in allocating land rights: an instruction to divide land
ownership by lot in inheritances is found in the Book of Numbers (Silverman
& Chalmers, 2001); similarly, the Vikings divided land among heirs or other
claimants by lot, and a law to this eﬀect still exists today in Denmark for cases
where the estate of a deceased person is administered by a court (Eckhoﬀ,
1989). Randomization is also frequently invoked in military drafts: examples
include Britain in the 18th century before an impending French invasion of
Ireland, Austria-Hungary and the United States before World War I, and
famously, during the Vietnam War (Silverman & Chalmers, 2001; MacAtas-
ney, 1998; Fienberg, 1971; Rosenblatt & Filliben, 1971). (Note, however,
that randomization in these cases is not undisputed; for instance, economists
have argued that the coercion and cost associated with this system should
be replaced by one in which the military competes for volunteers in the la-
bor market; Fisher, 1969.) Other examples include lotteries held for dorm
roommates at colleges and the U.S. green card lottery.
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Thus, randomization is of central importance in social choice theory: it
is the single method that is claimed to be fair and eﬃcient when no infor-
mation is available about the mental states or material resources of potential
recipients (Eckhoﬀ, 1989; Katta & Sethuraman, 2006). In addition, how-
ever, randomization has another crucial function in science and medicine:
it is the backbone of the Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT). In random-
ized controlled trials (RCTs), the randomization mechanism ensures that the
treatment and control groups are statistically identical, and thus allows at-
tributing any diﬀerences in behavior or welfare outcomes to the intervention.
It is due to this feature that RCTs are widely regarded as the mainstay of
clinical trials (Sacks et al., 1981) and, more recently, the evaluation of social
programs in both developed and developing countries (Fisher, 1928; Newman
et al., 1994; Harrison & List, 2004; Duﬂo & Kremer, 2003; Thomas, 2010).
Like randomized allocation of resources in general, randomization in the ser-
vice of science has a long and proud history. The Belgian physician van
Helmont ﬁrst suggested randomly assigning patients to a bloodletting treat-
ment and a control treatment without bloodletting, and then ask how many
funerals both of us shall have (van Helmont, 1662). Systematic randomized
trials appeared by the 19th century (Chalmers, 2001).
The criterion commonly required for the permissibility of randomization
in the context of clinical trials and ﬁeld experiments is clinical equipoise.
This principle argues that for a randomized controlled trial to be justiﬁed,
clinicians must be genuinely uncertain as to which of several treatments is
better (Freedman, 1987). However, in the case of many welfare programs,
equipoise does not obtain: it is diﬃcult to argue genuine uncertainty as
to whether receiving a welfare beneﬁt is better or worse than not receiving
it. The same will apply in the context of the experiment described in this
paper, where one participants receives money and the other does not; in this
case it is diﬃcult to argue that not receiving money is as good as receiving
money. However, a number of authors have argued that lack of equipoise is
not necessarily suﬃcient grounds for rejecting randomization as an allocation
method; for instance, randomization is permissible if resources are scarce and
not everyone can get the beneﬁt  in this case randomization may even be
the preferred allocation method (Lockwood & Anscombe, 1983; Lilford &
Jackson, 1995; Toroyan et al., 2000).
Thus, social choice theorists have generally argued that randomization is
acceptable in social choice when no information is available about the feature
of potential recipients; and in the context of RCTs, when resources are so
scarce that only some potential recipients can receive the beneﬁt. However,
is this actually true empirically  i.e., do people actually view randomization
as fair under these conditions? This question is important in its own right
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 if randomization is not actually perceived as fair by potential recipients,
this would place a serious constraint on its permissibility. Second, in the
context of RCTs, participants' perception of the fairness of the allocation
mechanism may actually inﬂuence their behavior: it has been shown that the
mere process of being surveyed alters respondents' behavior (Zwane et al.,
2011; Orne, 1962; Bhargava, 2006), and thus it is possible that behavior may
also respond to the allocation of treatment or control through randomization.
The perceived fairness of randomization has only been considered in a
handful of studies, all of them survey-based. Hillis & Wortman (1976) found
in a survey that randomization was perceived to be permissible when the
study was scientiﬁcally necessary; however, these authors also found that
scarce resources were not regarded as a suﬃcient justiﬁcation for randomiza-
tion. Innes (1979) presented college students with vignettes about a research
project and then asked them for their assessment of the justiﬁability of using
randomization in the study. Randomization was judged positively through-
out. Erez (1985) surveyed prison inmates about their opinions regarding
four diﬀerent selection criteria for special programs from which they might
beneﬁt: need; merit; ﬁrst come, ﬁrst served; and random assignment. Need
was perceived as the fairest and randomization as the least fair criterion.
Similarly, Johnson found that people generally judge randomization as unac-
ceptable in clinical trials when one treatment is better than the other: even
if expert opinion is split 80%-20% about which treatment is better, only 3%
of respondents ﬁnd randomization acceptable. However, acceptability was
better when the treatment was not a life-saving intervention. This ﬁnding
echoes Gary Burtless' (1995) claim that except among philosophers and re-
search scientists, random assignment is often thought to be an unethical way
to ration public resources.
But is it? Surprisingly, no study to date has gone beyond using surveys
and tested the perceived fairness of randomization in an experimental setting.
The purpose of the present study is to ﬁll this gap. We set up experimental
groups of three participants, in which one allocator decides on how to allocate
an indivisible prize of 5 CHF to one of the other two receivers. The allocator
can choose between one of the two receivers herself, or she can choose to
let the computer randomize. We then ask whether the receivers judge the
diﬀerent allocation strategies as fair; crucially, we elicit this information in
an incentive-compatible manner, in that we test whether receivers are willing
to incur costs to reward or punish the allocator for her decision. In addition,
we manipulate the information the allocator has about the receivers: they
can either have the same or a diﬀerent level of wealth, and this is known
either with complete certainty or with some uncertainty.
We ﬁnd that randomization is generally not perceived as fair: receivers
8.3. MATERIALS & METHODS 209
punish the allocator when she chooses random allocation. In addition, this
punishment is not sensitive to equality or uncertainty: the two receivers do
not punish the allocator less when they have equal incomes, or when their
incomes are not known with certainty. In contrast, the allocator responds
to information about the receivers: when their wealth is similar, allocators
are more likely to randomize allocation. Together, our results suggest that
random allocation of resources has social costs: receivers are willing to incur
costs to signal their discontent with randomization as an allocation mech-
anism. Second, our ﬁndings reveal an important disconnect between what
allocators and receivers perceive as fair: allocators deem it acceptable to
randomize when incomes are similar, whereas this is not true for receivers.
These ﬁndings have implications for the design of allocation mechanisms in
social choice.
8.3 Materials & Methods
8.3.1 Participants
We tested 105 healthy participants who were recruited from the subject pool
at the University of Zürich. Their mean age was 22.08 ± 3.31 (mean ±
S.D.). We excluded students of economics and psychology. All participants
gave written informed consent and were reimbursed for their participation.
An experimental session lasted 2h.
8.3.2 Session structure
The experiment was conducted in three sessions with 36, 36, and 33 par-
ticipants, respectively. Participants were seated at networked computers in
the behavioral laboratory of the Department of Economics at the University
of Zürich. Each participant was randomly assigned the role of allocator or
receiver at the beginning of the session, and kept this role for the entire ses-
sion. Participants played the task in groups of 3, where two participants were
receivers, and the remaining participant was the allocator. All participants
knew of their role (allocator vs. receiver), but did not know the identities of
the other players in their group. Allocators received a starting endowment
of CHF 32; receivers received varying starting incomes, depending on the
condition (See details below).
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8.3.3 Block structure and conditions
After being given detailed task instructions and correctly answering test ques-
tions about the task, participants performed N/3 blocks of the allocation
task; thus, in the sessions with 36 participants, 12 blocks were played, and in
the session with 33 participants, 11 blocks. Each block consisted of 6 decision
situations, each corresponding to one of 6 conditions. In the richer-certain
condition, receiver A had a higher starting endowment than receiver B. In
half of the blocks, this starting endowment was CHF 20, while that of re-
ceiver B was CHF 10; in the other half of blocks, receiver A's endowment
in this condition was CHF 30, while that of receiver B was CHF 20. In the
poorer-certain condition, these roles were reversed: receiver A either had
an endowment of CHF 20 while receiver B had CHF 10, or receiver A had
CHF 30 while receiver B had CHF 20. In the equal-certain condition, both
receivers had the same starting income; in half of the blocks, both receivers
had CHF 15, in the other half of blocks, they both had CHF 25. Thus,
the mean endowments of the richer-certain and poorer-certain conditions
across participants were equal to the endowment in the equal-certain con-
dition.
These three conditions were replicated with the addition of uncertainty
about incomes to generate the remaining three conditions: in the richer-
uncertain condition, either receiver A had a starting endowment somewhere
between CHF 12.50 - CHF 27.50 while receiver B had an endowment between
CHF 2.50 - CHF 17.50; or receiver A had an endowment somewhere between
CHF 22.50 - CHF 37.50 while receiver B had an endowment between CHF
12.50 - CHF 27.50. In the poorer-uncertain condition, these roles were
again reversed, as described above. In the equal-uncertain condition, either
both participants had an endowment between CHF 7.50 - CHF 22.50, or
between CHF 17.50 - CHF 32.50. Within these ranges, a uniform probability
distribution was used to determine the actual starting endowments. receivers
were not informed about the probability distribution of their incomes within
the ranges; note, however, that the midpoint of the ranges correspond to
the endowments in the certain conditions. Note also that the endowment
ranges of both participants overlapped in the uncertain conditions; thus,
in the richer-uncertain condition, participant A had a higher endowment
participant B in expectation.
Within each block, participants played one trial in each of these condi-
tions; thus, against each allocator and each other receiver, receivers assumed
the richer-certain, poorer-certain, equal-certain, richer-uncertain, poorer-
uncertain, equal-uncertain roles exactly once.
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8.3.4 Trial structure
Each trial was structured as follows. At the beginning of the trial, all three
members of a group were informed about the endowments of the two re-
ceipients; thus, each receiver knew both their own and the other receiver's
endowment, and the allocator knew both receivers' endowments. In addition,
all members knew that they all had full information; in particular, receivers
were aware that the allocator knew their respective endowments.
The allocator then faced the following choice: they could decide how to
allocate an indivisible prize of CHF 5 between the two receivers. In doing so,
they had three options: they could either give the prize to receiver A, or to
receiver B, or they could let the computer randomize with 50-50 probability
which receiver would get the prize.
Simultaneously, receivers A and B had the option to punish or reward
the allocator for their decision. In particular, each receiver was given an
additional reward/punishment budget of CHF 8, and could decide to spend
between 0-8 CHF on rewarding or punishing the allocator. (Note that we
used neutral language, rather than the terms reward and punishment, in
communicating this part of the experiment to the participants; in particular,
participants were told that they could increase or decrease the income of
the allocator.) Crucially, reward and punishment could be made contingent
on the possible allcoator decisions: for instance, receivers could reward or
punish the allcoator for giving the prize to them, to the other receiver, or
for choosing to let the computer randomize. We used the strategy method
to avoid censoring of data; thus, receivers chose a reward or punishment
for each possible allocator decision. Allocators knew that receivers had this
reward/punishment opportunity. The reward/punishment technology was
1:2, i.e. for each CHF that receivers spent for rewarding the allocator, CHF
2 were added to the allocator's income; for each CHF that receivers spent to
punish the allocator, CHF 2 were subtracted.
After each group of 3 (2 receivers and 1 allocator) had played 6 trials,
corresponding to the 6 conditions, groups were randomly re-assigned, and
the next block began. In reassigning groups, no participant ever played with
any of the other two participants in their group again during the remain-
der of the experiment. In addition, neither the allocator nor the receivers
were informed of the decisions of the other group members at the end of
a trial; rather, this information was only revealed at the very end of the
experiment. Together, the reassignment without replacement and lack of in-
formation about the behavior of others rules out reputational eﬀects, as well
as learning and updating about the behavior of others.
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8.3.5 Estimates of others' preferences
To control for participants' beliefs about the preferences and actions of oth-
ers, in the second part of the session, all participants repeated the same task
as above, except they were now asked to indicate not their own preferences,
but their best estimates of the choices the other participants made in each
situation. Thus, participants were presented with the same decision situa-
tions as in the ﬁrst part of the experiment, and contingent on their - now
ﬁctive - endowment and the various potential allocator decisions, were asked
to guess the average reward and punishment that the other participants had
dealt the allocator for each income situation and allocator decision. Allo-
cators also guessed the behavior of receivers in this part of the experiment.
This task was incentivized by paying each participant CHF 1 for each guess,
minus CHF 0.10 for every CHF they deviated from the actual mean that was
spent by the receivers in the ﬁrst part of the experiment to reward or punish
the allocator in the particular situation.
8.3.6 Payment
At the end of the experiment, one trial from each part of the experiment
was chosen at random and paid out to all participants; thus, the allocator
received their initial endowment of CHF 32 plus or minus the aggregate
reward or punishment from the receivers for the allocator's decision on this
trial; conversely, the receivers received their initial endowment plus the CHF
8 reward/punishment budget, minus the money spent out of this budget
on rewarding or punishing the allocator; one of the receivers in addition
received the CHF 5 prize, either because of the allocator's decision or through
randomization. In addition, all participants received the payment from the
second part of the experiment, as described above.
At the end of the experiment, all participants ﬁlled out a socioeconomic
questionnaire and were paid out.
8.4 Results
Our experiment oﬀers three unique angles to assess participants preferences
over appropriate allocations. Firstly, we observe how allocators preferences
inform their allocation of scarce goods. Secondly, we observe how receivers
choose to reward or punish allocators for their choices and, thirdly, we observe
what participants believe about other peoples preferences over allocation
decisions.
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8.4.1 Allocators' preferences
We begin by presenting simple summary statistics on allocator behavior in
Table 8.4.1. The table shows the frequency of allocators actions (whether to
give to the richer receiver, the poorer receiver or choose to allocate randomly)
under various informational conditions. Overall, allocators favor giving to
poor receivers, which they do in 47% of cases. This is followed by allocating
randomly, in 35% of cases. Seldom (in 7% of cases) do allocators choose to
award the payment to the richer receiver (Note these percentages do not sum
to 100 as there were some cases where wealth was equal and choosing the
"richer" or "poorer" receiver was not possible.) When we varied whether the
allocator knew for certain who was rich and who was poor or whether they
knew so only in expectation, we see a shift towards favoring random allo-
cation. In Table 8.4.2 we assess whether this shift is statistically signicant
by regressing 3 separate indicator variables (one for each type of allocator
choice) on an indicator variable that there was uncertainty about which re-
ceiver was richer. The results show that allocators are 13% more likely to
randomize and 9% less likely to give to the poorer (in expectation) receiver
when there is uncertainty about which receiver is richer.
We further note that when wealth was equal among receivers, random-
ization was, on average, the preferred method of allocation, but we note that
a sizable fraction of allocators (slightly over 30%) chose not to allocate ran-
domly when receivers had equal wealth. Table 8.4.3 shows the frequency
with which allocators chose to randomize in various information conditions.
We present an F-test that the frequency is equal to 50% - showing that ran-
domization is the preferred option when wealth is equal (with certainty or
in expectation) and the less preferred option when wealth is unequal (with
certainty or in expectation).
8.4.2 Receivers' preferences
Receivers had a chance to express their preferences over the decisions of
allocators by indicating how much they would reward or punish allocators for
certain actions. In Table 8.4.4 we show the average reward (or punishment
if less than zero) in Swiss Francs under various wealth conditions and in
response to diﬀerent actions on behalf of the Allocator.
The ﬁrst column, indicating the average reward or punishment a receiver
assigns to the allocator when the allocator awarded the payment to that
receiver shows an almost uniform reward to the allocator from the receiver
who gets the payment - it does not vary much depending on whether the
receiver is rich or poor. The second column shows that receivers punish
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Condition Give to me Give to other Random
All 0.96 -0.65 0.01
Receiver was poor 0.98 -0.97 -0.22
Receiver was poor, certain 0.98 -0.92 -0.19
Receiver was poor, uncertain 0.98 -1.01 -0.25
Equal wealth 0.9 -0.68 0.26
Receiver was rich 1.01 -0.29 0
Receiver was rich, certain 0.96 -0.25 0.06
Receiver was rich, uncertain 1.06 -0.34 -0.05
Table 8.4.4: Summary statistics for receiver behavior. The table shows the
average reward (>0) or punishment (<0) that receivers dealt to allocators,
contingent on their own initial endowment and the allocator's decision about
whom to give the CHF 5 prize or whether to randomize.
the allocator when she chooses to give to the other receiver. Both poor
and rich receivers punish the allocator for giving to the other, but poor
receivers punish around 3 times as much. Receivers also tend to punish the
allocator at relatively high levels when the wealth distribution is equal but
the Allocator chooses to give to the other receiver. The ﬁnal column shows
that, on average, poor receivers punish the allocator for choosing to allocate
the payment randomly while rich receivers neither punish nor reward the
allocator for choosing randomly. Receivers do seem to favor randomization,
as reected by a positive reward, when the wealth distribution is equal.
Table 8.4.5 assesses whether these observed patterns and diﬀerences are
statistically signicant. We estimate the following equation:
ai = β1Ri + β2Pi + εi,
where ai is the reward or punishment awarded by receiver i to the alloca-
tor, Ri is an indicator that the receiver is rich, and Pi is an indicator that the
receiver is poor. The inclusion of indicator variables for being both the rich
and poor receiver lends these coe¢ cients the interpretation as the di¤erence
in reward and punishment for the rich and poor receivers relative the average
reward or punishment in the situation where receivers have equal wealth. We
estimate this regression separately for each possible action of the allocator:
when the payment is awarded to receiver i, when the payment is awarded to
the other receiver and when the allocation is randomly chose.
The ﬁrst panel, derived from rewards and punishments from receivers who
received the payment, conﬁrms that there is no statistical di¤erence in the
reward to the allocator between rich and poor receivers when they receive the
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payment. The second panel conrms that poor receivers do punish allocators
that give to the other receiver more than in the equal wealth condition (by
0.28 francs, signicant at the 5% conﬁdence level). Rich receivers punish the
allocator less than in the equal wealth condition when the allocator gives the
payment to the other, poorer, receiver - by 0.39 francs (statistically diﬀerent
than zero at the 5% conﬁdence level). We fail to reject that the additional
punishment by poor receivers when the reward goes to the rich receiver is
more or less than the reduced punishment given by richer receivers when
the payment goes to the poorer receivers. In the ﬁnal panel, we show that
when wealth is unequal, both poor and rich receivers reward the allocator less
for choosing to allocate randomly than in the equal wealth condition: poor
receivers reward 0.48 francs less (resulting in an actual punishment relative
to the average reward of 0.26 francs in the equal wealth condition) while
rich receivers reward 0.25 francs less, the diﬀerence between poor and rich
receivers is statistically signicant at less than the 1% conﬁdence level.
In the second column we introduce interaction eﬀects, allowing punish-
ments to depend on whether it is certain or uncertain which receiver is richer.
We do not ﬁnd that this matters much in determining the level of reward or
punishment.
8.4.3 Estimates of Others' Preferences
In addition to asking receivers how they would reward or punish allocators for
various allocation decisions, we asked participants how much they thought
other receivers would reward or punish allocators for their choices. Tables
8.4.6 and 8.4.7 show parallel results as those discussed pertaining to receivers
actual actions. While the magnitude of the estimated rewards and punish-
ments for other receivers are larger than the actual rewards and punishments
inicted by receivers, the relative magnitudes are quite similar to those de-
scribed pertaining to actual rewards and punishments. One exception is that
participants expected rich receivers to reward allocators for giving to them
much more than they actually did. But participants correctly guessed that
poor receivers would punish more when they did not receive the payment,
and rich receivers would punish less when they did not receive the payment.
They further correctly assumed that poor receivers would punish more for
random allocations than rich receivers. Contrary to the actual behavior of re-
ceivers, however, participants thought that uncertainty about which receiver
was rich would lessen the punishment inﬂicted on allocators when they chose
to allocate randomly.
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8.5 Discussion
The use of randomization in medical trials, and more recently in social science
research, is scientiﬁcally necessary - but may carry ethical costs. Similarly,
the use of randomization to allocate scarce goods, spots in a prestigious pub-
lic school for example, may be cheap and expedient, but is not necessarily
fair. While it is diﬃcult to make general statements about whether the social
benets of randomization (e.g. the development of useful scientic knowledge)
outweigh the costs of perceived unfairness or other ethical costs, the facets
of preferences illuminated in this experiment provide some guidance about
how to limit the ethical downside when choosing an allocation mechanism.
Firstly, we note that those responsible for the allocation of indivisible goods
express diﬀerent preferences over the proper allocation mechanism than, de-
mographically similar, receivers of these goods. Therefore minimizing the
"ethical cost" of a particular allocation mechanism requires recognizing that
the ethical judgements of receivers are not identical to those making the al-
location decision and that the preferences of each group must be taken into
account. Secondly, there is a general perception that goods should be allo-
cated to those individuals who most "need" them, suggesting that proper
targeting is key to limiting the ethical downside of allocation decisions. Tar-
geting, however, is often expensive (it may be costly, for example locate
individuals with the most severe cases of a disease to participate in a medial
trial, or to ﬁnd the poorest households to participate in a school lottery or in
a welfare program). We propose a novel approach for measuring the social
value of targeting which, although the results are specic to this contest, may
be generalized to other settings.
Given that a desire for equality is a well-documented phenomenon (Dawes
et al., 2007; Cruces et al., 2011; Ruström & Williams, 2000), it is perhaps not
surprising that those in charge of allocating a good have a preference to direct
that good to those that most "need" it. In the particular context of this lab-
oratory experiment, we observe that allocators favor awarding the payment
to the poorer receiver. This preference for equality is reected to some ex-
tent by receivers: wealthy receivers punish allocators who gave the payment
to the other receiver less than poor receivers. What is more surprising is
that receivers and allocators diﬀer in their perception of appropriate alloca-
tion mechanism in more convoluted, and realistic, situations. When there is
some uncertainty about which receiver is in fact more "needy" (even if one is
clearly more so in expectation) allocators nd random allocation to be a less
objectionable form of allocation, whereas receivers preferences over alloca-
tions (expressed by the extent to which they reward or punish the allocator)
are una¤ected by the introduction of this uncertainty. Thus we note that
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the perceived goodness of certain allocation mechanisms can diﬀer between
those allocating and those receiving a scarce good. We further note that this
is not an "intrinsic" diﬀerence, but purely situational as both allocators and
receivers were drawn from the same demographic distribution in this exper-
iment. Therefore, in assessing whether any particular allocation mechanism
is likely to carry signiﬁcant ethical costs (and evaluating whether these costs
are less than anticipated benets), it is important to understand the prefer-
ences and perceptions of all interested parties, recognizing that preferences
and perceived costs are shaped by ones position in the transaction.
As noted above, randomization is often a necessary and useful tool for pol-
icy makers and researchers, in allocating scarce goods and generating robust
scientic knowledge. Randomization, however, is subject to certain ethical
concerns as it creates a situation where "some people get it and some people
dont." A common response to this objection is that nearly every situation
involves scarcity, thus randomization is a fair, as well as eﬃcient or scien-
tically useful, manner of distributing goods. Our experiment suggests that
this is true, but only under certain conditions. When there is an equal distri-
bution of wealth between receivers, randomization is generally the preferred
allocation mechanism: it is chosen mechanism on the part of allocators and
the unique situation where receivers reward allocators for choosing to dis-
tribute the payment to a randomly selected receiver. This premise does not
appear true, however, when there is disparity in wealth among the receivers
- thus properly targeting individuals with equivalent needs appears essen-
tial in limiting the ethical costs of random allocation. As noted, however,
proper targeting can be expensive. We propose estimating the social value
of additional targeting, which can be compared to the costs of targeting, by
determining the willingness to pay for additional targeting.
As an example, we note that, in the context of this experiment, punish-
ments for the allocator are socially ineﬃcient since both parties pay for them;
thus the average cost to receivers for punishing the allocator is a measure of
the social cost of that action. We ﬁnd that the average cost to receivers (the
sum of the absolute values of rewards and punishments) is 1.30 when the
wealth distribution is unequal (this ﬁgure is the average cost weighted by the
frequency with which the allocator chose each allocation option), whereas
this cost is only 0.85, or 35% less, when the wealth distribution is equal.
This ﬁgure suggests that receivers would give up 35% of the average cost in
the unequal condition, or 6% of their endowment, to change their situation
to one in which the wealth of the potential receivers was equalized - per-
haps through better targeting. Such an exercise could be used to determine
whether the additional cost of targeting a pool of equally deserving potential
recipients of a good outweighs the cost of identifying that group.
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Even when randomization is not a desired allocation mechanism, and the
goal is simply to provide goods to the most needy population, identifying that
population can be diﬃcult and costly. This begs the question of how much
should be dedicated to targeting (which often takes away from funds that
could be provided as goods to intended recipients). For example, when dis-
tributing subsidized food in an impoverished area, how much of the program
budget should be spent on identifying the poorest households? Taking into
account that less targeting and greater uncertainty about which recipients
are poorer means more food distributed in total. To answer such questions,
we propose measuring the willingness to pay for better targeting. In the
context of our experiment, we note that allocators do not strictly maximize
their individual payoﬀ in this experiment: doing so would have implied giv-
ing the payment to the poor receiver in all cases, whether there was certainty
about their relative wealth or not. Allocators do give the payment to the
poorer receiver on average, but they are more likely to randomize when there
is uncertainty about which receiver is richer (we also note that participants
were fairly good at guessing the average reward or punishment, suggesting
allocators would have had a sense of their likely payoﬀ). The increased use
of randomization in the presence of uncertainty reduced allocators average
payoﬀ from 0.34 to 0.16, or by 44%. While the magnitude is of course spe-
ciﬁc to this particular context, we note it is relatively large on a percentage
basis, and to the allocators endowment of 8 CHF. This suggests a relatively
high willingness to pay for additional information about potential recipients,
allowing allocators to direct resources to those whom they prefer to reach.
In summary, we ﬁnd that both allocators and receivers view randomized
allocation of resources unfavorably. Most notably, receivers are willing to
give up resources to inﬂict costly punishment on allocators who choose ran-
domization; this behavior is a lower bound on the social costs of random
allocation. In addition, we ﬁnd that allocators and receivers diﬀer in their
assessment of the conditions under which random allocation is fair: allocators
shift towards random allocation when the incomes of receivers are similar,
compared to the situation where incomes are diﬀerent. receivers, in contrast,
do not make this distinction. Thus, avoiding the social costs of random al-
location require taking into account the preferences of receivers, which may
not be reﬂected in those of policy makers.
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Chapter 9
Both Sides Retaliate in the
Israeli-Palestinian Conﬂict
9.1 Summary
Ending violent international conﬂicts requires understanding the causal fac-
tors that perpetuate them. In the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict, Israelis and
Palestinians each tend to see themselves as victims, engaging in violence only
in response to attacks initiated by a fundamentally and implacably violent
foe bent on their destruction. Econometric techniques allow us to empirically
test the degree to which violence on each side occurs in response to aggres-
sion by the other side. Prior studies using these methods have argued that
Israel reacts strongly to attacks by Palestinians, while Palestinian violence is
random (i.e. not predicted by prior Israeli attacks). Here we replicate prior
ﬁndings that Israeli killings of Palestinians increase after Palestinian killings
of Israelis, but crucially show further that when non-lethal forms of violence
are considered, and when a larger dataset is used, Palestinian violence also
reveals a pattern of retaliation: i) the ﬁring of Palestinian rockets increases
sharply after Israelis kill Palestinians, and ii) the probability (although not
the number) of killings of Israelis by Palestinians increases after killings of
Palestinians by Israel. These ﬁndings suggest that Israeli military actions
against Palestinians lead to escalation rather than incapacitation. Further,
they refute the view that Palestinians are uncontingently violent, showing in-
stead that a signiﬁcant proportion of Palestinian violence occurs in response
to Israeli behavior. Well established cognitive biases may lead participants
on each side of the conﬂict to under-appreciate the degree to which the other
side's violence is retaliatory, and hence to systematically underestimate their
own role in perpetuating the conﬂict.
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9.2 Introduction
Over half of Israelis and three quarters of Palestinians think the other side
seeks to take over their land. When accounting for their own acts of aggres-
sion, Israelis often claim to be merely responding to Palestinian violence (1-
3), and Palestinians often see themselves as simply reacting to Israeli violence
(4-6). Are these views just self-serving rationalizations designed to justify vi-
olence committed for other reasons, or are they in part true? That is, do
Israeli attacks against Palestinians in fact occur in response to prior violence
by Palestinians, and do Palestinian attacks against Israelis occur in response
to prior violence by Israelis? The answers to these questions are important
because they carry implications about the nature of the actors on each side,
and the most eﬀective strategies for reducing the conﬂict. Fortunately, these
questions can be approached empirically by applying quantitative economet-
ric methods (vector autoregression) to well-documented empirical databases
of the timeline of violence over the Second Intifada.
Several recent studies have taken this approach (7-10) and argued that
Israeli killings of Palestinians ﬁt the pattern of retaliation, increasing im-
mediately after Palestinian killings of Israelis, while Palestinian killings of
Israelis do not ﬁt the pattern of retaliation (8, 10). This ﬁnding supports
the narrative that Israel merely responds to Palestinian violence, whereas
Palestinian attacks are not contingent on Israeli behavior, instead reﬂect-
ing a fundamental and non-negotiable goal of harming Israel. This view in
turn bolsters Israeli arguments for military over diplomatic solutions on the
grounds that there is no one to talk to. However, the prior analyses suﬀer
from several limitations, making their conclusions premature.
Most importantly, prior analyses consider only killings, not other forms
of violence. Three problems arise as a result. First, multiple nonlethal forms
of aggression occur on both sides, such as unsuccessful attacks on Israelis by
Palestinians, and house demolitions, imprisonment, blockades, and restric-
tions of movement by Israel against Palestinians. Any of these nonlethal
forms of aggression could either cause or constitute retaliation. Second, vec-
tor autoregression asks whether killings of one side follow killings by the
other side at a consistent time lag. However, given the lower level of or-
ganization and technology of the various armed Palestinian factions, such
time-locked responses may be diﬃcult for Palestinians to achieve; Jaeger &
Paserman suggest, alternatively, that Palestinians may intentionally random-
ize the timing of their attacks to preclude preventative measures being taken
by Israel, which would render any retaliatory attacks invisible to VAR (see
11-13 for a discussion of whether Palestinian groups act rationally). Third,
some crucial factors may be invisible to vector autoregression because they
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are not punctate events but chronic conditions: e.g., chronic fear of suicide
bombing and/or rocket attacks among Israelis, and the chronic oppression of
living under occupation among Palestinians.
These problems illustrate the impossibility of modeling and testing all
potential nonlethal causes and forms of retaliation in the Israeli/Palestinian
conﬂict. However, one form of violence avoids all three problems and is
therefore amenable to econometric testing: the ﬁring of Qassam rockets from
Gaza into Israel. Rocket ﬁrings are punctate events that can be precisely
timed; they are rarely lethal (between January 2001 and April 2008, the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and B'tselem registered 3645 Qassam rocket
ﬁrings, but only 15 associated fatalities); and precise quantitative data on
the numbers of rockets ﬁred every day are available. Together, this means
that if rockets are used in a retaliatory fashion this might be evident in a
vector autoregression. We therefore conducted analyses of data obtained
from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) that give the number of daily Qassam
rockets ﬁred by Palestinians into Israeli territory, irrespective of whether
anyone died as a result. Our analysis covers the period of January 2001 -
April 2008, i.e. from the beginning of the Second intifada until the ceaseﬁre
that preceded the December 2008 Gaza War.
We ﬁnd that Palestinian Qassam rocket ﬁrings increase sharply on the
day following the killing of Palestinians by Israel. In addition, we show that
the probability of Palestinian killings of Israelis (although not the number of
people killed) increases following the killing of Palestinians by Israel. Thus,
it appears that Palestinian violence does contain an element of retaliation,
and that Israeli military operations against Palestinians lead to escalation
rather than incapacitation. Consistent with previous analyses, we conﬁrm
that Israeli aggression, too, contains an element of retaliation, in that Is-
rael is more likely to kill Palestinians on days following killings of Israelis
by Palestinians. Together, these results suggest that, contrary to previous
analyses that characterized Israeli violence alone as retaliatory, the dynamics
of retaliation in the Second Intifada are bidirectional.
9.3 Results
9.3.1 Summary statistics
Figure 9.3.1 shows the timeline of violence between Israelis and Palestinians
from January 1, 2001, to April 16, 2008. Each panel is a histogram plotting
the daily count of events; panel A shows Palestinian fatalities resulting from
Israeli attacks, panel B shows Israeli fatalities resulting from Palestinian
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attacks, and panel C shows daily counts of Qassam ﬁrings by Palestinians
into Israeli territory.
Table 9.3.1 shows summary statistics associated with these variables.
Palestinian fatalities, Israeli fatalities, and Qassam ﬁrings occurred on 49.75%,
11.85% and 34.66% of all days in the dataset, respectively. There were a total
of 4874 Palestinian fatalities, 1062 Israeli fatalities, and 3645 Qassam ﬁrings;
this corresponds to a daily average of 1.65 ± 3.52 (mean ± standard devi-
ation) Palestinian fatalities, 0.36 ± 1.66 Israeli fatalities, and 1.37 ± 3.75
Qassam ﬁrings. Of the Qassam ﬁrings, 15 (0.41%) resulted in fatalities, un-
derscoring that Qassam ﬁrings are a largely non-lethal form of Palestinian
aggression.
In the following we consider two versions of each of the three variables:
the number of daily events on one hand, and the daily incidence on the
other hand. The former variable is the count of events, i.e. the number of
Palestinian and Israeli fatalities and Qassam ﬁrings on any given day. The
incidence is a dummy variable that takes value one on days when one or more
events occurred, and zero otherwise.
Table 9.3.2 shows the pairwise correlation coeﬃcients and their p-values
for the three variables, both in terms of number of daily events as well as
incidence. It can be seen that Israeli and Palestinian aggression are strongly
positively correlated (although Qassam ﬁrings and Palestinian fatalities only
correlate in levels, not in incidence), while the two forms of Palestinian ag-
gression correlate negatively, potentially reﬂecting a substitution eﬀect. This
cursory ﬁrst analysis suggests that Israeli and Palestinian violence may be
mutually related. However, to test for retaliatory aggression, we must con-
sider relationships across time.
9.3.2 Impulse response functions
To test for retaliatory patterns of violence, in the restricted sense of tempo-
ral relatedness proposed by Granger (1969), we initially computed impulse
response functions for the three variables. As pointed out by (8), the value of
the Israeli response function on day t can be interpreted as the excess number
of attacks against Palestinians t days after a Palestinian attack against Is-
raelis, normalized by the number of attacks against Israelis. The Palestinian
response function is interpreted analogously.
Figures 9.3.2 and 9.3.3 show the response functions for levels and inci-
dence, respectively. In each panel, an attack of one party occurs at time
0, and the function plots the excess number (Figure 9.3.2) or probability
(Figure 9.3.3) of attacks by the other side occurring on the following days.
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Figure 9.3.1: Timeseries of Palestinian fatalities (A), Israeli fatalities (B), and
Qassam attacks by Palestinians on Is ael (C). Data are daily event counts
between 2000 and 2008 (cf. Table 1 for exact dates), compiled from data
from the Israeli human rights organization Bt'selem (A & B) and the Israeli
Defense Forces (C).
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Variable pair Levels Incidence
Palestinian x Israeli fatalities Coeﬃcient 0.1092 0.1449
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Palestinian fatalities x Qassam attacks Coeﬃcient 0.2708 0.0286
p-value 0.0000 0.1399
Qassam attacks x Israeli fatalities Coeﬃcient -0.0405 -0.0913
p-value 0.0367 0.0000
Table 9.3.2: Pairwise correlations. Shown are correlation coeﬃcients for
Palestinian and Israeli fatalities and Qassam ﬁrings, and their associated
p-values. Signiﬁcant correlations are set in bold.
Our main question was whether Israeli and Palestinian violence show re-
taliatory patterns. Speciﬁcally, we hypothesized that Qassam rocket ﬁrings
might to some extent be a consequence of previous Israeli aggression against
Palestinians. Figure 9.3.2D suggests that this may be the case: the number
of Qassam rocket ﬁrings by Palestinians increases compared to baseline on
the days following Israeli killings of Palestinians. Interestingly, Israel does
not appear to respond to ﬁrings of Qassam rockets (Figures 9.3.2C, 9.3.3C).
Conversely, Figures 9.3.2A and 9.3.3A suggest that, as reported previously
(8), Israeli killings of Palestinians increase on the days following killings of
Israelis by Palestinians. In contrast to previous ﬁndings, however, Palestini-
ans appear to not only respond to Israeli attacks with Qassam rockets, but
also by increasing the incidence of killings of Israelis.
9.3.3 Statistical model
To quantify these results, we employed a standard vector autoregression
model (VAR), in which current Israeli and Palestinian fatalities are regressed
on lagged values of both variables. We perform these regressions twice for
each pair of variables: once for levels, and once for the dummy incidence
variables. The results of these regressions for the three variables under con-
sideration are shown in Supp. Tables 4-7.
To test based on these regressions whether Israeli attacks predict Pales-
tinian attacks and vice-versa, we computed the F-statistics for the joint signif-
icance of the lagged coeﬃcients of the respective other variable. The results
are shown in Table 9.3.3. They conﬁrm the patterns observed in Figures
9.3.2 and 9.3.3: past Palestinian fatalities signiﬁcantly predict an increase in
ﬁrings of Qassam rockets, both in terms of the number of rockets ﬁred, as
well as in terms of the number of days on which ﬁrings occur. Thus, the ﬁring
of Qassam rockets appears to occur at least partly in response to previous
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Figure 9.3.2: Impulse response functions for number of events (levels). Each
graph shows the excess number of attacks by one side following an attack
from the respective other side. (A) shows the Palestinian response in terms
of Qassam rocket attacks to killings of Palestinians by Israel. (B) shows the
Palestinian response in terms of killings of Israelis to killings of Palestinians
by Israel. (C) shows the Israeli response in terms of killings of Palestinians
to Qassam attacks by Palestinians. Finally, (D) shows the Israeli response
in terms of killings of Palestinians to killings of Israelis by Palsetinians.
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Figure 9.3.3: Impulse response functions for probability of events (incidence).
Each graph shows the excess probability of attacks by one side following an
attack from the respective other side. (A) shows the Palestinian response
in terms of Qassam rocket attacks to killings of Palestinians by Israel. (B)
shows the Palestinian response in terms of killings of Israelis to killings of
Palestinians by Israel. (C) shows the Israeli response in terms of killings
of Palestinians to Qassam attacks by Palestinians. Finally, (D) shows the
Israeli response in terms of killings of Palestinians to killings of Israelis by
Palsetinians.
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Israeli attacks on Palestinians. (Note that this analysis also shows that the
small increase in the incidence of Qassam ﬁrings following killings of Pales-
tinians shown in Figure 9.3.3D is statistically signiﬁcant when controlling for
the history of attacks.)
In addition, in contrast to the results of (8), we ﬁnd that past Palestinian
fatalities also predict an increase in the probability that Palestinians will kill
any Israelis in the following days (incidence).
Conversely, we ﬁnd that killings of Palestinians by Israelis also contain
a retaliatory element, both in terms of levels and incidence; however, this
retaliation occurs only after killings of Israelis, and not after (mostly non-
lethal) Qassam ﬁrings.
To understand the magnitude of these eﬀects, we estimated the percent-
age of attacks that can be ascribed to retaliation. Our results suggest that
the number of Qassams ﬁred increases by 6% on the ﬁrst day after a sin-
gle killing of a Palestinian by Israel, the probability of any Qassams being
ﬁred increases by 11%, and the probability of any Israelis being killed by
Palestinians increases by 10% (for details see Materials & Methods). Con-
versely, one day after the killing of a single Israeli by Palestinians, the number
of Palestinians killed by Israel increases by 9%, and the probability of any
Palestinians being killed by 20%.
We can then use these values to estimate what proportion of aggression on
either side can be attributed to prior attacks from the other side throughout
the period under consideration. This calculation (see Materials & Methods)
showed that retaliation accounts for a larger fraction of Palestinian compared
to Israeli aggression: in the levels speciﬁcation, 10% of all Qassam rockets
(358 in number) can be attributed to prior Israeli attacks on Palestinians, but
only 4% of killings of Palestinians by Israel (158 in number) can be attributed
to prior Palestinian attacks on Isarel. In the incidence speciﬁcation, 6% of
all days on which Palestinians attack Israel with rockets, and 5% of all days
on which they attack by killing Israelis, can be attributed to retaliation; in
contrast, this is true for only 2% of all days on which Israel kills Palestinians.
To solidify these results, we conducted several controls. First, to ascertain
that the increase of Qassam attacks following Palestinian fatalities is not due
to Palestinian fatalities on the same day (which might have occurred after
the Qassam attacks on that day), we added a control variable for same-day
Palestinian fatalities (Table 9.3.3); this does not alter the results. Second,
we wished to control for the elevated level of Qassam attacks on day 0, i.e.,
concurrent with Palestinian fatalities: Qassam attacks on the following day(s)
might be the result of previous Israeli aggression, which, however, might in
turn be triggered by these Qassam attacks on day 0. We address this potential
confound in two ways. First, the VAR analysis controls for previous own
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aggression; thus, Qassam attacks are higher following Palestinian fatalities,
holding constant previous Qassam attacks. Second, as can be seen from the
regression tables (Suppl. Tables 4-7), the increase of Qassam rockets after
Palestinian fatalities was most signiﬁcant on the ﬁrst day after such fatalities.
We therefore repeated the analysis without taking into consideration attacks
which occurred on days after mutual Israeli and Palestinian attacks. The
results are shown in Table 3; again it can be seen that Palestinian fatalities
predict an increase in Qassam attacks, but not vice-versa, although note that
the eﬀect reaches signiﬁcance only in the incidence speciﬁcation.
9.4 Discussion
In this study we replicate prior ﬁndings that Israeli killings of Palestinians
ﬁt the pattern of retaliation, that is, they increase after Palestinian killings
of Israelis (8, 10; see also 14-18). However, unlike prior studies, we show
that Palestinian violence also shows a retaliatory pattern: i) the ﬁring of
Qassam rockets increases sharply after Israelis kill Palestinians, and ii) the
probability (although not the number) of killings of Israelis by Palestinians
increases after killings of Palestinians by Israel. This result argues against
the narrative that sees Palestinians as inherently and unconditionally violent.
Instead, our analysis shows that Palestinian violence is in part contingent on
Israeli violence: Palestinians, like Israelis, are more likely to attack after they
themselves have been attacked. In addition, it shows that Israeli military
actions against Palestinians may lead to escalation of violence rather than
incapacitation of Palestinian military operations against Israel.
Is the Israeli/Palestinian conﬂict a cycle of violence, in which each at-
tack is followed by a counterattack in a tit-for-tat fashion? Jaeger & Paser-
man (8) argue that it is not, because their analyses found that Israeli vi-
olence ﬁt a pattern of retaliation whereas Palestinian violence did not (see
also 19-21, 9). In contrast, our data show that both sides retaliate, consis-
tent with tit for tat dynamics. One might argue that the ﬁring of rockets
does not constitute the continuation of a cycle, since rocket attacks rarely
lead to Israeli fatalities. Indeed, our data show that rocket attacks are usu-
ally not followed by retaliation by Israel. Nonetheless, rocket attacks cause
widespread public anger in Israel and attract broad media coverage. Thus,
even though rocket attacks are usually not met with an immediate, time-
locked increase in killings of Palestinians, they may nonetheless lead to an
overall (not time-locked) increase in Israeli violence against Palestinians, thus
continuing the cycle in the longer run. In addition, we ﬁnd that Palestinian
retaliation also occurs through an increased probability of killings of Israelis;
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this Palestinian response is unambiguously a continuation of the cycle of vi-
olence, both in terms of public attention and Israeli military reaction. Thus
our data show that, in contrast to prior reports, some aspects of the Israeli
Palestinian conﬂict ﬁt the tit for tat cycle of violence pattern (see also 15,
22-24).
Our results may be most newsworthy to the participants in this con-
ﬂict themselves. Palestinians and Israelis each tend to describe themselves
as victims in the conﬂict, each side describes their own violent attacks as
retaliatory, and each describes the attacks of the other side as caused by ag-
gressive intent rather than as responses to external attack. Of course, public
statements from each side are bound to reﬂect self-serving eﬀorts to gain the
moral high ground in the battle of public opinion. However, deeper cognitive
forces may also be at play here (25): It is well documented in the psychology
literature that people tend to see their own behavior as driven more by the
situation they are in (e.g., being under attack by the other), but to see the
behavior of others as driven more by their disposition (e.g., being inherently
hostile or violent; 26). These fundamental cognitive biases may lead each side
to underappreciate the degree to which the other side's violence is retaliatory,
and therefore to systematically underestimate their own role in perpetuating
the conﬂict (see also 27).
Despite the symmetrical pattern of violence we report here, in which both
sides retaliate for attacks from the other side, other aspects of the Israeli-
Palestinian conﬂict are characterized by deep asymmetries. Most obviously,
over four times as many Palestinians as Israelis were killed in the period in-
vestigated here; during the subsequent 2008-2009 Gaza war (after the period
studied here) this asymmetry reached about 100 Palestinian deaths for each
Israeli death. Second, Israel controls and often severely restricts many facets
of Palestinian life, including access to food and medicine and freedom to
move within and outside their territory, whereas Palestinians exert no such
control over Israelis. Third, in an asymmetry particularly importantly for the
present study, the Israeli Defense Forces is one of the most technologically
sophisticated and well-trained military organizations in the world, whereas
the Palestinians have no regular military at all, only an array of armed fac-
tions not under direct central governmental control. Indeed, it is precisely
this lack of central control and much lower technological sophistication on
the Palestinian side that probably explains why prior vector autoregression
analyses focusing on only killings did not detect the time-locked pattern of
Palestinian retaliation that we found in rocket ﬁrings.
Given the fact that Qassam attacks are almost completely ineﬀective in
killing Israelis, one might ask why Palestinians engage in ﬁring these rockets.
Several potential answers suggest themselves. One intuitive reason is that
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Palestinians use all means available to them to respond to Israeli attacks;
the military power of Palestinians is vastly inferior to that of Israel, and
Palestinians do not have access to many means other than rockets. (Of course
we do not claim that Palestinian retaliation occurs only through rockets or
the probability of Israeli fatalities; other forms of Palestinian retaliation may
well exist, but data on it may be more diﬃcult to obtain.) In addition, there
is some evidence that Israel increases its vigilance (e.g. by closing borders)
after it has killed Palestinians (8). This fact might make it even more diﬃcult
for Palestinians to retaliate, leading them to resort to rockets as the only
viable form of retaliation (28-30). Second, while Qassams are not particularly
eﬀective at killing Israelis, they do cause signiﬁcant psychological distress
among Israelis (while not incurring a military response from Israel, discussed
below), which is mirrored in the strong political and public response to the
rocket attacks in Israel (3, 7). A related possibility is that rocket attacks
are used by Palestinian factions (particular extremist ones) to solidify their
position and reputation among the population (31-33, 9). Finally, attacks
may be used to aﬀect political opinion in Israel (34-36), cause economic
damage to Israel (37-38), or more generally to derail the peace process (39-
40).
Conversely, another question that emerges from these results is why Israel
responds so strongly to killings of Israelis, but does not show a time-locked
response in terms of Palestinian fatalities to Qassam rockets over the period
under consideration. One possible explanation is that the Israeli Defense
Forces recognize that only a relatively small proportion of rocket attacks ac-
tually result in fatalities; this fact may reduce the IDF's motives to retaliate
against Qassams militarily. Alternatively, one might conjecture that Israel
responds to Qassam ﬁrings with less-than-lethal violence against Palestini-
ans; we do not have data available that would speak to this question, but
future analyses might ask whether Israel responds to Qassam ﬁrings by e.g.
imposing restrictions on freedom of movement on Palestinians.
An important caveat of the present study is that our analyses cannot
test causation directly; rather, they test whether the timeline of events ﬁts
the temporal proﬁle expected for retaliation, i.e. whether one event reli-
ably predicts the other event at a later time (41). Nonetheless, the most
straightforward interpretation of our results is that it is not only Israelis who
retaliate for killings of Israelis by killing Palestinians, but also Palestinians
who retaliate for killings of Palestinians by ﬁring rockets and by increasing
the probability of killing Israelis on any given day.
A related potential concern regarding our results is reverse causation. Our
data could, for instance, reﬂect killings of Palestinians by Israel in anticipa-
tion of rocket attacks, rather than Palestinian retaliation for previous killings
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of Palestinians by Israel. Three facts argue against this possibility. First, one
would expect that, if Israel kills Palestinians in anticipation of rocket attacks,
that these actions would lead to a decrease in rocket attacks following killings
of Palestinians by Israel, rather than the increase that is actually observed.
Second, if prevention of attacks was the main reason for Israeli attacks, one
would expect Israeli killings of Palestinians to occur not only before, but
also after rocket attacks; in fact, one might argue that killings of Palestini-
ans by Israel should increase particularly strongly following rocket attacks,
reﬂecting Israeli operations to shut down the cells that were responsible for
the attacks. However, we ﬁnd that killings of Palestinians by Israel actually
do not increase signiﬁcantly following rocket attacks. This ﬁnding suggests
that the killings of Palestinians by Israel preceding rocket attacks are usually
not preventative measures to suppress rocket attacks. Finally, the preced-
ing argument is strengthened by the IDF rules of engagement surrounding
Palestinian rocket attacks: according to (3), [s]oldiers are allowed to ﬁre
freely at rocket- and mortar-launching cells immediately before, during or
after a launch, and with permission from a senior oﬃcer, they can also ﬁre at
Palestinians trying to lay bombs within half a kilometer of the border fence.
Other than that, however, no oﬀensive operations are permitted. In other
words, it is likely that preventative attacks by Israel would be concentrated
on the day of the (attempted) rocket attacks, rather than occurring mainly
on the day prior. Since the data show that Israeli attacks in fact do occur
on the day preceding rocket attacks, we conclude that the rocket attacks are
a consequence, rather than a cause, of the Israeli attacks. These arguments
hold analogously for the increased probability of killings of Israelis by Pales-
tinians following Israeli attacks on Palestinians. Conversely, the argument
against reverse causality in the context of the Israeli response to Palestinian
attacks has been made by (8) and (10).
In sum, our analyses of the temporal dynamics of violence in the Second
Intifada show evidence both of Israeli retaliation for Palestinian violence,
and also Palestinian retaliation for Israeli violence. These ﬁndings suggest
that the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict is characterized by retaliatory dynamics
in both directions: both sides respond to killings by the other side in a time-
locked fashion; in the case of Israel, this response takes the form of killings of
Palestinians, whereas in the case of the Palestinians, it comes in the form of
(mostly nonlethal) Qassam attacks against Israel. In addition, Palestinians
appear to retaliate by increasing the probability of killing Israelis on any
given day. The implication of our results is that both sides are at least to
some extent correct when they claim that their aggression occurs in response
to previous aggression from the respective other party. To the extent that
both sides see themselves in a purely retaliatory role, our data suggest that
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in doing so they may under-appreciate the extent to which the violence of
the other side is contingent on their own. An increased awareness of this bias
may lead both sides to better understand their own role in perpetuating the
conﬂict, and thus contribute to its resolution (27).
9.5 Materials & Methods
Daily counts of Israeli and Palestinian fatalities were obtained from Bt'Selem
(www.btselem.org); daily counts of Qassam attacks from the Israeli Defense
Forces.
Following (8), we deﬁned the Israeli response function as
IsrRFt =
(∑
s:Is>0
Is∑
s:Is>0
1
)−1(∑
s:Is−t>0 Ps∑
s:Is−t>0 1
−
∑
s Ps
T
)
and the Palestinian reaction function as
PalRFt =
(∑
s:Ps>0
Ps∑
s:Ps>0
1
)−1(∑
s:Is−t>0 Is∑
s:Is−t>0 1
−
∑
s Is
T
)
.
Here, Is and Ps denote the number of attacks against Israelis and Palestinians
on day s, respectively; attacks against Israelis can either be Israeli fatalities
or Qassam ﬁrings.
To prepare the Vector Autoregression, we ﬁrst used Schwarz's Bayesian
Information Criterion to choose the most appropriate autoregressive order for
each of the three variables; the optimal number of lags was 5 for Palestinian
fatalities, 4 for Israeli fatalities, and 22 for Qassam rocket ﬁrings (see Supp.
Information, Supp. Table 1). We then ascertained that the timeseries were
stationary using an augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (see Supp. Information,
Supp. Table 2). Next we considered two alternative VAR models, namely
ordinary least squares (OLS) and negative binomial (NB) models. Leave-one-
out crossvalidation showed that OLS made better out-of-sample predictions
than NB; we therefore based our analyses on OLS (Supp. Table 3).
Thus, we ﬁt the following system of equations:
It = αI +
LI∑
s=1
βI,sIt−s +
LP∑
r=1
γI,rPt−r + εI,t
Pt = αP +
LP∑
r=1
βP,rPt−r +
LI∑
s=1
γI,sIt−s + εP,t.
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Here, It and Pt again denote attacks against Israelis and Palestinians on
day t, respectively; LI and LP is the optimal number of lags on attacks against
Israelis and Palestinians, respectively, determined by information criteria;
αI,t and αP,t are the constant terms, and εI,t and εP,t the error terms.
To test whether past attacks on Palestinians predict current attacks against
Israelis, we asked whether the LI elements of the coeﬃcient vector γI are
jointly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero by computing their F-statistic. Con-
versely, to test whether past attacks on Israelis predict current attacks against
Palestinians, we asked whether the LP elements of the coeﬃcient vector γP
are jointly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Further details are given in Supporting Information online.
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9.6 Supplementary Information
9.6.1 Data
We obtained data on Israeli and Palestinian fatalities from the human rights
organization Bt'selem (www.btselem.org), which is widely respected on both
sides of the conﬂict for providing accurate and reliable data. In addition, we
obtained data on Qassam ﬁrings from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). In this
paper we consider three variables. The ﬁrst is the daily count of Palestinian
deaths resulting from Israeli attacks. The remaining two are two diﬀerent
measures of Palestinian aggression against Israel: ﬁrst, the daily count of
Israeli deaths resulting from Palestinian attacks; second, the daily count of
Qassam rockets ﬁred from Palestinian into Israeli territory (irrespective of
whether anyone died as a result).
Our data cover the period from September 29, 2000 until October 29,
2008 for fatalities, and the period from January 1, 2001 to April 16, 2008 for
Qassam ﬁrings. All results reported here continue to hold when the fatality
data are restricted to the time period available for the Qassams.
We consider the data in two forms: the levels data contains the daily
count of Israeli and Palestinian attacks, while the incidence data is a dummy
variable which takes the value one on days where at least one attack occurred,
and 0 otherwise.
9.6.2 Autoregressive order selection
To test whether Israeli aggression caused Palestinian retaliation and vice-
versa, we conducted a series of vector autoregressions (VAR). This technique
regresses current Israeli and Palestinian fatalities on previous Israeli and
Palestinian fatalities, up to a pre-speciﬁed lag.
In a ﬁrst step, we used an information criterion approach to choose the
most appropriate autoregressive order for each VAR process. Lütkepohl (1)
showed that Schwarz's Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC; 2) performed
better than Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC; 3-5) in choosing the correct
autoregressive order; indeed, SBIC is consistent estimate of the correct lag
order (6). We therefore chose the lag structures based on SBIC.
Columns 1-3 in Suppl. Table 9.6.1 reports the SBIC values for the three
variables of Israeli and Palestinian aggression. The SBIC values are min-
imized at lags 5, 4, and 22 for Palestinian fatalities, Israeli fatalities, and
Qassam ﬁrings, respectively, suggesting that these lags may be the most
appropriate ones.
However, note that the diﬀerence in information criteria values is small;
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under these conditions, a straightforward model choice is not possible (6-
7). Therefore we computed Schwarz weights, which have a more intuitive
interpretation as the probability of the particular lag order being the optimal
one (7). As can be seen in Suppl. Table 9.6.1, columns 4-6, the Schwarz
weights for best lags identiﬁed above were 0.87, 0.71, and 0.70 for Palestinian
fatalities, Israeli fatalities, and Qassam ﬁrings, respectively; in addition, the
ratios of the probabilities for these lags compared to the next-best lags within
each variable were 11.84, 6.99, and 3.45, respectively. Together, these results
suggest that the lags identiﬁed using SBIC have a high probability of being
the optimal ones.
9.6.3 Timeseries order of integration
VAR requires all variables to be of the same order of intergration. We there-
fore tested for the presence of a unit root using the augmented Dickey-Fuller
Test (8). The absence of a unit root implies stationarity of the time series
and integration of order 0, and therefore justiﬁes using VAR on the data.
The null hypothesis of the Dickey-Fuller test is the presence of a unit root;
a large negative value rejects this hypothesis. We performed the test using
the autoregressive orders determined with information criteria, both with and
without lag and drift terms. The results are shown in Suppl. Table 9.6.2.
The null hypothesis was rejected in all cases, suggesting that the timeseries
are stationary and a VAR approach is justiﬁed.
9.6.4 Model selection
Next we considered two alternative VAR models, namely ordinary least
squares (OLS) and negative binomial (NB) models. The former has been
employed in previous papers using this data (9-11); however, from a theo-
retical point of view negative binomial models are more appropriate in this
context since they take into account the count nature of the data. (Note also
that negative binomial models are preferable to another group of count data
models in this context, namely Poisson models, since the data are overdis-
persed, cf. Table 9.3.1.)
To choose between these alternative models, a selection criterion approach
is not feasible because the two models are too diﬀerent from each other
(6). We therefore used a cross-validation approach: for each of the levels
regression models described in the Results section, we omitted a single day
from the dataset and ﬁt the model to the remainder of the data. We then
generated a prediction for the number of Israeli and Palestinian attacks on
the left-out day, and computed the mean squared prediction error:
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SBIC Schwarz weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Palestinian Israeli Qassam Palestinian Israeli Qassam
Lag fatalities fatalities attacks fatalities fatalities attacks
0 5.35252 3.85969 5.49496 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1 5.26646 3.85015 4.95958 0.0000 0.0561 0.0000
2 5.22253 3.85035 4.92645 0.0000 0.0419 0.0000
3 5.20365 3.84974 4.91772 0.0737 0.1022 0.0263
4 5.20465 3.84841* 4.91993 0.0171 0.7146 0.0014
5 5.20196* 3.84994 4.92232 0.8723 0.0763 0.0001
6 5.20419 3.85159 4.91918 0.0334 0.0068 0.0038
7 5.20575 3.85238 4.91861 0.0034 0.0022 0.0081
8 5.20847 3.85487 4.9216 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
9 5.21045 3.85576 4.92452 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
10 5.21315 3.85616 4.92483 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
11 5.2141 3.85753 4.91769 0.0000 0.0000 0.0273
12 5.21671 3.85974 4.91811 0.0000 0.0000 0.0157
13 5.21819 3.85582 4.92079 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005
14 5.21898 3.85749 4.92189 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
15 5.22135 3.86 4.92484 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
16 5.22386 3.8627 4.92644 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
17 5.22658 3.86542 4.9292 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
18 5.2293 3.86579 4.93207 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
19 5.2316 3.86837 4.92297 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
20 5.22733 3.87038 4.92096 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004
21 5.22749 3.86948 4.91617 0.0000 0.0000 0.2023
22 5.23017 3.872 4.91523* 0.0000 0.0000 0.6980
23 5.22568 3.8747 4.91822 0.0000 0.0000 0.0136
24 5.2284 3.87548 4.9197 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019
25 5.22791 3.87171 4.9211 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003
26 5.23005 3.87397 4.92398 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
27 5.23127 3.87614 4.92629 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
28 5.23139 3.87709 4.92924 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
n 2925 2925 2635 2925 2925 2635
Table 9.6.1: Lag order selection statistics. Columns 1-3 report Schwarz's
Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) values for the three variables of Is-
raeli and Palestinian violence. Columns 4-6 report Schwarz weights for the
same variables. See Methods for the description and interpretation of these
measures.
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(1) (2) (3)
Test speciﬁcation Test statistic Palestinian fatalities Israeli fatalities Qassam attacks
Basic Z -15.1096 -20.4431 -5.1241
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
With trend Z -15.2863 -21.6778 -6.5658
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
With drift Z -15.1096 -20.4431 -5.1241
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 9.6.2: Dickey-Fuller Test. This table reports the results of the aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test for the three timeseries of interest. The trend
speciﬁcation includes a trend term in the associated regression, and assumes
that the process under the null hypothesis is a random walk (possibly with
drift). The drift specifciation assumes that the process under the null hy-
pothesis is a random walk with nonzero drift. Signiﬁcantly negative test
statistics are evidence for stationarity.
The results are shown in Suppl. Table 9.6.3. For all variables, the predic-
tion errors obtained with the OLS model were smaller than those obtained
with the NB model. We therefore based our analyses on OLS. (Note that
this ﬁnding also suggests that the OLS approach used by Jaeger & Paserman
(9-10) and Jaeger et al. (11) was probably appropriate.)
9.6.5 Magnitude estimations
To estimate the magnitude of the VAR results, we proceeded as follows. First,
the percentage increase in the expected number or probability of attacks on
the day after a single attack from the other side was computed by comparing
the excess number of attacks on a day after an attack from the other side to
the average number of attacks on a given day. For instance, on the ﬁrst day
after a killing of Palestinians by Israelis, an extra 0.08 Qassam rockets are
ﬁred, which corresponds to a 6% increase over the 1.37 average daily rockets.
Second, to estimate what percentage of all attacks can be accounted for by
retaliation, we computed the number of attacks that were due to retaliation
by multiplying the total number of attacks from the respective other side
with the excess attacks due to retaliation that resulted from these attacks.
For instance, Israeli attacks caused 4478 Palestinian fatalities, each of which
led to the ﬁring of an extra 0.08 Qassam rockets, or 358 rockets in total.
This corresponds to 10% of the 3645 rockets that were ﬁred altogether. (To
obtain a conservative estimate and to avoid bias from diﬀerent lag structures
we restricted ourselves to retaliation on the ﬁrst day after an attack. In
addition, we restricted the estimation period to that for which Qassam data
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Model speciﬁcation Measure of Palestinian violence
OLS Israeli fatalities Qassam attacks
MSE for prediction of attacks on Israel 2.7132 8.3462
MSE for prediction of attacks on Palestinians 10.6977 12.0430
Negative binomial Israeli fatalities Qassam attacks
MSE for prediction of attacks on Israel 3.9297 135700000.0000
MSE for prediction of attacks on Palestinians 3329.1307 5045.0877
Table 9.6.3: Model selection through cross-validation. This table reports
the mean squared prediction errors (MSE) obtained from cross-validation.
For each of the levels regression models described in the Results section, we
omitted a single day from the dataset and ﬁt the model to the remainder
of the data. We then generated a prediction for the number of Israeli and
Palestinian attacks on the left-out day, and computed the mean squared
prediction error. Smaller mean prediction errors are taken as evidence for
superiority of the associated model speciﬁcation.
are available.)
9.6. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 255
Levels Incidence
DV: Attacks on Israel DV: Attacks on Palestinians DV: Attacks on Israel DV: Attacks on Palestinians
Measure of Qassam Israeli Qassam Israeli Qassam Israeli Qassam Israeli
Palestinian aggression attacks fatalities attacks fatalities attacks fatalities attacks fatalities
L1is 0.446 0.092 0.027 0.156 0.172 0.082 0.018 0.099
[0.000]*** [0.005]*** [0.549] [0.056]* [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.494] [0.000]***
L2is 0.134 0.032 0.057 0.08 0.113 0.068 0.005 0.044
[0.044]** [0.160] [0.463] [0.113] [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.842] [0.108]
L3is 0.121 0.041 0.098 0.106 0.111 0.062 -0.024 0.051
[0.069]* [0.054]* [0.327] [0.025]** [0.000]*** [0.006]*** [0.370] [0.065]*
L4is -0.059 0.054 -0.119 0.077 0.051 0.048 0.017 0.083
[0.276] [0.232] [0.137] [0.396] [0.032]** [0.027]** [0.524] [0.002]***
L5is -0.021 -0.041 0.069 -0.009
[0.586] [0.239] [0.004]*** [0.739]
L6is 0.051 -0.021 0.04 -0.011
[0.211] [0.518] [0.091]* [0.676]
L7is 0.047 0.008 0.075 0.048
[0.228] [0.788] [0.002]*** [0.075]*
L8is -0.03 -0.007 0.014 -0.056
[0.490] [0.815] [0.550] [0.036]**
L9is -0.04 -0.026 0.006 0.026
[0.305] [0.330] [0.800] [0.342]
L10is -0.007 0.028 0.044 0.013
[0.834] [0.261] [0.061]* [0.633]
L11is 0.063 -0.016 0.035 0.022
[0.130] [0.525] [0.141] [0.421]
L12is 0.035 0.027 0.028 -0.008
[0.532] [0.356] [0.226] [0.767]
L13is -0.002 -0.041 0.011 0
[0.974] [0.084]* [0.648] [0.990]
L14is 0.05 0.097 0.055 -0.023
[0.323] [0.008]*** [0.022]** [0.389]
L15is 0.005 -0.073 -0.012 0.047
[0.914] [0.102] [0.603] [0.081]*
L16is -0.052 0.018 0.035 -0.061
[0.197] [0.521] [0.123] [0.024]**
L17is -0.005 -0.051 -0.016 -0.043
[0.902] [0.021]** [0.468] [0.111]
L18is -0.057 -0.009 0.012 -0.023
[0.092]* [0.676] [0.603] [0.379]
L19is 0.057 0.03 0.026 0.039
[0.410] [0.382] [0.252] [0.142]
L20is 0.017 0.04 0.019 -0.012
[0.750] [0.333] [0.413] [0.642]
L21is 0.054 -0.036 0.008 -0.009
[0.207] [0.345] [0.727] [0.727]
L22is 0.067 0.053 0.021 0.025
[0.215] [0.425] [0.341] [0.339]
L1pa 0.08 0.011 0.183 0.172 0.038 0.012 0.129 0.124
[0.001]*** [0.332] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.010]*** [0.343] [0.000]*** [0.000]***
L2pa 0.013 0.01 0.146 0.153 0.01 0.028 0.107 0.103
[0.595] [0.483] [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.516] [0.020]** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
L3pa -0.041 0.005 0.109 0.115 0.005 0.027 0.045 0.039
[0.048]** [0.612] [0.247] [0.151] [0.739] [0.026]** [0.025]** [0.041]**
L4pa -0.02 -0.004 0.038 0.025 -0.01 0.003 0.103 0.088
[0.353] [0.634] [0.254] [0.436] [0.494] [0.799] [0.000]*** [0.000]***
L5pa -0.007 0.043 0.091 0.069 -0.03 0.051 0.096 0.099
[0.666] [0.086]* [0.003]*** [0.019]** [0.037]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Constant 0.136 0.173 0.679 0.611 0.025 0.026 0.27 0.239
[0.055]* [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.101] [0.005]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Observations 2641 2948 2641 2948 2641 2948 2641 2948
R-squared 0.481 0.033 0.175 0.164 0.434 0.048 0.088 0.102
Table 9.6.4: Full regression table for basic speciﬁcation. All regressions are
OLS models and are estimated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors. Robust p values are shown in brackets. We denote signiﬁcance at
10% with *, signiﬁcance at 5% with **, and signiﬁcance at 1% with ***.
The dependent variable are attacks by Palestinians on Israel (columns 1 and
2), and attacks by Israel on Palestinians (columns 3 and 4). The right-hand
side variables are the number or incidence of Israeli and Palestinian attacks
at lags ranging from 4 to 22 (see Methods for choice of lag structure). Lagged
variables are expressed as L#is and L#pa, respectively, where # is the lag
order. For both the dependent and independent variables, columns 1 and 3
use Qassam ﬁrings as a measure of Palestinian aggression, while columns 2
and 4 use Israeli fatalities as a measure of Palestinian aggression.
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Levels Incidence
DV: Attacks on Israel DV: Attacks on Palestinians DV: Attacks on Israel DV: Attacks on Palestinians
Measure of Qassam Israeli Qassam Israeli Qassam Israeli Qassam Israeli
Palestinian aggression attacks fatalities attacks fatalities attacks fatalities attacks fatalities
pa 0.168 0.032 0.25 0.122 0.031 0.068 0.054 0.153
[0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.004]*** [0.006]*** [0.040]** [0.000]*** [0.040]** [0.000]***
L1is 0.442 0.087 -0.084 0.145 0.171 0.075 0.009 0.087
[0.000]*** [0.008]*** [0.185] [0.077]* [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.747] [0.001]***
L2is 0.124 0.03 0.023 0.076 0.112 0.065 -0.001 0.034
[0.030]** [0.179] [0.689] [0.121] [0.000]*** [0.004]*** [0.974] [0.215]
L3is 0.104 0.038 0.068 0.101 0.111 0.059 -0.03 0.041
[0.040]** [0.072]* [0.390] [0.033]** [0.000]*** [0.008]*** [0.264] [0.132]
L4is -0.039 0.051 -0.104 0.071 0.05 0.043 0.014 0.076
[0.351] [0.251] [0.116] [0.431] [0.033]** [0.050]** [0.594] [0.005]***
L5is -0.014 -0.036 0.069 -0.013
[0.699] [0.254] [0.004]*** [0.637]
L6is 0.055 -0.034 0.04 -0.013
[0.162] [0.248] [0.088]* [0.618]
L7is 0.045 -0.004 0.074 0.044
[0.229] [0.892] [0.002]*** [0.104]
L8is -0.028 0 0.016 -0.057
[0.498] [0.998] [0.502] [0.033]**
L9is -0.035 -0.016 0.005 0.025
[0.348] [0.511] [0.826] [0.348]
L10is -0.012 0.03 0.044 0.01
[0.714] [0.197] [0.063]* [0.700]
L11is 0.066 -0.032 0.035 0.02
[0.108] [0.229] [0.149] [0.464]
L12is 0.031 0.018 0.028 -0.009
[0.581] [0.523] [0.222] [0.725]
L13is 0.005 -0.04 0.011 -0.001
[0.924] [0.096]* [0.648] [0.972]
L14is 0.033 0.085 0.055 -0.026
[0.489] [0.009]*** [0.020]** [0.330]
L15is 0.018 -0.075 -0.013 0.048
[0.704] [0.080]* [0.561] [0.078]*
L16is -0.054 0.031 0.037 -0.063
[0.170] [0.314] [0.105] [0.020]**
L17is 0.004 -0.05 -0.015 -0.042
[0.928] [0.027]** [0.505] [0.118]
L18is -0.055 0.005 0.013 -0.024
[0.088]* [0.827] [0.581] [0.365]
L19is 0.052 0.016 0.025 0.038
[0.438] [0.627] [0.275] [0.157]
L20is 0.01 0.036 0.02 -0.013
[0.835] [0.306] [0.404] [0.614]
L21is 0.06 -0.049 0.008 -0.01
[0.140] [0.188] [0.718] [0.715]
L22is 0.058 0.036 0.02 0.024
[0.202] [0.488] [0.358] [0.361]
L1pa 0.049 0.005 0.163 0.17 0.034 0.003 0.127 0.122
[0.073]* [0.638] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.021]** [0.792] [0.000]*** [0.000]***
L2pa -0.012 0.005 0.143 0.152 0.006 0.021 0.107 0.098
[0.565] [0.720] [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.674] [0.081]* [0.000]*** [0.000]***
L3pa -0.06 0.001 0.119 0.115 0.004 0.025 0.044 0.035
[0.013]** [0.877] [0.199] [0.150] [0.811] [0.043]** [0.026]** [0.067]*
L4pa -0.026 -0.005 0.042 0.025 -0.013 -0.003 0.104 0.088
[0.220] [0.578] [0.181] [0.428] [0.371] [0.823] [0.000]*** [0.000]***
L5pa -0.022 0.041 0.093 0.064 -0.033 0.045 0.098 0.091
[0.175] [0.108] [0.002]*** [0.037]** [0.024]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Constant 0.021 0.154 0.645 0.589 0.016 0.01 0.269 0.235
[0.803] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.283] [0.268] [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Observations 2641 2948 2641 2948 2641 2948 2641 2948
R-squared 0.503 0.037 0.21 0.167 0.435 0.058 0.089 0.112
Table 9.6.5: Full regression table, controlling for same-day events. All re-
gressions are as described for Table 9.6.4, except a control variable is added
for attacks taking place on the same day.
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Levels Incidence
DV: Attacks on Israel DV: Attacks on Palestinians DV: Attacks on Israel DV: Attacks on Palestinians
Measure of Qassam Israeli Qassam Israeli Qassam Israeli Qassam Israeli
Palestinian aggression attacks fatalities attacks fatalities attacks fatalities attacks fatalities
L1is 0.162 0.013 0.048 0.087 0.147 0.066 0.039 0.154
[0.003]*** [0.407] [0.127] [0.097]* [0.000]*** [0.079]* [0.263] [0.002]***
L2is 0.123 0.014 0.005 0.014 0.113 0.061 0.008 0.03
[0.009]*** [0.385] [0.877] [0.698] [0.000]*** [0.012]** [0.784] [0.339]
L3is 0.072 0.045 -0.026 0.082 0.13 0.041 -0.041 0.04
[0.031]** [0.056]* [0.535] [0.064]* [0.000]*** [0.077]* [0.170] [0.189]
L4is 0.025 -0.004 0.008 -0.047 0.045 0.031 0.002 0.082
[0.434] [0.687] [0.767] [0.081]* [0.087]* [0.165] [0.938] [0.006]***
L5is -0.008 -0.058 0.07 -0.005
[0.786] [0.038]** [0.008]*** [0.880]
L6is 0.099 0.016 0.006 -0.039
[0.076]* [0.600] [0.811] [0.202]
L7is -0.031 0 0.088 0.052
[0.374] [0.993] [0.001]*** [0.094]*
L8is 0.055 -0.03 0.03 -0.063
[0.283] [0.226] [0.255] [0.038]**
L9is -0.012 -0.023 0.023 0.04
[0.770] [0.337] [0.395] [0.186]
L10is -0.044 0.025 0.043 0.024
[0.225] [0.274] [0.096]* [0.427]
L11is 0.046 0.025 0.048 0.029
[0.169] [0.164] [0.077]* [0.342]
L12is 0.045 -0.011 0.008 0
[0.426] [0.596] [0.759] [0.997]
L13is -0.011 -0.027 0.031 -0.01
[0.863] [0.206] [0.243] [0.754]
L14is 0.033 0.025 0.056 -0.023
[0.518] [0.275] [0.034]** [0.448]
L15is 0.108 0.001 -0.021 0.039
[0.065]* [0.965] [0.408] [0.204]
L16is -0.074 0.008 0.022 -0.056
[0.138] [0.798] [0.368] [0.066]*
L17is 0.012 -0.001 -0.015 -0.049
[0.672] [0.958] [0.562] [0.105]
L18is 0.003 -0.021 0.007 -0.024
[0.906] [0.355] [0.797] [0.424]
L19is -0.016 -0.007 0.043 0.044
[0.525] [0.760] [0.103] [0.149]
L20is 0.036 0.04 0.028 -0.018
[0.429] [0.214] [0.283] [0.544]
L21is 0.047 0.035 -0.001 -0.02
[0.160] [0.395] [0.951] [0.507]
L22is 0.002 -0.047 0.023 0.03
[0.950] [0.052]* [0.363] [0.313]
L1pa 0.007 0.002 0.198 0.167 0.033 0.012 0.128 0.134
[0.470] [0.874] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.048]** [0.320] [0.000]*** [0.000]***
L2pa 0.017 0 0.114 0.168 0.014 0.025 0.114 0.095
[0.126] [0.980] [0.000]*** [0.006]*** [0.358] [0.040]** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
L3pa -0.013 0.005 0.187 0.028 0.004 0.024 0.035 0.039
[0.291] [0.556] [0.171] [0.368] [0.784] [0.057]* [0.116] [0.048]**
L4pa -0.01 0.004 0.036 0.049 -0.008 0.004 0.097 0.082
[0.507] [0.593] [0.414] [0.108] [0.591] [0.752] [0.000]*** [0.000]***
L5pa -0.01 0.027 0.073 0.104 -0.042 0.05 0.104 0.102
[0.518] [0.236] [0.017]** [0.003]*** [0.006]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Constant 0.235 0.228 0.678 0.683 0.025 0.034 0.279 0.242
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.131] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Observations 2157 2702 2157 2702 2157 2702 2157 2702
R-squared 0.283 0.007 0.169 0.121 0.391 0.028 0.088 0.085
Table 9.6.6: Full regression table, omitting mutual events at t-1. All regres-
sions are as described for Table 9.6.4, except that events at t-1 are omitted
from the analysis.
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Levels Incidence
DV: Attacks on Israel DV: Attacks on Palestinians DV: Attacks on Israel DV: Attacks on Palestinians
Measure of Qassam Israeli Qassam Israeli Qassam Israeli Qassam Israeli
Palestinian aggression attacks fatalities attacks fatalities attacks fatalities attacks fatalities
L1is 0.427 0.064 0.034 0.152 0.148 0.04 0.042 0.078
[0.000]*** [0.051]* [0.453] [0.066]* [0.000]*** [0.080]* [0.112] [0.005]***
L2is 0.121 0.006 0.061 0.077 0.092 0.028 0.027 0.026
[0.072]* [0.810] [0.433] [0.126] [0.000]*** [0.221] [0.302] [0.358]
L3is 0.109 0.015 0.104 0.103 0.092 0.022 -0.004 0.031
[0.106] [0.460] [0.304] [0.030]** [0.000]*** [0.322] [0.865] [0.265]
L4is -0.07 0.026 -0.113 0.075 0.035 0.008 0.034 0.064
[0.200] [0.571] [0.151] [0.412] [0.136] [0.717] [0.204] [0.019]**
L5is -0.03 -0.037 0.055 0.005
[0.439] [0.293] [0.021]** [0.857]
L6is 0.043 -0.02 0.028 -0.001
[0.283] [0.544] [0.227] [0.977]
L7is 0.039 0.009 0.064 0.057
[0.318] [0.763] [0.007]*** [0.032]**
L8is -0.036 -0.007 0.005 -0.048
[0.387] [0.833] [0.839] [0.068]*
L9is -0.046 -0.027 -0.004 0.034
[0.238] [0.308] [0.881] [0.206]
L10is -0.014 0.028 0.034 0.021
[0.670] [0.272] [0.143] [0.423]
L11is 0.055 -0.016 0.026 0.031
[0.180] [0.532] [0.278] [0.245]
L12is 0.026 0.027 0.017 0.003
[0.649] [0.361] [0.442] [0.924]
L13is -0.01 -0.04 0.001 0.009
[0.856] [0.086]* [0.963] [0.738]
L14is 0.042 0.097 0.044 -0.012
[0.404] [0.009]*** [0.063]* [0.649]
L15is -0.001 -0.072 -0.021 0.057
[0.982] [0.105] [0.358] [0.032]**
L16is -0.058 0.017 0.024 -0.049
[0.143] [0.524] [0.288] [0.068]*
L17is -0.014 -0.051 -0.027 -0.034
[0.731] [0.021]** [0.231] [0.194]
L18is -0.064 -0.009 0 -0.014
[0.059]* [0.682] [0.994] [0.587]
L19is 0.05 0.031 0.015 0.047
[0.465] [0.373] [0.517] [0.072]*
L20is 0.007 0.04 0.006 0
[0.898] [0.331] [0.802] [0.986]
L21is 0.041 -0.034 -0.006 0.002
[0.319] [0.344] [0.783] [0.937]
L22is 0.05 0.054 0.004 0.04
[0.359] [0.425] [0.863] [0.126]
L1pa 0.086 0.01 0.169 0.165 0.05 0.003 0.09 0.1
[0.001]*** [0.362] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.831] [0.000]*** [0.000]***
L2pa 0.02 0.009 0.134 0.147 0.023 0.019 0.068 0.08
[0.392] [0.534] [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.120] [0.118] [0.001]*** [0.000]***
L3pa -0.034 0.003 0.097 0.109 0.018 0.019 0.007 0.017
[0.102] [0.731] [0.307] [0.175] [0.208] [0.121] [0.713] [0.358]
L4pa -0.012 -0.007 0.026 0.018 0.004 -0.007 0.064 0.065
[0.567] [0.409] [0.442] [0.553] [0.766] [0.595] [0.001]*** [0.001]***
L5pa 0 0.039 0.078 0.061 -0.015 0.039 0.056 0.074
[0.985] [0.127] [0.011]** [0.034]** [0.296] [0.002]*** [0.005]*** [0.000]***
year==2002 -0.066 0.659 0.729 -0.145 0.005 0.048 0.12 -0.015
[0.164] [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.675] [0.726] [0.350] [0.001]*** [0.764]
year==2003 0.184 0.154 0.083 -0.496 0.071 -0.075 -0.032 -0.097
[0.096]* [0.324] [0.638] [0.120] [0.001]*** [0.127] [0.403] [0.069]*
year==2004 0.201 -0.068 0.419 -0.065 0.124 -0.114 -0.018 -0.042
[0.017]** [0.562] [0.057]* [0.847] [0.000]*** [0.017]** [0.671] [0.426]
year==2005 0.204 -0.116 -0.461 -0.898 0.086 -0.124 -0.234 -0.264
[0.071]* [0.304] [0.004]*** [0.008]*** [0.000]*** [0.011]** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
year==2006 0.923 -0.251 0.023 -0.21 0.263 -0.165 -0.189 -0.11
[0.000]*** [0.012]** [0.938] [0.555] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.044]**
year==2007 0.971 -0.231 -0.354 -0.586 0.283 -0.159 -0.296 -0.199
[0.000]*** [0.026]** [0.249] [0.079]* [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
year==2008 2.599 -0.197 0.283 -0.416 0.311 -0.143 -0.208 -0.204
[0.006]*** [0.067]* [0.662] [0.328] [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.005]*** [0.000]***
Constant -0.077 0.208 0.666 1.092 -0.04 0.159 0.375 0.433
[0.060]* [0.071]* [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.011]** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Observations 2641 2948 2641 2948 2641 2948 2641 2948
R-squared 0.49 0.059 0.185 0.169 0.447 0.086 0.12 0.122
Table 9.6.7: Full regression table, including year dummies. All regressions
are as described for Table 9.6.4, except that the specﬁcations reported here
include year dummies to allow for time trends.
Bibliography
[1] Lütkepohl, H. (1985). Comparison of Criteria for estimating the Order
of a Vector Autoregressive Process. Journal of Time Series Analysis, 6,
35-36, 47, 50.
[2] Schwarz, G.E. (1978). Estimating the dimension of a model. Annals of
Statistics, 6, 461464.
[3] Akaike, H. (1973). Information theory and an extension of the maxi-
mum likelihood principle. In B. N. Petrov & F. Caski (Eds.), Proceed-
ings of the Second International Symposium on Information Theory.
Budapest: Akademiai Kiado.
[4] Akaike, H. (1974). A new look at the statistical model identiﬁcation.
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 19, 716-723.
[5] Akaike, H. (1978). On the likelihood of a time series model. The Statis-
tician, 27, 217-235.
[6] Burnham, K.P., & Anderson, D.R. (2002). Model selection and multi-
model inference: a practical information-theoretic approach. 2nd Edi-
tion. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.
[7] Wagenmakers, E.J., & Farrell, S. (2004). AIC model selection using
Akaike weights. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11, 192-196.
[8] Elliott, G., Rothenberg, T.J., & Stock, J.H. (1996). Eﬃcient Tests for
an Autoregressive Unit Root. Econometrica, 64, 813836.
[9] Jaeger, D.A., & Paserman, M.D. (2006). Israel, the Palestinian Fac-
tions, and the Cycle of Violence. American Economic Review, 96,
4549.
[10] Jaeger, D.A., & Paserman, M.D. (2008). The Cycle of Violence?
An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conﬂict.
American Economic Review, 98, 15911604.
259
BIBLIOGRAPHY 260
[11] Jaeger, D.A., Klor, E.F., Miaari, S., & Paserman, M.D. (2009). The
Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds: Violence and Public Opin-
ion in the Second Intifada. Boston University Working Paper.
Chapter 10
The lifespans of winners and
runners-up in U.S. presidential
elections do not diﬀer
10.1 Introduction
The eﬀect of holding a high-stress oﬃce such as that of U.S. President has
been suggested to aﬀect health outcomes such as expected lifespan. However,
in seeming opposition to this popular belief, it has recently been shown that
U.S. Presidents in fact live longer than average males of the same birth cohort,
conditional on having survived until the age of ﬁrst inauguration (Olshansky,
2011). However, comparing the lifespans of U.S. Presidents to average males
of the same birth cohort neglects the fact that presidents are highly untypical:
they are richer, better educated, and more urbanized than the typical male.
These factors typically increase lifespan, and thus comparing presidents to
average males is likely to result in an underestimate of the eﬀect of holding
oﬃce on lifespan. Here we control for this selection by comparing the winners
and runner-ups of U.S. presidential elections from 1792 until the present.
These groups are similar in the socioeconomic variables mentioned above,
but diﬀer in whether they have served as president. We ﬁnd that winning
an election, the number of elections won or participated in, the success rate
in winning elections, the number of days spent in oﬃce, or ever serving
as president, do not aﬀect expected lifespan compared to runners-up. We
observe a weak positive eﬀect of survived assassination attempts on lifespan.
Together, these results suggest that presidents' lifespan is not aﬀected by
holding oﬃce.
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10.2 Methods
We obtained the birth and death dates of all U.S. presidents and the runners-
up in the electoral college from 1792 until present (variables dob and dob in
Table 1, respectively), and used these dates to calculate the lifespan of each
president and runner-up (dayslived). We further computed the number of
days spent in oﬃce (daysoﬃce), the number of elections won (numwins),
the number of elections participated in (numelect), an indicator variable for
whether a candidate ever won an election (everwon), the success rate at
winning elections, deﬁned as the ratio of number of elections won to num-
ber of elections participated in (successrate); further, an indicator variable
for whether a candidate ever served as president (everpres ; note that this
variable diﬀers from everwon since some vice-presidents took oﬃce after the
death of the president and thus were not elected), and an indicator variable
for whether a candidate was ever the victim of an unsuccessful assassina-
tion attempt (assass_attempt). Presidents who were victims of successful
assassination attempts were excluded from the analysis, as were presidents
who are still alive today and for whom lifespan can therefore not be calcu-
lated. We then compared the average lifespan of presidents and runners-up,
and assessed the signiﬁcance of any diﬀerences using OLS regressions, where
daysalive was the dependent variable and the election outcome variables de-
scribed above were explanatory variables. Date of birth was always included
as a control variable to account for general changes in life expectancy over
time.
10.3 Results
Figure 10.3.1 presents a scatterplot comparing the lifespan of runners-up to
that of the winners of U.S. presidential elections. The diagonal line repre-
sents equal lifespans for the runner-up and the winner; data points below
the line indicate that the runner-up lived longer than the winner, while data
points above the line indicate the opposite relationship. Of the 50 elections in
which neither the winner nor the runner-up were later assassinated, we found
that the runner-up outlived the winner in 29 cases, while the winner lived
longer in the remaining 21 cases. A binomial test of this observed proportion
against a theoretically predicted proportion of 0.5 resulted in a result of P =
0.3222 (two-sided binomial test), suggesting that winners of presidential elec-
tions live somewhat less long than runners-up, but not signiﬁcantly so. This
result was conﬁrmed by a series of OLS regressions, with daysalive as the
dependent variable and daysoﬃce, numwins, numelect, everwon, successrate,
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Figure 10.3.1: Relationship between lifespan of runner-up (x-axis) and winner
(y-axis) of each U.S. presidential election from 1792 until present. The 45
degree line represents equal lifespans for winner and runner-up; data points
above this line indicate that the winner lived longer than the runner-up, data
points below the line indicate the opposite. The labels on the data points
indicate the year of the election. Data for presidents who were assassinated
or are still alive is not shown.
everpres, assass_attempt, and dob as independent variables. The results are
shown in Table 10.3.1: we found that none of the election outcome vari-
ables signiﬁcantly predicted lifespan. Surprisingly, the eﬀect of unsuccessful
assassination attempts on lifespan was positive and near signiﬁcance at the
P = 0.05 level; however, this result is potentially confounded by the possi-
bility that healthier presidents may be more likely to survive assassination
attempts. Together, these results suggest that winners of U.S. presidential
elections do not live longer or shorter than runners-up.
10.4 Discussion
The purpose of this study was to assess the eﬀect of winning an election and
serving as U.S. President on lifespan. Popular belief maintains that holding
the stressful oﬃce of U.S. President should decrease lifespan, while a recent
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study has suggested that presidents may live longer than average males. We
control for the selection bias which aicts a straight comparison of presidents
to the average population by instead comparing winners to runners-up in U.S.
presidential elections. These two groups diﬀer largely in terms of whether
they ever held oﬃce as U.S. president, and can thus be compared to identify
the eﬀect of holding the oﬃce of president on lifespan. This analysis reveals
that, while election winners tend to die earlier than runners-up, holding oﬃce
has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on lifespan. Thus, the stress associated
with holding the oﬃce of U.S. President is either not severe enough to result
in detectable diﬀerences in lifespan, or it is outweighed by a winner eﬀect
(Redelmeier & Singh, 2001; Rablen & Oswald, 2008; Sylvestre et al., 2006;
Han et al., 2011).
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Chapter 11
Certain Outcomes vs. Lotteries
for Incentive Design
11.1 Summary
Numerous experiments in th behavioral and social sciences, both in the lab
and in the ﬁeld, incentivize participation by oﬀering monetary rewards. Here
I use insights from behavioral economics about risk aversion and probability
weighting to make recommendations for the optimal design of such incentive
schemes. I show that, for individual participants and given a ﬁxed budget,
certain payments for participation are superior to coinﬂip lotteries. In con-
trast, across participants it can be advantageous to oﬀer lotteries in which
one participant receives a large reward for participation, and the remaining
participants receive nothing, compared to a scenario where each participant
gets a small fee.
11.2 Setup
This note asks how to optimally incentivize participation in a research study
with either certain payments or lotteries. Deﬁne a prospect as the utility
of a lottery, where a lottery is a discrete distribtion of probabilities over a
number of outcomes. In evaluating prospects, people take into account both
the amounts and the probablilities involved; to the best of current knowledge,
the value of a two-outcome prospect with outcomes x and y can be described
by this function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Prelec, 1998):
V = pi (p) v (x) + (1− pi (p)) v (y)
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where |x| > |y|, v (·) is the utility of an outcome, and pi (p) is the subjec-
tive probability of that outcome as a function of its true probability p.
An alternative way of writing this value is
V = v (y) + pi (p) (v (x)− v (y)) .
For a certain payment, this reduces to
V = v (y) .
The commonly used functions to model how people actually evaluate prospects
are as follows:
v (x) = xσ
pi (p) =
1
exp
((
ln 1
p
)α) .
The parameter σ reﬂects risk aversion (as captured by the concavity of
the value function), and the parameter α reﬂects non-linear (s-shaped) prob-
ability weighting.
11.3 Example
Let's work through an example: is it better to oﬀer people a certain payment
of PKR 100, or a lottery where they get $200 with p = 0.5, or $0 with
p = 0.5?
For the lottery to be superior to the certain outcome, the following needs
to be true:
v (100) < v (0) + pi (0.5) (v (200)− v (0))
Now substitute the functional forms:
100σ < 0σ +
1
exp
((
ln 1
0.5
)α) (200σ − 0σ) .
To make a priori judgments about whether to oﬀer people the lottery or
the certain outcome, we need estimates for the parameters α and σ. The best
estimates from developing countries that I'm aware of are cited in Tanaka
et al. (2010): they estimate σ at 0.59, 0.63, and 0.48 in southern Vietnam,
northern Vietnam, and rural China, respectively (the China data come from
Elaine Liu), and α at 0.74, 0.74, and 0.69, respectively. Let's take the average
of these and use
σ = 0.57
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α = 0.72.
Then we obtain:
100.57 < 0.57 +
1
exp
(
(ln 2)0.72
) (2000.57 − 00.57)
13.80 < 0 + 0.46 (20.49− 0)
13.80 < 9.51
This condition is not fulﬁlled; thus the certain outcome in this case would
be considered superior to the lottery.
11.4 Extensions
11.4.1 A decision rule for coinﬂip lotteries
Let's say we want to decide whether to incentivize people with a certain
outcome or a two-outcome lottery, we have a ﬁxed total budget B for each
participant, and for the sake of simplicity we want to use a coinﬂip lottery,
i.e. p = 0.5. We are free to decide the two possible outcomes of the lottery,
x and y. Because the expected cost of the lottery must equal the budget, the
budget constraint is:
px+ (1− p) y = B
Since we are dealing with a coinﬂip lottery, this simpliﬁes to:
x+ y = 2B.
The value of the lottery is therefore:
V = pi (0.5) v (x) + pi (0.5) v (2B − x)
= pi (0.5)xσ + pi (0.5) (2B − x)σ .
Maximizing this expression with respect to x yields:
∂V
∂x
= pi (0.5)σxσ−1 − pi (0.5)σ (2B − x)σ−1
x = B.
In other words, the value of a coinﬂip lottery is always lower than the value
of the safe outcome with the same expected cost to the experimenter, up to
the point where the two outcomes of the lottery are identical and equal to
B; in this case the lottery is just as valuable as the safe outcome. Together,
this means that coinﬂip lotteries are never superior to safe outcomes when
incentivizing indvidual participants.
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11.4.2 A decision rule for paying each participant a ﬁxed
participation fee vs. entering them in a draw
Now let's assume we have a ﬁxed budget B which we can either divide up
among all N participants, so that each participant gets B
N
, or we can play
a lottery in which one person gets B while all others get 0. The lottery is
superior to the ﬁxed payment if(
B
N
)σ
<
1
exp ((lnN)α)
Bσ.
(Note that the probability of each individual participant to get the prize
in the lottery is p = 1
N
, and therefore 1
p
= N in the denominator.)
This simpliﬁes to:
1
Nσ
<
1
exp ((lnN)α)
exp ((lnN)α) < Nσ
(lnN)α < σ lnN
1
σ
< (lnN)1−α
1
σ
1
1−α
< lnN
N > exp
(
1
σ
1
1−α
)
≈ 1711.60.
This means that up to a sample size of 1711, it is preferable to pay each
participant an individual participation fee; starting from a sample size of
1712, it is preferable to enter participants in a lottery.
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Chapter 12
The Problem with the Problem
with Free Will
12.1 The neuroscientist's problem with free will
Cognitive neuroscientists have a problem with free will. In the folk sense of
purely mental and not physical causation, we have come to agree that free
will either does not make sense or does not exist. The reason we think we
know this is because we have come to understand that all behavior comes
from the brain. As an undergraduate, I regarded this as the single most
important insight that neuroscience had ever come to: all behavior comes
from the brain. It can adapt to environmental stimulation of course, and
it is modulated by genes, random ﬂuctuations of background neural activ-
ity and hormone levels, and its own history, in the sense that learning and
experience can change synaptic weights and thus cognition and behavior.
But nevertheless: all of these processes follow the laws of physics, and the
brain is a deterministic system. Therefore there is little room in this picture
for a non-physical entity which is causally responsible for how we think and
act. The brain itself is plenty, thank you very much, we don't need souls to
explain behavior.
This argument against free will is encountered in two incarnations: it is
either formulated as a logical insight, to the eﬀect that the concept of free
will does not make sense; or it is presented as based on evidence. In the ﬁrst,
does-not-make-sense sense, the neuroscientiﬁc argument against free will is
not based on experimental results; it is a premise, a point of departure for our
experiments. It is therefore somewhat less interesting, and I will deal with
it further down. The more interesting incarnation of the neuroscientist's
argument against free will is the version which suggests that this insight is
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based on experimental results. It is more interesting because it bites itself
in the tail such that if it is true, then the same experimental results which
prove the non-existence of free will also prove, ipso facto, that they themselves
cannot be trusted. But let's take one step at a time.
On the surface, this evidence-based argument against free will is ex-
tremely compelling  in fact, it is more compelling than any other insight
from cognitive neuroscience. The reason for this is that almost any result
ever obtained in this ﬁeld can be marshaled in support of the argument.
Think about it: the point of cognitive neuroscience is to study the link be-
tween brain and behavior; and every study that ﬁnds another small link of
this nature  some area lighting up in response to a reward, a jerk of the
knee during transcranial magnetic stimulation, a change in impulsivity af-
ter hormone treatment  becomes yet another bullet in the arsenal of the
neuroscientist who thinks that mental causation is just a load of romantic
nonsense; and another blow to the romanticist's hope that maybe someday
we'll ﬁnd evidence of a behavior that doesn't have its basis in the brain.
What's more is that over the last few decades, the romanticist's hope
should have been reduced considerably by the quality and sheer number of
studies demonstrating physical causation of even complex cognitive processes.
Using lesions and brain stimulation, these studies show that the behavioral
consequences of altering brain activity are as pervasive as the supporting
data are persuasive, ranging from perception to addiction, moral judgment,
and economic decision-making. As early as the 1950s, Wilder Penﬁeld showed
that stimulating a patient's temporal lobe with electrical currents could evoke
vivid memories (Penﬁeld, 1952). In the 1990s, Bill Newsome and his col-
leagues conducted a series of groundbreaking studies in which they showed
that electrical stimulation of area MT in the brain of macaque monkeys could
bias the animals' perception of motion in a particular direction (Salzmann
et al., 1990). More recently, an Iranian team around Arash Afraz, Roozbeh
Kiani, and Hossein Esteky found that stimulating cells in the inferotemporal
cortex of monkeys that encode faces could inﬂuence the monkeys' perception
of noisy stimuli such that they became more likely to judge them to be faces
(Afraz et al., 2006). In 2007, Naqvi and colleagues showed that smokers
with lesions of the insula frequently lost their addiction to smoking, without
relapse. The same year, Koenigs, Young et al. found that lesions of the
prefrontal cortex caused humans to make more utilitarian moral judgments,
e.g. judging it more permissible to sacriﬁce one human life to save several
others. Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), Daria Knoch and
her colleagues have shown that disrupting neural activity in dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex diminishes subjects' ability to reject unfair oﬀers and build
a good reputation in economic exchange games (Knoch et al., 2006, 2009)
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and make future-oriented choices (Figner et al., 2010). These are but a few
examples; what they have in common is that they demonstrate an intimate
link between neural activity and behavior, in particular, that neural activity
is suﬃcient to produce even complex behaviors.
But the evidence-based argument against free will gets even stronger. A
small group of neuroscientiﬁc experiments now deal head-on with the ques-
tion of whether even conscious volition  i.e., free will itself  has a neural
basis. In 1983, Benjamin Libet conducted what is probably the most famous
of these experiments: he and his team asked subjects to move one of their
ﬁngers at will, whenever they felt like it. In addition, they recorded when
each choice to move was made: in front of the subjects was a clock face with
a rapidly rotating hand, and subjects were asked to remember the location
of the hand at the instant in which they made the decision to move. This al-
lowed Libet and his team to compare the timing of the decision to move with
electrical activity in the subjects' brains measured with electroencephalogra-
phy (EEG). Libet and his team found that the neural activity that initiated
the movement in the brain, the readiness potential, commenced several
hundred milliseconds before the choice to move broke into subjects' aware-
ness (Libet et al., 1983). Thus, the free will decision to move appeared to
be not a cause of the eventual movement, but a consequence or an epiphe-
nomenon, leaving little room for mental causation. A potential problem with
this result is the fact that subjects' perception of the clock face might be bi-
ased  if there was some lag between their consciously experienced decision
to move and the time it took them to judge the position of the rotating
hand on the clock face, then the report of the decision to move could be de-
layed and therefore the decision itself might actually have coincided with, or
preceded, the readiness potential. (mention Haggard here) However, a more
recent study produced evidence for the original interpretation of Libet's ﬁnd-
ing. A team from Berlin told subjects to freely decide to move a ﬁnger on
either their left or their right hand, at the time of their choosing (Soon et
al., 2008). While subjects made these decisions, their brains were scanned
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The researchers then
used sophisticated algorithms called support vector machines (SVMs) to at-
tempt to predict, purely based on neural activity, whether the subject would
move their left or their right ﬁnger. The stunning ﬁnding of this study was
that neural activity could not only correctly predict which ﬁnger the subject
would move, but it could do so as early as ten seconds before subjects re-
ported the conscious decision to move. Since the delay between the report
and the actual decision is likely to be much shorter than that, this ﬁnding
leaves little room for the alternative explanation of a lag in reporting the
conscious decision. Thus, our brain appears to contain information about an
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upcoming decision many seconds before we become consciously aware of it.
Together, these ﬁndings suggest not only that neural activity is suﬃcient
to produce voluntary action, but in addition, that conscious volition may
be an epiphenomon or a consequence, rather than a cause, of such neural
activity. For the romanticist interested in preserving the notion of mental
causation, this leaves little hope.
Thus, neuroscientists have a problem with free will in the sense of purely
mental causation, and they have solid scientiﬁc evidence on their side  any
study that ever showed a link between the brain and behavior, but in partic-
ular, studies that demonstrate that brain processes are suﬃcient to produce
complex behavior, and others which show that conscious volition not only has
a neural basis, but may be epiphenomenal to the neural processes governing
an action. In addition, this argument gels perfectly with everything else we
know about the brain  it has all the ingredients of a deterministic physical
system, and there is neither room nor need to introduce mental causation.
So, all behavior is determined, and neuroscientists are justiﬁed in having a
problem with free will.
12.2 The problem with this problem
However, there is a problem with this problem. It is this: the neuroscientiﬁc
experiments that lead us to think that free will in the sense of mental cau-
sation does not exist didn't conduct themselves. They were conducted by
people with brains  brains which, if we believe the neuroscientiﬁc evidence
and arguments, are just as deterministic and free of free will as all others.
This means that we (that is, the conscious selves which like to dissociate
themselves from the brain in an implicit form of dualism) have no choice in
the experiments we conduct  they are the products of deterministic physi-
cal processes in our brains, and therefore they are completely predetermined.
The hypotheses we come up with, the designs we choose, the analyses we per-
form, the interpretations we make, and the papers we write: our conscious
selves have no say in any of it, all of these things were going to happen the
way they did from the beginning of time.
I had said above that there was a second version of the neuroscientist's
argument against free will, an it does not make sense version. In this
does-not-make-sense sense, the non-existence of free will is an assumption of
cognitive neuroscience, rather than an insight gained in experiments. The
point of departure for cognitive neuroscience, this argument goes, already is
that behavior comes from the brain; this does not ﬁrst have to be proven
in experiments. And again, because the brain is a deterministic physical
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system, this leaves no room for free will. The problem with this view is that
it, too, becomes its own victim: if free will does not make sense, then this
argument does not make sense; whoever makes it had no choice in doing so,
it was predetermined from the beginning of time that she would.
This insight instantly casts serious doubt on the ﬁndings of any experi-
ment that has ever been done. For if the only laws that govern how these
experiments are done are physical ones, not mental ones, then we no longer
have much reason to think that our hypotheses are valid, our experimental de-
signs are useful, our analyses appropriate, and our interpretations reasonable.
Instead, our hypotheses, experimental designs, analyses, and interpretations
will be those which our brain processes lead us to think are valid, useful,
appropriate, and reasonable  we have no external criterion against which
to assess whether this judgment is correct. Most damagingly, we have no
reason to think that the results of these experiments will bring us closer to
the truth; instead, we will think that they do, but again we have no criterion
against which to assess whether this is so.
Wait, you say. Surely there are many criteria against which we can judge
scientiﬁc experiments? Isn't a hypothesis valid if it is falsiﬁable? Isn't a
design useful if it tests the hypothesis against a counterfactual? Most im-
portantly, haven't we gotten closer to the truth if the theories we construct
based on our experimental results make predictions that are accurate? And
at the end of it all, can't we at least rely on logic, which dictates which
conclusions are valid and which aren't?
If we accept the neuroscientiﬁc argument against free will, the answer
to all of these questions is No. All of the criteria for progress that the
philosophers of science have come up with over the centuries are, in the end,
also just the products of these people's brains. Someone had to formulate
them, others had to accept them. The fact that we adhere to some of them
shows not that they are reasonable, but that our brain processes make our
conscious selves believe that they are. The fact that not everyone agrees on
which ones to adhere to shows not that there are diﬀerent truths out there
(how could there be?), but that individual diﬀerences in our brains make us
disagree on which criteria are the right ones. Even logic is not a magic door
to the truth  it, too, was formulated by human brains and thus falls victim
to the same problem: logic may make perfect sense to us, but the fact that
it does says more about what our brains are wired to ﬁnd persuasive than
what is true.
Of course it may be the case that our brain processes are wired such that
they lead us to come up with experiments that actually do lead us closer
to the truth. While this would be extremely unlikely to come about by
chance (given that there are billions of possible experiments, the probability
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of scientists conducting just the right ones is slim), one could imagine that
evolutionary pressure may have equipped us with brain processes that are
wired for truth-ﬁnding. (Cite philosophy evolution argument from Putnam
article Why reason cannot be naturalized). Note, however, that this argu-
ment rests on what we think we know about evolution by natural selection
 another scientiﬁc insight that was had by a human brain! (The fact that
it was Darwin's brain does not help much.) So we're back at square one.
In sum, the neuroscientist's problem with free will has a problem: it is
self-defeating, in that if the claim that we have no free will is true, then
that argument itself, and the evidence cited in its support, are ispo facto in
doubt. But it gets worse. At this point, the reader will have noticed that
the neuroscientiﬁc argument against free will refutes more than just itself:
it leads to fundamental skepticism about any knowledge at all. The essence
of the neuroscientist's argument is that we cannot trust our brains, and
this is just the Cartesian Evil Demon argument reincarnate (cite something
sensible here)  if we think our brains are deterministic, then we cannot know
anything about the world at all, and we are thrown back onto thinking that
we might be brains (or consciousnesses, rather) in vats. This epistemological
dead-end has vexed philosophers for centuries, and now neuroscientists have
found their own path into it, admittedly creative, but ending in the same
place nevertheless.
So, this is where we are: if we believe the neuroscientist's arguments
against free will, then we have to become fundamental skeptics about every-
thing, including neuroscience itself. And thus we no longer have any reason
to believe free will does or does not exist. Nor do we have reason to believe
in anything else. Including this article.
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